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EXHIBITS LIST

Reporter's Transcripts taken August 21, and 22, 2012 will be lodged with the Supreme Court.

Joint Exhibits:
1.

Roy Green Safety Video

2.

Dr. John R Katovich, 7/3/06

3.

Dr. Michael Ludwig, 7/7/06 to 7/27/06

4.

Dr. Clyde A. Hanson, 7/30/06

5.

Surveillance Video, 7/29/06 and 7/30/06

6.

Dr. Michael Ludwig, 8/7/06 to 10/4/06

7.

Dr. J. Craig Stevens, 9/11/06 IME

8.

Dr. Brian L Norce, 9/11/06

9.

Dr. Bret A. Dirks, 9/18/06 to 11/10/06

10.

Deposition of Roy Green, 1/5/07

IL

Deposition of Dr. Michael Ludwig, 1/5/07

12.

Dr. Bret A Dirks, 1/30/07 to 9/12/07

13.

Surveillance Video, 9/11/07 and 9/12/07

14.

Dr. Bret A. Dirks, 9/13/07 to 1/9/08

15.

Dr. Bruce Woodall, 1/31/07 to 2/2/08

16.

Dr. Scott Magnuson, 10/1/07

17.

Dr. Don Williams, 1/31/08 to 3/13/08
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18.

Inland Medical Evaluations

19.

Dr. Don Williams, 3/20/08 to 6/29/12

20.

Dr. Bret A. Dirks, 3/25/08 to 8/7/08

21.

Dr. William F. Ganz, 10/1/08

22.

Dr. Bret A. Dirks, 10/16/08 to 9/7/09

23.

Dr. Jolm McNulty, 9/8/98 IME

24.

Deposition of Roy Green, 2/20/09

25.

Dr. Tim Relmberg, PhD., 4/13/10 to 4/26/10

26.

Kootenai Medical Center Radiology, 10/22/10

27.

Dr. Ken Young, 5/9/11

28.

Deposition of Dr. Don Williams, 9/17/12

29.

Deposition of Dr. Bret A. Dirks, 9/18/12

30.

Prescription Bills Information

31.

Correspondence, 1/26/07 to 6/10/19

32.

Temporary Total Disability Information

33.

Surety File Information

34.

Dr. Jolm McNulty, 1/10/08 to 11/18/09

35.

Inland Medical Evaluations (See Exhibit #18)

36.

AMA Guide to Permanent Impairment - Shoulder

37.

AMA Guide to Permanent Impairment-Thoracic

38.

AMA Guide to Permanent Impairment - Lumbar

39.

ICRD Notes
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40.

Pictures

41.

Earnings History

42.

Income Tax Returns

43.

St. Joe Salvage Logging Expenses

44.

Inland Medical Evaluations

45.

Dr. Don Williams

46.

Mark Bengston, MPT, Pinnacle Physical Therapy FCE

47.

Dan W. Brownell

48.

St. Maries Job Listings

49.

Nance Collins Ph.D.

50.

Deposition of Nancy Collins, PhD.

51.

Dan W. Brownell Testimony at Hearing

52.

Nancy Collins, Ph.D. Testimony at Hearing

53.

Handicap Hunting Permits

54.

Deposition of Dr. Don Williams (Same as 28)

55.

Deposition of Dr. Bret A. Dirks (Same as 29)

56.

Deposition of Carrie Nordin - Stimson Lumber

57.

Social Security Disability File

58.

St. Joe Valley Clinic - St. Maries Family Medicine, 2/20/84 to 6/17/03

59.

Dr. Ernest C. Fokes, 11/16/87

60.

Dr. M. Westbrook, 12/29/87 to 3/31/88

61.

Dr. James P. Wilhelm, 2/13/88
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Dr. Powell

Dr. Clark, 2/29/88

62.

Omac IME Panel

63.

Dr. Ronald Cocchiarella, 3/2/88

64.

Dr. Thomas Beaton, 5/6/88

65.

Kootenai Medical Center FCA, 5/18/88 & 5/19/88

66.

Dr. George V. Gould, 7/15/88 & 9/15/88

67.

Dr. Don M. Hopwood, 8/5/88 & 8/26/88

68.

Dr. Stephen Atkinson, 3/26/93 to 5/24/93

69.

Dr. John C. Stackow, 9/17/00 to 5/9/03

70.

Dr. John McNulty, 3/14/02

71.

Dr. David Hills, 5/10/02

72.

Dr. Phillip Chapman, 1/9/03

73.

Dr. Michael Weiss, 3/31/03

74.

Dr. Giovanni Fizzotti, 4/15/03

75.

Dr. Michel E. Coats, 12/18/02 to 11/1/04

76.

Deposition of Dr. Bret A. Dirks, 12/23/04

77.

Inland Imaging, 11/10/04

78.

Dr. William F. Ganz, 1/14/03 to 3/22/04

79.

Dr. Bret A. Dirks, 1/31/03 to 2/15/05 and 3/24/11 to 5/17/12

80.

Benewah Community Hospital, 11/15/02 to 9/23/05 and 12/10/07 to 10/27/11

81.

Dr. R. Clinton Horan, 10/18/07

82.

Dr. Bruce Woodall, 10/8/10 to 7/19/11

83.

Dr. James Lea, EMA Study, 3/12/12
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84.

Idaho Department of Fish & Game Information

85.

Prior Surety File DOI: 2/13/90

86.

Prior Surety File DOI: 8/24/00

87.

ICRD Notes 1988

88.

Industrial Commission Form 1 Reports

89.

Prior LSSA

90.

Discovery Responses

91.

Industrial Commission Legal File (If Judicially Noticed)

Depositions not listed as exhibits:
1.

Stephen Sears, M.D., taken 8/21/14

Additional Documents:
1.

Claimant Roy Green's Opening Brief, filed December 10, 2012

2.

Defendant Employer/Surety's Responsive Brief, filed January 17, 2013

3.

Defendant ISIF Post-Hearing Brief, filed January 14, 2013

4.

Defendant Employer/Surety's Notice of Withdrawal of Specific Argument and Correction to
Responsive Brief

5.

Claimant Roy Green's Reply Brief, filed March 20, 2013

6.

Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief Re: Thoracic Impairment, filed October 20, 2014

7.

ISIF Brief on Retained Jurisdiction, filed November 10, 2014

8.

Response to ISIF's Brief on Retained Jurisdiction, filed November 17, 2014
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WvRKER1S COMPENSATION COI\1PLA1NT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION NO:
Claimant's Attorney:
STARRKELSO
Attorney at Law
PO Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1312

Claimant:
ROY GREEN
110 Highwood Drive
St. Maries, ID 83861

Telephone Number: (208) 245-3010
Worker's Compensation Insurance Carrier's
(Not Adjustor's) Name And Address:

Employer's Name And Address (at time of injury):
ST. JOE SALVAGE
c/o Roy Green
110 Highwood Drive
St. Maries, ID 83861

TRAVELERS
P.O. Box 7427
Boise, ID 83707-1427

' ,)
!.j

CLAIMANT'S

DATE OF INJURY OR MANIFESTATION OF,·1OCCUPATIONAL
\)
DISEASE: 7-03-06

CLAIMANT'S

·.
.. ,

i·)

•

STATE AND COUNTY IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRED:
Benewah, Idaho

-,,,
WHEN INJURED, CLAIMANT WASEARN~G AN AVERAGE
WEEKLY WAGE OF: $1,000 per day, PURSUANT TO §72-419,
IDAHO CODE

DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE OCCURRED (WHAT HAPPENED): Struck on the head by a tree.
NATURE OF MEDICAL PROBLEMS ALLEGED AS A RESULT OF ACCIDENT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE: Neck, back, and
atrophied muscles as a result of denial of claim.

WHAT WORKERS' COMPENSATION BENEFITS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THIS TIME: Medical; TTD's; Attorney fees and punitive
costs.

DATE ON WHICH NOTICE OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO
EMPLOYER: 7-03-06
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVEN:

ORAL

TO WHOM YOU GAVE NOTICE: Self and then ALE

WRITTEN X - OTHER, PLEASE SPECIFY - -

ISSUE OR ISSUES INVOLVED:
Medical
Causation
TTD's
Attorney fees and punitive costs.
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OFFACTS? IF YES, PLEASE
STATE WHY:

No.

NOTICE: COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND MUST BE FILED IN ACCORDANCE WITH IDAHO CODE §72-334 AND FILED ON FORM J.C.
1002

PHYSICIANS WHO TREATED CLAIMANT

Dr. Ludwig
Coeur d'Alene

Dr. Bret A. Dirks
Coeur d'Alene

AND ADDRESS)

Benewah Community Hospital
St. Maries

Brian L. Norce, D.C.
Appleway Chiropractic

Dr.Horan
Coeur d'Alene

Dr. Katovich
Benewah t:mnmunity
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU INCURRED TO DA TE?
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY?
WHAT MEDICAL COSTS HAVE YOU PAID, IF ANY?

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE. o YES
DATE:

B

NO

SIGNATURE OF CLAIMANT OR ATTORNEY:

PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS IMMEDIATELY BELOW
ONLY IF CLAIM IS MADE FOR DEATH BENEFITS
NAME AND SOCIAL SECURITY NUl'vIDER
OF PARTY FILING COMPLAINT?

DA TE OF DEATH:

RELATION OF DECEASED TO CLAIMANT:

WAS CLAIMANT DEPENDENT ON DECEASED:

DID CLAIMANT LIVE WITH DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT:

DYES

DYES

ONO

ONO

CLAIMANT MUST COMPLETE, SIGN AND DATE THE ATTACHED MEDICAL RELEASE FORM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on th~7 day
Complaint upon:
EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS
ST. JOE SALVAGE
c/o Roy Green
110 Highwood Dr.
St. Maries, ID 83861

via:

D personal service of process
~ular U.S. Mail

SURETY'S NAME AND ADDRESS
TRAVELERS
PO Box 7427
Boise, ID 83707-1427

via:

D personal service of process

llieg(ifar U.S. Mail

DI HAVE NOT SERVED A COPY OF THE COMPLAINT ON-ANYONE

~vtlfdv-···
Signature

NOTICE: An Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer on Form LC. 1003 with the
Industrial Commission within 21 days of the date of service as specified on the certificate of mailing to avoid default. If no
answer is filed, a Default Award may be entered!

Further information may be obtained :from; Industrial Commission, Judicial Division, PO Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 837200041 (208) 334-6000

RELEASE FORM ON PAGE

1Cl 003 (Rev. i/01 /2004)

Send Original To: Industrial Commission, Judicial D1",1nn, 117 Main Street, PO BOX 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-,,v-+ I

NO.

06-007698

ANSWER TO COMPLAINT
INJURY DATE:

_______

07/03/2006

;;..;;..;...;;..;;..;..;.;.;..,;;....;;..;;.

X The above-named employer or employer/surety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating:
The Industrial Special Indenmity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating:
CLAIMANT'S NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

ROY GREEN
110 HIGHWOOD DRIVE
ST. MARIES, JD 83861

STARR KELSO, ESQ.
PO BOX 1312
COEUR D'ALENE, JD 83816-1312

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

WORKERS' COMPENSA TJON INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT
ADJUSTOR'S) NAME AND ADDRESS

ST. JOE SALVAGE
110 HIGHWOOD DRIVE
PO BOX 309
ST. MARJES, lD 83861

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY
ST. PAUL TRAVELERS
PO BOX7427
BOISE, JD 83707

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING EMPLOYER/SURETY (NAME AND
ADDRESS)

ATTORNEY REPRESENTING INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND
(NAME AND ADDRESS)

ERIC S BAILEY (!SB #4408)
BOWEN & BAJLEY, LLP.
350 NORTH NINTH STREET, STE. 200
BOISE, IDAHO 83702

·-

-

IT [S: (Check one)
Admitted

Denied
on or about the time

1. ·n1at the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually
claimed.

X

a

2. 1l1at the employer/employee relationship existed.

X
3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act.
X

4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly

X

entirely
NIA

NIA

'.J by an accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment.

5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of the
employment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, arc characteristic or and peculiar to the trade,
occupation, process, or employment.
6. That the notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the
employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the manifestation of such
occupational disease.

X

X
X

F/J

7. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho Code,
Section 72-419: $ under investioation.
8. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self-insured under the Idaho Workers' Compensation Act

(COMPLETE OTHER SIDE)

Answer-Par

(Continued from front)

I 0,

State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses,
(1)

WHETHER THE CONDITION FOR WHICH CLAIMANT SEEKS BENEFJTS IS RELATED TO A JULY 3, 2006, INDUSTRIAL
ACCIDENT;

(2)

WHETHER CLAIMANT'S COND!TJON IS THE RESULT OF PREEXISTING COND!TIONS AND/OR EVENTS;

(3)

THE APPROPRIATENESS OF IDAHO CODE§ 72-406 DEDUCTIONS;

(4)

CLAIMANT'S ENTITLEMENT TO ADDITIONAL INCOME AND MEDICAL BENEFJTS;

(5)

WHETHER CLAIMANT IS ENTlTLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES; AND

(6)

DEFENDANTS ASSERT THERE EXISTS NO PROVISION UNDER TlTLE 72 OF THE IDAHO CODE FOR PUNJTIVE
DAMAGES/COSTS,

Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint A copy of your Answer must be mailed
to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular U,S, mail or by personal service of process, Unless you deny liability, you should
pay immediately the compensation required by law, and not cause the claimant, as well as yourselt~ the expense of a hearing, All compensation which is concededly due
and aecrued should be paid, Payments due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed, Rule Ill(D), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the
Idaho Workers' Compensation Law, applies, Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form LC 1002,
I AM INTERESTED IN MEDIATING THIS CLAIM, IF THE OTHER PARTIES AGREE,

YES

NO X

DEFENDANTS WILL NOTIFY THE COMMISSION IF AND WHEN MEDIATION IS APPROPRIATE
DO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF LAW OR A COMPLICATED SET OF FACTS? IF SO, PLEASE STATE

NO,

Amount of Com ensation aid to date

PPD
U N D E R

Dated

TTD

Medical

INVESTIG

AT[ON

Signature of Defendant or Attorney

PLEASE COMPLETE

I hereby certify that on the

_!_5_

t

CERTfFJCA TE OF SERVICE
of November, 2006, 1 caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon:

STARR KELSO, ESQ,
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX l312
COEUR D'ALENE, JD 83816-1312
FAX: (208) 664-6261

persona] service of process

via

f_. regular U,S, mail
l

facsimile

IDAHO 83720-0041
ORIGINAL TO: INDUSTRI AL COMMISS ION, JUDICIAL DIVISION, P.O. BOX !b720, BOISE,

WORKERS' COMPENSATION
COMPLA INT AGAINST THE
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND (ISIF)
IAL
INDUSTR
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

CLAIMANT 'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Roy Green
110 Highwood Drive
St. Maries, Idaho 83861

Starr Kelso
Attorney at Law
PO Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816

EMPLOYER 'S NAME AND ADDRESS

EMPLOYER'S ATTORNEY'S NAME AND ADDRESS

Roy Green dba St. Joes Salvage Logging
c/o 110 Highwood Drive
St. Maries, Idaho 83861

Eric S. Bailey
Bowen & Bailey, LLP
PO Box 1007
Boise, Idaho 83701

J.C. NUMBER OF CURRENT CLAIM

WORKERS' COMPENSATION INSURANCE CARRIER'S (NOT
ADJUSTERS) NAME AND ADDRESS

2006-07698

Travelers Indemnity Company
St. Paul Travelers
PO Box 7427
Boise, Idaho 83707

DATE OF INJURY

7/3/06

OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE:
NATURE AND CAUSE OF PHYSICAL IMPAffiMENT, PRE-EXISTING CURRENT INJURY

1 fusion; AC separation of
See medical records previously provided with the Notice of Intent to File Claim Against ISIF. T12/L
disc disease and spinal
right shoulder; bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome; pre-existing multi-level cervical and lumbar
de eneration.
STATE "'HY YOU BELIEVE THAT THE CLAIMA

Claimant asserts inabili to work due
, 2008.
DA TE: November

IS

TALLY AND PERMANENTLY DISABLED:

ination of medical factors.

CERTIFICATE OF SE
-'-"'\,

copy o(tfie foregoing Complaint
I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of November, 2008, I caused to be erved a true and correcl
upon:
via:

D

persona[ ser:v'ice of process
reg4lar~l,J.S. 'Mail

Roy Green
c/o Starr Kelso
PO Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816

via:

D

per~al se%'.i.l;:e of process
reguf§r U.S. 1Mail

Employer's Name

Roy Green dba St. Joe Salvage Logging
c/o 110 Highwood Drive
St. Maries, Idaho 83861

via:

personal service of process
regular U.S. Mail

Surety's Name

Travelers Indemnity Company
St. Paul Travelers
PO Box7427
Boise, Idaho 83707

via:

personal service of process
regular U.S. Mail

Manager, ISIF
Dept. of Administration

PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-7901

Claimant's Name

D I have not served a copy of the Complaint upon anyone.

You must attach a copy of Form IC 1001 Workers' Compensation Complaint, to this document.
An Answer must be filed on Form IC 1003 within 21 days of service in order to avoid default.

ICI002 (REV. 3/01/2008)

COMPLAINT AGAINST ISIF

Appendix 2
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FAX NO,.

P. 01

WuRKER'S COMPENSATION COMPLAINT
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION NO·
Clalmllnt:

Claimant's Attorney:
STARR KELSO
Attorney at Lnw
· PO Bolt 1312
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1312

ROYGRERN
I l OJlighwood Drive
SL Marles,JD 83861
Telcuhone Number: (208) 245-30 I 0

Employer's Nnme And AddreiiS (at time of injury):

Worker's C(1mpc11sation Insurance Carrier's
(Not Adj1t..qfor's) Name And Adtlress:

ST. JOE SALVAGE
c/o ltoy Green

TRAVELERS
P.O. Box 7427
Boise, JO 83707-1427

110 Highwood Driv~
St. Maries, ID 8386 t
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CLAIMAN'l"S 8S#:
SJ 9-88-0707

(

CLAIMANT'S UlRTHDATE:

'

''J
' - !

1,.,1

, ..,

DATE OF INJlJltY OR MANIFESTA'f10N OF OCCUPA'J'!ONAL
DISEASE: 7-03~06
::'.~'
U

7ff23wS9

(,.fJ
\./ ~

i·,)

WHEN INJURED, cr.AIMANT WA$ ,BARNlij'G AN AVERAGE
WEEKLY WAGE OP: $1,000 per clay, PURSUANT TO §72-419,

ST/\TR AND COlJN'l'Y IN WHICH INJURY OCCURRRD:
8em,wnh, rduho

IDAHOCOf>R

DRSCRIB~ HOW lNJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL IJISEASE OCCURR[m (WHAT HAPPENED): Struck ou the hend by ll tree.

NA'rURE OF MHDICAL PROFIT.EMS ALLEGED AS A RBS ULT OF ACClORNT OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE: Neck, back, and
11trophied muscle$ ns a result of denial of claim.

WI lAT WORKERS' COMPENSATJON BBNIW1TS ARE YOU CLAIMING AT THTS TlME: Medicitl; TTD's; Attorney fees and punitive
cos!s.

DATE ON WHICI I NO'l ICc OF INJURY WAS GIVEN TO
EMPLOYER: 7-03"06
HOW NOTICE WAS GIVJJN:

ORAL __x__

TO WHOM YOU GAVF- NOTICE: Self and then Al ,l~

WR!TTEN _x__-

OTHER, PL.RASE SPECffY _ _

lSSlJE OR lSSUES INVOLVED:
Mcdicnl
Cnusathm

'fTJ)'s
Al1orney feci; nod pm1iti-v~ roots.

PO YOU BELIEVE THIS CLAIM PRESENTS A NEW QUESTION OF I .AW Oil A COMPLTC,\TRT> SET OF FACTS? IF YES. PLEASE

STATE WHY:
No.

fi

1cr., COMl'I ,AIN'l'S AGAINS.1' TIIF. INJ>U51'RrAl, S!'l.:l'IAL INOF.MNITV FUN!) ll'IIJl>T J!I( VIJ,Ji)) IN AC( Onl)AN(:1> WlTII l!lA!lO COOE §7:!-,;;)4 ,\NI) JIii ,m ON JIOR~f Y.C.

SEP-19-2008 FRI 03:16 PM
"·

PHYS ICf ANS WHO TREATW CLAIMANT('

-

I"""

'IE AND ADDRESS)

:Or. Ludwig
Coeur d'Alene

Pr. Brill A, Dirks
Coeur d'.Alellt

P. 02

FAX NO,

Drilin L. Norce, 0.C.

Dr.Horan
Coinir d'Alene

Benew11h Com1111.1plty Hos11ihil
St. M~tks

Applcw!ky Chiropractic

Dr,Kutovkh
Benewah C'om1111111it.y lfo9pihll

WflAT Ml<f)lCAL COSTSHAVBYOU INGIJRREIJTO DATE?
WITAT MEDICAL COSTS llAS YOUR EMPLOYER PAID, IF ANY?
WlfAT MEDICAL COSTS HA.VE YOU PATD, IF ANY?

Unknown
Unknown
Unknown

I AM tN·n:Rt:STlm JN MEDJATJNG 'l'lUS CLAIM. H<' TH!il OTHER PARTIES AGllEE. Cl YHS eNO

PATrl;

I SJGNATURB OF CLAIMANT OR ATTORNEY:

JI}- Z7-·{)/;

;;1nAA/{,{lffr

PLEASE ANSWER THE SET OF QUESTIONS TMMEDJATELY BELOW
ONLY ll<' CLAIM JS MADE FOR DF!ATH BENEFITS
DATE OF DEATl-:I:

NAMR AND S0C1AL Sl:lCURt'l'Y NUMOER
or PARTY FILING COMPLAINr?

RELATION OF Dl~CII1Ump TO CLAIMANT:

WAS CLAIMANT DEPENDENT ON DECEASED:

I)Jf) CLAIMANT LlVB WITH

oYns

l'.:!YES

ONO

DECEASED AT TIME OF ACCIDENT:

tJNO

CLAIM_6.NT MUST COMPLF,TI<::, SIGN AND DATE THE A'l''rACHED MEDICAL RELEA,ST•"! FORM·

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on th(}'i.{7 day of
Complainl upon:

6c-Mf/.e.,1-

EMPLOYER'S NAME AND ADDRESS

, 20Q/f...., Tcaused to be served a true and co11·ect copy of the foregoing
SURETY1S NAME AND ADDRESS

S'l'.J0.1£SALVAGE

TRAVELERS

c/o Roy Green

P0Box7427

110 Highwood Dr.

Boise, ID 83707-1427

St. Maries, ID 83861

via:

D personal sci-vice of process
[1.1-rcgi:,Iar U.S. Mail

via!

D personal service of process
~i:U.S.Mail

DI HAVE NOT SERVED A COPY OF nm COMPLAINT O.N~ANYONE
11./J ~-··

4plaA.A,Mt{-},,. ___,~. - Signatnrc

NOTICE: An .Employer or Insurance Company served with a Complaint must file an Answer Orl Fonn l .C. 1003 with the
Indu$lrinl Commission within 21 clays of the date of service as specified on the certificate ofma.illng to avoid default. if no
a11swer is flied, a Default Award may be entered!
Further informntion may be obtained from: lndustrial Commission, Judicinl Division, PO Box 83720, Boise, Tdaho 837200041 (20&) 334-6000
(COMPLETE MEDICAL Rh'LEASE FORM ON PA GE."?)

:;,end Orig}nal to: Industrial Commission, Judici

06 07698

I.C.

ision, 317 Main Street, Boise, Idaho 83720-600

ANS\VE R TO COMPLAINT
INJURY DATE: 07/03/2006

Claimant's Name and Address:
ROY GREEN
110 HIGHWOO D DR
ST. MARIES, ID 83861

Claimant's Attorney's Name and Address:
STARR KELSO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
POBOX131 2
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816

Employer's Name and Address:
ROY GREEN DBA ST. JOBS SALVAGE LOGGING
% 110 HIGHWOOD DR.
ST. MARIES, ID 83861

Worker's Compensatio n Insurance Carrier's (Not Adjuster's)
Name and Address:
TRAVELERS INDEMNIT Y COMPANY
ST. PA UL TRAVELERS
POBOX742 7
BOISE, ID 83707

,nti,1g
Attorney
Address)
ERIC S. BAILEY
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP
POBOX100 7
BOISE, JD 83701

or E.mployer/Surety (Name !:l.nd

Attome)' R_epr~senting Tndus!rial Special Indcnn1ity Fund (Name
and Address)
THOMAS W. CALLERY
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY
POBOX854
LEWISTON JD 83501

The above-named employer or employer/sur ety responds to Claimant's Complaint by stating:
The Industrial Special Indemnity Fund responds to the Complaint against the ISIF by stating:

IT IS: (Check One)
DENIED
ADMITTED

X

1. That the accident or occupational exposure alleged in the Complaint actually occurred on or about the
time claimed.
,·?

X

2. That the employer/em ployee relationship existed.

X

3. That the parties were subject to the provisions of the Idaho Worker's Compensatio n Act.

X
NIA

UNKNOWN
TO ISIF

NIA
UNKNOWN
TO ISIF

X

4. That the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused partly
accident arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment

or entirely

byan

5. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, manifestation of such disease is or was due to the nature of
the empioyment in which the hazards of such disease actually exist, are characteristic of and peculiar io
the trade, occupation, process, or employment
6. That notice of the accident causing the injury, or notice of the occupational disease, was given to the
employer as soon as practical but not later than 60 days after such accident or 60 days of the
manifestation of such occupational disease.
7. That, if an occupational disease is alleged, notice of such was given to the employer within five
months after the employment had ceased in which it is claimed the disease was contracted.
8. That the rate of wages claimed is correct. If denied, state the average weekly wage pursuant to Idaho
Code, Section 72-419:
9. That the alleged employer was insured or permissibly self insured under the Idaho worker's
Compensatio n Act.

10. What Benefits, if any, do you concede are due Claimant?
NONE FROM ISIF

11. State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for denying liability, together with any affirmative defenses.
PLEASE SEE EXHIBIT A ATTACHED HERETO AND INCORPORATED HEREIN
BY REFERENCE AS THOUGH SET FORTH IN FULL

Under the Commission rules, you have twenty-one (21) days from the date of service of the Complaint to answer the Complaint. A copy
of your Answer must be mailed to the Commission and a copy must be served on all parties or their attorneys by regular U. S. mail or by
personal service of process. Unless you deny liability, you should pay immediately the compensation required by law, and not cause the
claimant, as well as yourself, the expense of hearing. All compensation which is concededly due and accrued should be paid. Payments
due should not be withheld because a Complaint has been filed. Rule 11 l(D), Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure under the Idaho
Worker's Compensation Law, appiies. Complaints against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund must be filed on Form l.C. l 002.
I am interested in mediating this claim, if the other parties agree.

No

Yes

Do you believe this Claim presents a new question oflaw or a complicated set of facts? If so, please state.

NO.

Amount of Com ensation Paid to Date
PPD

TTD

Medical

Dated

Signature of Defendant or Attorney

Please Complete
I hereby certify that on the-'-""-- day of November, 2008, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Answer upon:

Claimant's Name and Address:

Employer and Surety's
Name and Address

ROY GREEN
% STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

ERIC S. BAILEY
Bowen & Bailey
PO Box 1007
Boise, ID 83701

via: - - - Personal Service of Process
regular U. S. Mail

via:

Personal Service of Process
_X__ regular U. S. Mail

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
(If Applicable)

via:

Personal Service of Process
_ _ regular U. S. Mail

EXHIBIT 'A'
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES

1.

Industrial Special Indemnity Fund recently received the Workers' Compensation
Complaint against the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund and contemplates the initiation of
formal discovery. The Fund has limited medical records available and is unable at this time
to accurately either admit or deny portions of the Complaint and reserves the right to amend
this Answer as necessary and warranted by subsequent discovery.

2.

Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled.

3.

Claimant did not suffer from a known manifest, pre-existing, permanent physical
impainnent within the meaning ofidaho Code Section 72-332(2).

4.

Any permanent physical impairment suffered by the Claimant was not a hindrance or
obstacle to Claimant's employment or re-employment.

5.

If Claimant is totally disabled, it is not due to the aggravation and acceleration of a preexisting condition nor due to the combined affects of pre and post injury conditions.

6.

Claimant incurred no physical impairment from the alleged accident which gives rise to this
action.

7.

Claimant's disability, if any, is due to the natural progression of an underlying degenerative
process and was not aggravated or accelerated by a work injury, and Claimant would be so
disabled irrespective of the events of Claimant's employment.

3 of2
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816
Tel: 208-765-3260
Fax: 208-664-6261

Attorney for Mr. Green

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ROYOREEN
Claimant;
vs.
ROY GREEN DBA ST. JOE
SALVAGE LOGGING,
Employer,

: Case No. LC. 06-07698

CLAIMANT'S MOTION
FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST
THE ISIP PURSUANT TO
ICJRP&P RULE 16

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety, and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants
COMES NOW Claimant by and through his attorney of record and pursuant to ICJRP&P
Rule 16 moves the Industrial Commission for it's Order entering sanctions against the Defendant
State of Idaho, fudustrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF).

The basis of this motion is as follows:
1. Claimant, in good faith~ entered into settlement negotiations with the ISIF and accepted
the ofter of the ISIP to settle this matter as pertains to ISIP exposure;
2. Clajmant, as a result of accepting the ISIF's offer of settlement, sought and obtained a

the vacation of the hearing scheduled herein so that it could be determined before this
claim proceeded to hearing against the employer/surety whether the settlement

agreement would be approved by the Industrial Commission so that the potential of
two hearings would be avoided;

l

CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST TBE ISIF
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KELSO LAW OFFICE

@002/010

3. That as documented by the exhibits attached to the Affidavit of Starr Kelso filed
herewith
lSIF, with knowledge of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in
'"Wernecke'\ required that a Lump Sum Settlement Agreement,... ... ~.,,..,.,,, .. by its counsel
had to be used;
4. The ISIF's Lump Sum Settlement Agreement was used in its entirety and signed by the
Claimant in a good faith effort to resolve this matter against the ISIF.
5. The only change to the ISIF's Lump Sum Settlement Agreement authorized by the

ISIF was the insertion of language apportioning the lump sum offered to Claimant over
a 25 year life expectancy.
6. On May 17, 2011 Claimant's counsel received an e-mail from Kim Tagaki of the
Industrial Commission that stated that the Industrial Commission' s Commissioners had
declined to approve the submitted Lump Sum Settlement Agreement;
7. On May 17, 2011 Claimant's counsel e-mailed Kim Tagaki inquiring as to the reason
for the Industrial Commission' s Commissione rs' action;
8. On May 17, 2011 Kim Tagaki telephoned Claimant's counsel and informed him that
the submitted Lump Sum Settlement Agreement failed to come close to meeting the
"'Wernecke" requirements for an ISIF settlement;
9. That Claimant has been anxiously awaiting the decision of the Industrial Commission
on the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement submitted in an effort to stop a pending
foreclosure on his home;
10. "lllat Claimant's colli1se1 expended several hours of time working to craft an acceptable
Lump Sum Agreement but his efforts were rejected by the 1SIF which insisted on the
form that its counsel prepared be utilized for submission to the Industrial Commission;
11. That Claimant's counsel expended substantial time obtaining, preparing, and faxing
various medical records and rehabilitation reports to the Industrial Commission' s staff
at their request; and
12. The industrial Commission' s Commissioners, and the staff of the Industrial
Commission, expended valuable time reviewing the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement
required by the ISIF to be submitted, and then have to reject the same because of its
failure to comply with the ''Wernecke'' requirements.
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It is requested that the Industrial Commiss ion enter its order:
a.

A warding Claimant reasonab le attorney fees;

b. Awarding Claimant punitive costs/dam ages in a sum to
establishe d at hearing
upon testimony and evidence regarding the same by the Claimant ;
c. Requiring the ISIF to pay the Industrial Commiss ion a reasonabl e sum to
compensa te it for the lost time of the Commiss ioners and its staff in reviewing and
consideri ng the submitted Lump Sum Settlemen t Agreeme nt.

DATE ~s

~ day of May, 2011.

~··

Starr Kelso, Attorney for Claimant Mr. Green
CERTIFI CATE OF SERVICE : A copy was faxed to Eric Bailey attorney for employer /surety
208-344- 9670 and Thomas Callery attorney for lSIF 208-746- 9553 on the 41 day of May,
2011.

~~

Starr Kelso

3
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho
Tel: 208-765-3260
Fax; 208-664-6261

14] 004/010

KELSO LAW OFFICE

16

Attorney for Mr. Green
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
ROY GREEN
Claimant,
vs.
ROY GREEN OBA ST. JOE
SALVAGE LOGGING,
Employer,

: Case No. LC. 06-07698

AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO
ICJRP&P RULE 16

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety, and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants
STA TE OF IDAHO

)
ss.
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI )
STARR KELSO being first duly sworn upon oath hereby states as follows:

1. I am the attorney for the Claimant> Roy Green, over the age of 18 years, and make this
affidavit based upon personal knowledge to which I will testify to if required to by the
Industrial Commission;

2. I spent well in excess of three (3) hours negotiating with the Defendant State of Idaho,
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, (ISIF) counseling my client, and drafting proposed
changes to the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement provided to m.e for review by the
counsel for the ISIP;

I

AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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3. That my regular hourly rate billed to clients is $200.00 per .hour. That as a resu]t of the
Industrial Commission' s Commissione rs' action in decHning the submitted Lump Sum
Settlement Agreement I will have expended time in excess of three hours that would
have been compensated for under the contingency fee agreement with Claim.ant but
which now will not otherwise be compensated for because those efforts were strictly
directed towards the submitted Lump Sum Settlement Agreement and are of no use
towards proceeding with this matter to hearing;
4. Attached hereto as Exhibits A, B, and C, and D are the relevant contents of e-mails to
and .from the counsel for the ISIF and myself. They speak for themselves. At the time
of the preparation of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement by counsel for the ISIF the
requirements of the Idaho Supreme Court in Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School Dist.

No 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P. 3d 1008 (2009) were public record;
5. The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, with the ISIF'S knowledge of the Wernecke
decision, was the one required by the ISIF to be submitted to the Industrial
Commission;
6. Exhibit D documents the ISIF's withdrawal of the settlement offer, without even an
attempt to resolve the Wernecke requirements.
7. One of the significant reasons that the Claimant agreed to enter into the Lump Sum
Settlement Agreement required by the ISIF was that he was, and still is, facing a
foreclosure on his home in St. Maries, Idaho. The foreclosure is as a result of his being
unable to work, the termination of his temporary total disability benefits, and the
refusal, by either Defendant, to pay him permanent total disability benefits or djsability
in excess of impairment benefits despite clear and overvvhelming evidence that he has
suffered, if not total and permanent disability, very significant disability.
8. Claimant was going to utili7.e the money from the Lump Swn Settlement Agreement to
fund a payment plan for his home and/or to clear the title on another piece of property
that he owns so that he could move his personal belongings and family to this other
piece of property in the event that his home foreclosure proceeded to sale.

9. The foreclosure of the sale of Claimant's home was just last month stayed for about a
month in order to see if a loan modification could be reached. That decision is pending.
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10. Toe ISIPs requirem ent that its languag e be utilized in the Lump Stun Settleme nt
Agreem ent, the several month wait for review, and the Industri al Commis sion's
Commis sioners' declinin g to approve the Lump Sum Settlem ent Agreem ent submitte
d
has caused Claiman t significa nt and substant ial emotion al distress and econom ic loss
that should he should be compen sated for by an award of sanction s against the ISIF
by
the Industri al Comn1ission.

DATED this 20lll day of May, 2011.

Starr;j&k
SUBSC RIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersig ned Not:arv Public, this ~1fay
of
~
,,,,,rt,1111,,11,1.
-M ay, 2011 .
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CERTIF ICATE OF SERVIC E: A copy was faxed to Bric Bai1ey attorney for employe
r/surety
208-344 -9670 !Uld Thomas Callery attorney for ISIF 208-746 -9553 on the ~ day
of May,
2010.

fj__LJ_

Starr Kelso
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RE: Try this one
OFrom : Tom

December 22, 2010 4:57 PM

cauery

To: "star; kelso" <'m!rr.kelso@frontler.com>

.. We have cases like this rejec
by the Comm ission and
then we are left with a stipu latio n that is used again st
us at heari ng. Ever since the Werne ke decis ion we have
had the Comm ission exam our LSA with a fine tooth comb.
Frank ly there is a good chanc e this LSA will not be
appro ved.
I have been instr ucted to use the LSA I
prepa red.
Tom Calle ry

0 / 0/ 0

I

3 0

[ X

X

8

05/?0/2011
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KELSO LAW OFFICE

this one

December 21, 2010 11:10 AM

Tom Callery

To; "starr kelso" <starr.kelso@frontier.com>
CC! "James Klle" <James.Kile@adrn.idaho.gov>

Starr I have reviewed your revised LSA with the ISIF. We
are not in a position to modify the agreemen t as you have
requested as we must reserve our ability to defend the
case if the LSA is not approved .
Our version of the LSA
is what we are willing to do.
If you and your client can
sign our version we will submit to the Commissi on
otherwis e we will be unable to settle.
Tom Callery

0
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Frontier Mail
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RE: Green Lump Sum
From : Tom Callery <tcallery@lewlston.com>

Fri, Jan 21, 2011 09:42 AM

Subject ; RE: Green LuITJJ Sum
To: starr kelso <starr,kelso@fro ntler.com>

Cc: 'Jarres KIie' <Jarrns.l<lle@admidaho.gov>
Starr go ahead and add the 25 years llfe expectancy. Send back signed copies to ire. Tom ca11ery
-----Original Message---·From: starr.ke!so@frontler.com [rrailto:st:arr,kelso@frontler.com]
Sent! Thursday, January 20, 2011 10:09 PM
To: Torn car1ery
Subject: Green Lrnrp Sum

If'fllOrtance: High
Tom,
Please take a look at the m:x:lifk:ation of paragraph 13 bebw:
13. Clairmnt has requested that the $50, ooo luITJJ sum settlerrent be allocated to non-rredlc.al benefits, attorney fees, and costs
advanced with the aroount of said IUITJJ sum less the attorney fees and costs approved by the Cormission being lifetirrn benefits
for the Clallmnt to be a lu""' sum pciyment In full satisfactkm of the potential future Fund liabHlty for the payment of benefits to
Claimmt prorated into, and tepre1;,enting the total of, equal rmnthly payrrnnts over Clairrant+s life expectancy of 25 years.
However, the parties acknowledge and

Let m; know If you are in agreerrent. Roy wlll be here in the a.mon Friday.

Starr

webma i!. frontier .com/.. ./printmessage?...
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RE: Lum p Sum settl eme nt on Roy Gree n v .. ISIF DOI: 7-3- 06
Emp loye r: Roy Gree n dba St. Joe Salv age
From : Tom Callery <tcallery @lewlsto n.com>
Subjec t : RE: Lu,rp sum settlerre nt on Roy Green v. ISIF DOI: 7-3-06 Errploye
r: Roy Green dba st.
Joe satvage

Tue, May 17, 2011 03:SS PM

To : starr kelso <starr.ke !so@fron tier.com>
Cc : 'Verlene Wise' <Verlene . Wi.Se@adm.idaho.gov >, 'Jarres Kile' <Jarres.
l<ile@adm. idi:lho. gov>
Starr since the Lun-p has been rejected the lSlF has instructe d rre
to request calendar ing and proceed to hearing. The language we
used was based on my analysis of the case and the substant ial evidence
Green had no pre-exist ing restrlctb ns prior to the last
acooent based on his own depositio n testlrron y and the video you
provided .In addition we believe there ls evidence thi'lt Green
can return to right duty type work. We agreed to settle because of the aflegatiO
n by Balley and the surety that there Is a c:ont>lned
with_ As a result the ISIF settlerre nt offer of 50k ls withdraw n and
the case wlll have to be tried. Torn Callery
---~-Orig inal Message -----

From: st<irr.kelso@frontier.com (11'Bilto:starr.kelso@frontiet.com]

Sent: Tuesday , May 17, 20112:4 2 PM
To: Tom Callery
Subject: Re: Lurrp Sum settrerrent on Roy

Green v. lSIF OOI: 7·3-06 Errployer: Roy Green dba St. Joe Salvage

Yes, I received it. l called and asked why. She said It didn't corrply
With Wernecke. I guess I am confused as it is essentially the
form that the ISIF required to be used·---- Origlnal Messag e-····
From: "Tom Callery" <tcallery@lewiston.com>
To: "starr kelso" <starr.kelso@frontler.com>
Sent: Tuesday , May 17, 201110: 58:15 AM
subject: FW: Lufll) Sum settlerre nt on Roy Green v. rsIF DO!: 7·3-06
Errpioye r: Roy Green dba St_ Joe Salvage

Starr this carre thru just rrinutes ago_ Tom Callery

From: Takagi, Klm [rrailto:K Takagi@ iic.ldaho .gov]
Sent: Tuesday, May 17, 2011 10:17 AM

To: tcallery@lewiSton.com
Subject: Lulll') Sum settleme nt on Roy Green v. ISIF OOI: 7-3-06 Erfl)loye
r: Roy Green dba

st.

Joe Salvage

HiThorres,

The Cormissi on dedlned to approve this settlem; nt agreem: nt, If you would like
a hearing with the Conmssl oners to discuss this
settlerrn nt:, you can send a request for hearing to the Com-rission
legal depamre nt.

Thanks.

webrnail.frontier.com/ __ .Jprlntmessage?. __
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Thomas W. Callery, ISBN 2292
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.LC.
1304 Idaho Street
0. Box 854
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-3591
Facsimile: (208) 746~9553
tcallery@lewiston.com

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO
ROY GREEN,
Claimant,

)
) Case No.: I. C. 06-07698
)
)
)

vs.
ROY GREEN dba ST. JOE SALVAGE
LOGGING,
Employer,
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,

Surety, and

)
)

) DEFENDANT ISlF RESPONSE TO
) CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
) SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ISIF
)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL )
)
INDEMNITY FUND,
)
Defendants
Comes now the Defendant, STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY

FUND, by and through its attorney of record, Thomas W. Callery of Jones, Brower & Callery,
PLLC, and hereby responds to the Claimant's motion for sanctions against the ISIF as follows:
L

Claimant ROY GREEN filed a complaint for benefits on or about October 30,

2006 against the Employer, St Joe Salvage Logging, and Surety, Traveler's Indemnity Co.
2.

The Defendant ISIF was served a complaint by the Employer and Surety alleging

ISIF liability on or about November 6, 2008.

DEFENDANT lSlF RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ISIF/1

2
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Thomas W. Callery, ISBN 2292
JONES, BROWER CALLERY,
1304 Idaho Street
Box 854
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-3591
Facsimile: (208) 746-9553
tcallery@lewiston.com

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
)
Claimant,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ROY GREEN dba ST. JOE SALVAGE
)
LOGGING,
)
)
Employer,
)
)
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
)
)
Surety, and
)
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL)
)
INDEMNITY FUND,
)
Defendants
ROY GREEN,

Case No.: I. C. 06-07698

DEFENDANT ISIF RESPONSE TO
CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE ISIF

Comes now the Defendant, STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY
FUND, by and through its attorney of record, Thomas W. Callery of Jones, Brower & Callery,
PLLC, and hereby responds to the Claimant's motion for sanctions against the ISIF as follows:
1.

Claimant ROY GREEN filed a complaint for benefits on or about October 30,

2006 against the Employer, St. Joe Salvage Logging, and Surety, Traveler's Indemnity Co.
2.

The Defendant ISIF was served a complaint by the Employer and Surety alleging

ISIF liability on or about November 6, 2008.

DEFENDANT ISIF RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ISIF/1

3

At the request of counsel for the Surety and mediator Dennis Burks, the ISIF

attended mediation in Coeur d'Alene on September 29, 2009.

settlement offer was made on

that date to the Claimant and his counsel. Said offer of settlement was neither accepted nor
rejected at the conclusion of the mediation.
4.

Counsel sent the Claimant and his attorney a lump sum agreement for review on

February 24, 2010. Said proposed lump sum agreement was never signed by Claimant.
5.

Eventually, the Claimant rejected said lump sum agreement and on March 10,

2010 filed a request for calendaring.
6.

The case was rescheduled for hearing on December 14, 2010.

7.

On December 3, 2010, shortly before hearing, the Claimant, through his legal

counsel, accepted the ISIF offer made at the mediation fourteen months prior.
8.

The acceptance of the offer by Claimant contained the following conditional

language (see Exhibit A attached hereto):
"I want to also emphasis that this acceptance by Mr. Green is not an admission, or
concession, of any nature or kind, that the ISIF has any liability regarding Mr.
Green's industrial accident and injury of July 3, 2006. I want to specifically
reference the fact that Mr. Green did not "join" the ISIF in this matter, that Mr.
Green's deposition testimony documents that he did not believe that his physical
condition prior to the accident and injury was a hindrance or obstacle to his
ability to obtain employment, that his cun-ent total permanent disability is solely
caused by his said July 3, 2006 accident."
9.

In addition, Claimant's counsel was clearly aware that, under the facts of the case,

approval of the lump sum agreement was not assured, and Claimant's counsel himself
acknowledged this in his December 3, 2010 letter (see Exhibit A attached hereto):
"It is my understanding from our discussions that the Industrial Commission has

been cautious in approving settlements involving the ISIF. Thus, of course, if the
Commission determines not to approve the settlement agreement the offer and
Mr. Green's acceptance will be null and void and we will proceed to hearing."

DEFENDANT ISIF RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ISIF/2

10.

The Claimant and his legal counsel were well aware that any lump sum agreement

would have to be approved by the Idaho Industrial Commission and were clearly advised that
approval was not a certainty in light of the Wernecke decision.
11.

The lump sum agreement drafted by the ISIF was based upon the facts of the case

and the very specific letter addressed to counsel for the ISIF dated December 3, 2010 by Mr.
Kelso. In said letter, the Claimant and his legal counsel reiterated Mr. Green's position that the
ISIF has no liability in this case and that the total and permanent disability of the Claimant was
caused solely by the accident of July 3, 2006.
12.

Counsel for the ISIF drafted a lump sum agreement based upon the facts of the

case and the information provided to it by the Claimant and his legal counsel. The lump sum
agreement presented to the Commission accurately reflected the positions of the respective
parties and the medical evidence. The ISIF did not prepare a lump sum agreement that was
inaccurate, incomplete or made false representations to the Commission concerning the facts of
the case in order to obtain approval by the Commission and satisfy the Wernecke requirements.
13.

It is the duty of the Commission to review the lump sum agreement and the

underlying facts of the case to determine if the elements of ISIF liability have been satisfied
based on Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District, 147 Idaho 277 (2009). The Commission
exercised its discretion in this case and determined that the elements of ISIF liability were not
satisfied, and that the lump sum agreement could not be approved.
14.

The actions of the ISIF in this matter do not warrant sanctions and have been

perfectly appropriate as to the Claimant and to the Idaho Industrial Commission. The motion for
sanctions filed by the Claimant is frivolous.

DEFENDANT ISIF RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ISIF/3

DATED this 27th day of May, 201 L

JONES, BROWER &

Attorney for Defendant ISIF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on the 27th day of May, 2011, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
served by the method indicated below and addressed upon each of the following:
~

STARR KELSO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 1312
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816

D
D

ERIC S. BAILEY
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP
P.O. BOX 1007
BOISE, ID 83701

D
D

DEFENDANT ISIF RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S
MOTION FOR SANCTIONS AGAINST ISIF/4

~

~

~

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile transmission to: 208-664-6261

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Facsimile transmission to: 208-344-9670
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Via fax: 208-746-'>553

A uorncy ttl I .aw

RE: Crccrl v. St. .foe Salvage, Tr~1vclcrs hldc.mni!Y Co., and HSDF

Dcnr Tom:
M(. Green hu.s authori zed me to accept ll1e $50,000.00 Cull and final Jump :mm
settlem ent oJkr of
your clicrn. the ISi.F. in lh~ above matter. Mr. Gr(~cn's ~,cceptancc oftht.: !SfF's ,)flt:r
is nol a waiver
of m1y claim against the cmploycr/surt:Ly in this nwLtcr. Mr. Green reserves the
rig11t to provide
appropriate language regarding the apportionment ()f the s.::nkment over
his rcn,ain ing life
cxrcctancy. It ha:,; not yet been def.ermined whL":Lher or not Mr. (3rcen is willing 10
acct;pl the .surety's
offer. This of'ler and acceptance is only a scttk:mcrH of the contingent liability ofthc
ISi F regardless
of whether the Industrial Comrnission, jf Lhe matter proceeds to hearing
,tgajn::;l the surety,
dctcm1ines that the lS1F actually has no liability or some liability regJ.rdl
ess oft:hc cxrcn1. I wa11L to
also c111phi1.sis that !hi.-:: acceptance by Mr. Green i;; not an admission. or ctHicession,
of any rwture or
kind, that the 1SfF h~!.S any lia.bili1y rcg~mJing Mr. Green' s industrial acciden t ;1nd
injury of' .July 3.
2006. I want to s1x:cilic<Jlly reference Lhe fact that Mr. Grlccn diu not '·join" th;;~
lSIF in this matter.
that: Mr. Green '.s lkposition testimony docum ents that he did not bcUcvc that hi:-; physica
l condition
prior 10 lht! accident and injury w,1s ;;i hindrance orohsw de 10 his ability to ohl;:iin. em.ploy
mi::rll. Lhi:rl
his currenttowl pcnn:.mcni dis:1l;ili'ty is soldy cau!;:cd by his said July 3, 2006 11<:ddc
nt. The foc1.1l1::i1
the surety chose to join the JSJF and the fact that the JSIF has chosen to offer a
full and final
:=:er tk:mc::nr f.o Mr. Green, hascd upon their respectivt~ independent ckcisions. in
no way in rlw::nce or
compromise Mr. Cin.:(.;.n 's belief that the ISTF ha~. and !Hid, no liability in his cl~~im
arising out nf his
accicknl and it\iury. It is my under.standing from our discussi<rns that the Indusif'i
al Commi.ssion has
been cmitious in approving settlements involving the JSIF. Thus, of cour~e,
if the C'.ommission
cklcrmines to not approv e the s1.~u1ement agreement th<;.~ offer and Mr. Gr1:cn 's ,tccepta
nce will be null
and void and we \Vi ll have to proceed 10 hearing.

)!,_ct}'1r:.l;yoprs.
' ()_14,~'.i itJ t-/,,····.
St.11 r

T....c:l~o

Allornc y at Law
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law
Box 1312
d'Alene, Idaho 83816
208-765-3260
Fax: 208-664-6261
Attorney for Mr Green

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STA TE Of< IDAHO

ROY GREEN
Claimant,

Case No. LC. 06-07698

vs.

CLAIMANT'S REPLY
TO lSIF'S RESPONSE TO
MOTION f<OR SANCTIONS

ROY GREEN DBi\ ST. JOE
SALVAGE LOGGING,
Employer,
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety, and

ST ATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRJAL SPECIAL
IND EivfNITY FUND,

Defendants
COMES NOW the Claimant and hereby files this Reply to the JSIF's Response to
Claimant's Motion for Sanctions.
FACTS
The ISJF mischaracterizes the basis of Claimant's Motion for Sanctions. The Claimant's
Motion is based upon the following:
I. The Claimant was placed in the position of needing to resolve any claim against the
ISIP because of the pending foreclosure on his home.
2. The Idaho Supreme Court entered its decision in Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School

Distria No. 401, 147 ldaho 277,207 P. 3d 1008 on April 14 2009.
7

3. As retlected hy Exhibit A to the Affidavit of Starr Kelso in Support of Motion for
Sanctions 1he ISIF was well aware of the Supreme Court's decision. The e-mail

CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO ISTF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
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specifically states that "Ever since the Wernecke decision we have had rhe Commission
exam our LSA with a fine tooth comb.
4. The ISfF, if it had intended to settle their liability in good faith for the sum of
$50,000.00, had to recognize that the known evidence supported findings of fact that
the Claimant was totally and permanently disabled under the odd-lot category and that
the ISIP had liability exposure.
5. The ISIF offered the settle111ent to Claimant on September 29, 2009 at mediation. On
December 3, 2010, the Claimant accepted the offer of the TSIF Both of these dates are
well after the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Wernecke.
6. Any offer by the ISIF to settle the claim for the $50,000.00 in September 2009, that
was left open to br;: ac<;epled until it was accepted on Decern ber 3, 20 l 0, necessarily
included an implied agreement that the lump sum settlement agreernent would meet,
and be consistent in its language with the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in

Wernecke. Any offer that did not intend for the lmnp sum agreement to be in full
compliance with Wernecke could not have been made in good faith.
7. Claimant's counsel was certainly aware of the fact lhal the Indusuial Commission
would review any lump sum settlement in light of Wernecke. Claimant's counsel
acknowledged that fact in his letter of December 3, 2010 attached to the ISIF's
Response filed with the Industrial Commission.
8. When the settlement otler was accepted by the Claimant it was certainly done so with
the good faith belief tlmt the agreement that the ISTF would prepare wottld meet the
Wernec.:k~ test.

9. The Claimant gave valuable consideration in accepting the offer of the ISIF. The
Claimant agreed to vacating and rescheduling the hearing and settled any liabilityof the

ISIF in this matter. The Claimant knowing the Industrial Commission would closely
review the lump sum agreemem had to reason to believe that a lump sum agreement
that on its face did not meet the Wernecke tes1 would be required to be signed.

10. It is one thing to submit a lump sum settlement agreement that appears to meet the
Wernecke test and have it declined by the Industrial Commission. It is a vastly
different thing to be required, because of the change in status of the hearing and the

2

CLAIMANT'S REPLY TO XSlF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SANCTIONS

0

0

2

0

/RX tW

87

08/08/2011 20 43 FAX

2088848

KELSO LAW OFFICE

[4] 003/008

pre~!':>ing financial needs faced by Claimant, to be forced to sign a lump surn settlement
agreement that did not even come close to meeting the Wernecke test
11. Certainly the ISIF would not have offered to settle

case for $50,000 ,00 if the ISIF

believed that it had pre~existing hindrance or obstacle liability exposure and/or that it
had no exposure that the Claimant was not totally and permanently disabled under the

odd-lot doctrine.
12. Based upon the opinion

or Dan Brownell, vocational rehabilitation expert, and the Sc

Maries, Idaho labor market, the Claimant has a solid belief that the evidence will
support that he is totally and permanently disabled under the odd-Tot doctrine.
I 3. The Claimant, in good faith does not subjectively believe that his total and pem1anent
disability is the result of the combination of a pre-existing hindrance or obstacle to
work and the industrial accident that led to this claim being filed. However, the
resolution of this matter is based upon what must have implicitly been a good faith
belief by the ISIF that Claimant's pre-existing condition was a hindrance or obstacle.
Certainly the ISIF is not going to offer to settle a case, especially for $50,000, when it
does not feel that it has substantial exposure to an extent of at least $50)000.
14. The ISIF refused all attempts by the Claimant to correctly word the lump sum to
accurately and correctly reflect that the opinion of Nancy Collins Ph.D, which the ISTF
was also utilizing in defense of Claimant's claim, \Vas based on an erroneous
assumption that a video tape that she reviewed was taken after the accident of July 3,
2006. In fact the video that Nancy Collins, Ph.D. based her opinion on employability
was taken prior to the industrial accident and injury of July 3, 2006. That fact is even
confinned on the video tape. The ISIF had a copy of the tape, and it also knew that her
opinion was e1roneous because the tape was taken prior to the July 3, 2006 industrial
accident.
15. The ISIP, 1:1.Her .supposedly making a good faith offer to settle for $50,000.00 (not an

insignificant sum of money from the JSIF) ultimately demanded that the Claimant must
sign the lump sum settlement agreement that it prepared. As reflected in the e-mail
dated December 21, 2010 (see copy attached as Exhibit A) the ISIF, after making the

3
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offer, and after the offer was acc;epte<l, demanded that the language in the agreement
"must preserve our ability to defend the case if the LSA is not approved.
16. In essence what this means that the ISIP

submitting language in the agreement that

would "preserve our ability to defend the case if the LSA is not approved" knew, that
the insertion of the "defense" language would render the lump sum settlement
agreement unacceptable to the Tndu,;trial Commission under Wernecke.
17. The fundamental bad faith of the ISIF is that it made an offer to settk and then, after
the offer was accepted, inse11ed language that it knew would not comply Wernecke
and demanded 1hat it, and only it, be submitted to the Industrial Commission.

18. The Claimant accepted the offer of the ISIF based upon the knowledge that the

Wernecke test must be met and was j usti!iecl in believing when he accepted the offer of
settlement that the ISCF would not make st.ich an offer if it did not believe that it could
agree to the facts required under the Wernecke test.
19. When it came time to put pen to paper and agree to the actual language the ISIF, with
full knowledge of the Wernecke. unilaterally demanded that a lump sum agreement
that it knew. or should have kno"vn, did not meet the Wermck test be signed.
20. Claimant, having accepted the offer, and having agreed to vacate and reschedule the
heating so that the pending lump srun agreement could be prepared and submitted for
approval of the Industrial Commission, was in literally no position because of his

ti nancial status

to

say "Oh, never mind, lets just reschedule the hearing.'' No, Claimant

had to try and ride the storm out on the 'horse' that he, in good faith, had agreed to
ride., after learning that the horse he was forced to ride tumcd out to be a nag.

LEGAL ARGUMENT
When the parties to a legal controversy, in good faith enter into a contract compromising

and settling their adverse claims, such agreement is binding upon the parties and is enforceable at
law or in equity according to the nature of the case. Wil.wm v. Bogert, 81 Idaho 535, 347 P. 2d
341 (Idaho 1959), Such a contract stands on the same stands on the same footing as any other

contract and is governed by the same rules and principles as are applicable to contracts generally.
ld at 542. In an action to enforce an agreement of compromise and settlement, made in good

faith, the court will not inquire into the merits or validity of the original claim_ ld at 542.
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The Claimant and the 18IF entered into an oral agreement to settle all ISIF liability to
Claimant in this matter for the sum of $50,000.00.
A contract

in words,

not only of the agreements which the parties have
'

but also of the obligations which are reasonably implied. Black v. Baker Of,/ Tools, Inc., l 07 P

3d 1457 (10 1h Cir. 199 7). What is plainly implied in an agreement is as much a pa11 of the
agreement as if expressly stated. see Wright v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md., J 76 Okla. 274, 54

P. 2d !084 (Okla. 1935) citing Kirke La Shelle Co, v. Paul Armslron Co., 263 NY. 79, 188 N.E.
163, 164 and Draper v. Nelson, 254 Mich 380, 236 NW 808.
It has long been the law in Idaho that "Good faith and fair dealing arc implied obligations
of every contract .. Idaho First Nat. Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 824 P. 2d
84 I (ldaho / 99 I). Any action by either party which vilates, nullifies or significantly impairs any

benefit of the contract is a violation of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Id.
The Claimant accepted the offer of the TSTF on December 3, 2010. The Idaho Supreme
Court's case in Wernecke, at that time, was well known to TSTF and it well knew that "the
Commission (would) exam our LSA with a fine tooth comb," Exhibit A to Afi1davit of Starr
Kelso in Support of Motion for Sanctions. It can not be argued, in good faith, that compliance
with Wernecke in any h.imp sum agreement document was reasonably implied in the offer and
acceptance. For the ISIF to argue otherwise is bad faith of the type that should be sanctioned.
The unilateral demand of the TSTF, after it had offered to settle for $50,000.00 and the
Claimant had accepted said offer, that the lump sum settlement agreement that it prepared and
contained language that "reserve(d) our ability to defend the case if the LSA is not approved",
and which language made the lump sum agreement unacceptable to the Industrial Commission
because of Wernecke, was a violation of the covenani of good faith and fair dealing implied in
the oral agreement, and v.Titten agreement attached a;; Exhibit A 1o lSlF's Response, to settle its

liability to Claimant.
The agreement to settle between Claimant and the ISTF in this case is not the same as in
Wernecke. Prior to the Wernecke decision neither Claimants nor the TSTF were aware of the

standard expressed by the Idaho S1iprer:ne Court applicable to lump sum agreements involving
the lSIF Tn this present case, both the TSIF and the Claimant were aware of the Wernecke
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standards established by the Idaho Supreme Court, and any good faith offer to settle made by the
ISIF obviously included the implied obligation of the ISIP to submit to Claimant an agreement
that complied with Wernecke. The ISIF submitted a lump sum agreement that the Industrial

Commission found woefully lacking in meeting the Wernecke standards and demanded that it,
and only it, be signed and submitted to the Industrial Commission. At the time that the offer of
Lhe TSTF was made and accepted by the Claimant, there was no statement, or indication, made in

the offer that the 1ump sum set1leme11t agreement would have to contain wording that "reserve(d)

our (ISIF's) ability to defend the case if the LSA is not approved." Indeed once the ofter was
accepted the agreement superceded the liability exposure of the ISIF, and the Industrial
Commission was "not in a position to inquire into the merits or validity of the original claim"
against the ISIF. Wilson v. Bogert, supra. at 542. The issue upon offer and acceptance

ha;:;

become one of contract. The Industrial Commission has exclusive jurisdiction of all questions
arising under the worker's compensation law. This agreement, and the actions of the 1SlF,
clearly "arise under the worker's compensation law" and the Industrial Commission is the only
t;ntity with jurisdiction to decide this issue. Van Tine v. Idaho State Ins. Fund. 126 Idaho 688.

889 P 2d 717 (Jd,iho 1994),
CONCLUSION
The Industrial Commission should enter its Order requiring the ISIF to sHbmi1 to Claimant
a lump sum settlement agreement that complies with the standards expressed in Wernecke. Once
the offer was made and accepted the merits of any liability claim against the !SIF in favor of
Claimant were superceded by the accepted offer. It is not the province of the ISIF to demand that

terminology be inserted into the lump sum settlement agreement that ''reserve our ability to
defend the case if the LSA is not approved." The underlying liability has been compromised and
it is the obligation of the ISIF to prepare for submittal a lump sum settlement agreement that

complies with Wernecke. The 1SIF has no liability after the offer and acceprance other than to
prepare and present an agr1;;emenl for submission to the Industrial Commission that complies
with Wernecke, and then upon appn>val by the Industrial Commission pay the Claimant

$50,000.00.

Tf the Industrial Con1mission does not enter its Order requiring the ISIP to prepare and
submit such an agreement, the Industrial Commission should hold that the lSlF acted in bad faith
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in the offering of such settlement to the Claimant and schedule a hearing at which the Industrial

Commission vVill

evidence on the nature and extent of damages suffered by the Claimant

as a result of the ISTF's bad faith actions in demanding the insertion of language in the written
lump sum agreement submitted to the Industrial Commission that does not comply with

Wernecke.

Starr Kelso, Attorney for Claimant
CERTIF~ OF SERVICE: A. copy was faxed to Eric Bailey uttorney for employer/surety
1
208-34~~:f!~ Callery attorney for ISIF 208-746-9553 on the 6 h day of June, 2011.
Starr Kelso
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RE: Try this one
Tue, Dec 21, 2010 11: 10 AM

From : Tom Callery <tc:allery@lewiston.com>

Subject : RE: Try this one
To ; sta rr kelso < st:a rr. ke lso@frontier.com>

cc: 'Jarres K~e· <Jam;:s.Kile@ad mldaho.gov>
St'1rr 1 have reviewed yowr revised LSA with the ISIF. We are not in ci positiOn to rrodify the agreerrent as you have requested as
we rrust reserve our ability to defend the case if the LSA is not approved. Owr version of the LSA is what we are wHling to do. If
you and your client can sign our version we will submt to the Corrmssion otherwise we will be unable to settle. Tom Callery
-····Or~inaf Message----From: starr.kelso@front ier.com [rreilto:starr.kelso @frontier.c:om]
Sent: Saturday, December 181 2010 9:15 AM
To: Tom Callery
Subject: Try this one

Torn,
Take a gander at the attached draft and see what yow think. 1 reference Nancy Collins based upon her opinion prior to her last
opinion that incorrectly assumed that the ykjeo was po$1: surgery from the July 3, 2006 accident. I think that it is a fair statem:mt. I
think I have highlighted all of the changes, but I rrny have mssed a word llere and there. Also on the deleted portions I just
indi(:Qte "OUT".

Let me know,
Starr
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Tel: 208-765-3260
Fax: 208-664-6261
Attorney for Mr. Green

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
ROY GREEN
Claimant.,

Case No. LC. 06-07698

u

vs.
ROY GREEN DBA ST. JOE
SALVAGE LOGGING,
Employer,

***SUPPLEMENTAL***
AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS PURSUANT TO
ICJRP&P RULE 16

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety, and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants
)
ss.
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI )
STA TE OF IDAHO

STARR KELSO being first duly sworn upon oath hereby states as follows:
1. I am the attorney for the Claimant, Roy Green, over the age of 18 years, and make this
affidavit based upon personal k11owledge to which I will testify to if required to by the
Industrial Commission;
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a copy of the Trustee's Deed issued as a result of the
foreclosure sale of Claimant's home on June 16, 2011.
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit Bis a copy of the Affidavit of Publication regarding the
sale of Claimant's home. It reflects that commencing January 1, 2009 Claimant was in
default of monthly payments of $1,765.42.

1

SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS

4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a copy of the Affidavit of Compliance regarding the
sale of Claimant's home reflecting the change in the sale date from April 21, 2011 to
May 19, 2011, to ultimately June 16, 2011.
5. That had the $50,000.00 settlement been approved and paid on or before June 1, 2011
that amount would have been sufficient to allow Claimant to avoid the foreclosure sale.
DATED this 22nd day of June, 2011.

~~cd---

Starr Kelso

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me, the undersigned Notary Public, this 22nd day of
,,,,nu111111,,
June 2011.
~~\\ ... , \-\ 0 VV'. 11,,,/,,;
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was faxed to Eric Bailey attorney for employer/surety
208-344-9670 and Thomas Callery attorney for ISIF 208-746-9553 on the Zcday of May,
2010.

Starr Kelso
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SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF STARR KELSO IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS
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TRUSTEE'S DEED
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T 11 e ne Corporation, an I a o corporation erem ca le rustee) as su,ccssor trustee under the IJeed or r, ust
hereinafter particularly described, does hereby Bargain, Sell and Convey, without warranty, to Chase Home Finance
LLC whose address is 3415 Vision Drive, Columbus, OH 43219, (herein called Grantee), all of the real property
situated in the County of Benewah County, State of Idaho, described as follows:

A parcel ofland, which is a portion of Tracts 13 and 14 of Cherry Creek Tracts, in the Northwest Quarter of the
Southwest Quarter of Section 21, Township 46 North, Range 2 West of the Boise Meridian, Benewah County, Idaho
described as follows:
Beginning at the Southwest comer of said Tract 13; thence along the south line of Tract 13 N 89° 46' E, 525.30 feet
to an iron rod, which is the rrue point ofbeginning; thence
N 39°32'40" E, 247.14 feet to an iron rod; thence
N 32°35'30" E, 366.88 feet to an iron rod; thence
N 41 °43'50" E, 402.19 feet to an iron rod: thence
N 50°45'40" E, 199.08 feet to an iron rod on the east line of Tract 14: thence
West 398.25 feet(rec. 498.2) to an iron rod on the right-of-way line of Highway 5~ thence
along the right-of-way S 41 °28'25" W, 571. 72 feet to an iron rod; thence leaving the highway south 497.40 feet (rec.
491.93 feet) to an iron rod, which was the true point of beginning.
By reason of the automatic stay provisions of U.S. Bankruptcy CDde 1 l U.S.C. 362, the sale was discontinued, and
pursuant to provisions of Idaho Code 45- I 506(A) the sale was rescheduled and conducted following expiration or
termination of the effect ofthe stay in the manner provided by that section. The Affidavit of Compliance with I.C.
45-l 506A(2)(3), together with copies of the required Affidavit of Affidavits which are anached hereto and
incorporated herein.

This conveyance is made pursuant to the powers conferred upon Trustee by the Deed of Trust between Roy J.
Green, unmarried man, as original grantor(s) for the benefit and securicy of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., as
beneficiary, recorded November 7, 2008, as Instrument No. 252461, and assigned to Chase Home Finance LLC, by
assignment recorded October 13, 2009, as Instrument No. 255369, Mortgage Records of Benewah County, Idaho
and after the fulfillment of the conditions specified in said Deed of Trust authorizing this conveyance as follows:
l. Default occurred in the obligations for which said Deed of Trust was given as security and the beneficiary
made demand upon the said trustee to sell said property pursuant to the terms of said Deed of Trust. Notice of
Default was recorded as Instrument No. 25537 l, Mortgage Records of Benewah County, Idaho and in the office of
the Recorder of each county in which the property described in said deed of trust or any part thereof. is situated. the
nature of such default being as set forth in said Notice of Default. Such default still e,cisted at the time of sale.
2. After re,cordation of said Notice of Default, trustee gave notice of the time and place of the sale of said
property by registered/certified mail., return receipt requested, by personal service upon the occupants of said real
property and/or by posting in a conspicuous place on said premises IUld by publishing in a newspaper of general
circulation in each of the counties in which the property is situated as more fully appears in affidavits recorded as
least 20 days prior to date of sale as Instrument No(s}. 256006, 256007 & 256008, Mortgage Records of Benewah
County, Idaho.
3. The provisions, recitals and contents of the Notice of Default referred to in paragraph ( J) supra and of the
Affidavits referred to in paragraph (2) supra shall be and they are hereby incorporated herein and made an integral
part hereof for all purposes as though set forth therein at length.
4. All requirements of law regarding the mailing, personal service, posting, publication and recording of Notice
of Default, and Notice of Sale and all other notices have been complied with.
5. Not less than 120 days elapsed between the giving of Notice of Sale by registered or certified mail and the sale
of said property.
6. Trustee, at the timi, and place of sale f'ixed by said notice, at public auction, in one parcel, struck off to
Grantee, being the highest bidder therefore, the property herein described, for the sum of $316,587.08, subject
however to all prior liens and encumbrances. No person or corporation offered to take any part of said property less
than the whole thereof for the amount of principal, interest, advances and costs.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, The Trustee, pursuant to a resolution of its Board of Directors has caused its
Corporation name to be hereunto subscribed.
Dated: June 16, 2011
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STATE OF IDAHO

County of Benewah, ss.
Cynthia Ann Hammes, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes
and says that she fa vice presl.dent ofTI1e Corporation, owner of the
St. Maries Gazette Record, a weekly newspaper printed and published at St. Maries, Benewah County, State ofidaho; the St. Maries
Gazette Record is a newspaper having general circulation in Benewah
Cmmn,.~ Sn.re ·of Idaho, and·has been-conthmou sly and tminterrupt~
edly published in Benewah County, State of Idaho, during a period of
more than seventy-eight consecutive weeks prior to the first publkad.on of notice of advertisement herein.
That the notice, of which the one hereto att~ed is a trne copy,
was ~ub!ished ~n said news~::?:g-or a p~riod o,L~-.. issues, the first
publtcauon bemg on _h~··· ········ .. ··· d8)j~of :_,J::e.f/:n.U(),.,,.. 20 ..
and the last on the .. .,.,'./ ';_ ..... , day of ./..tlt:Z. ...
20?.r.....
That said newspaper was regularly distributed to its subscribers
du1ing the time of the smne period; that said notice was published in

ch.. ,

i.l ...

the regular a11d ~re issue ofpj9i~~er. J
1
Dated this ··o/1¥· day ofj././i?l.:d.{!:i:;.......... , 20./ .

.. ~.aw~ . .....
)

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF BENEWAH

)
)
\

.(

On this{,~ day of

IJ&.fc:i2 ,in the year of·~(/

~-

before me, a Notar; Public. personally appeared Cynthia Ann ·.,.
Hammes, knov-.'fl or identified to me to be the person whose name
subscribed to within instrnment, and being by me first duly sworn,
declared that the statements therein are tme, and acknowledged to

'.J /•

metha1Sheexoc,,tedthesi~

/jlJrit-~(

~1-·\.

Notary Public for Idaho
Residing at St. Maries, Idaho
My commission expires:

t? ~7--l 3-ZOII
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Order No.: TS090l094A
CHF No. l78<i087S07/Green/302184 ·SM

AFFIDAVIT OF COMPLIANCE

I, Cindy Van Lith, the undersigned., being first duly sworn, deposes and says that I am ;1 citizen of the United States,
over eighteen (18) years of age, a resident of Ada County, State ofldaho, that I am an officer ofTitleOne
Corporation, our business address is 868 E. Riverside Drive, Suite 100, Eagle, Idaho 83616, and that we are
successor trustee.
That by reason of the expiration or termination of the effect of the automatic stay provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code 11 U.S.C. 362 and by that reason of ldaho Code 45·1506(A} Rescheduled Sale, the successor Trustee
1
rescheduled the sale for the 21 ' day of April, 201 I and further postponed sale to May 19, 2011 and then to June 16,
2011.
That Notice of the Rescheduled Sale was given at least thirty (30) days before the day of the rescheduled sale by
registered or certified mail to the last known address of all persons who were entitled to notice by mail of the
original sale and to any person who shall have recorded a request for notice of sale at least forty-five (45) days prior
to !he rescheduled sale date in the fonn and manner required by section 45-1511, Idaho Code.
That Notice of the Rescheduled Sale was published in the newspaper of original publication once a week for three
(3) successive weeks, making three (3) publications in all, with the last publication at least ten ( 10) days prior to the
day of sale.
That the successor Trustee makes this Affidavit, stating compliance with sub-section (2) and (3) of Section 45l 506A, Idaho Code, as more further required in sub-section (4) of said Section.
Dated: June 16,201 l

State of Idaho
County of Ada
On this 16"' day ofJune in the year 2011, before me, the undersigned, a notary public in and for said state personally
appeared, Cindy Van Lith, known to me to be the Assistant Treasurer of the corporation that executed this
instrument and the person who executed the instrument on behalf of said corporation as trustee, and acknowledged
to me that such corporation executed the same. In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my
official se lie day and year in this certificate first above written.

Public
Not
Residing at: . '-;1J~d/J,f'1.__,,
My commissio"ne ~Jiidn:~ II, t-{)f ~

260234
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ROY GREEN,
Claimant,
V.

ROY GREEN DBA ST JOE
SALVAGE LOGGING,
Employer,
and
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

IC 2006-07698
ORDER DENYING REQUEST
FOR SANCTIONS

On May 20, 2011, Claimant filed a motion for sanctions against the Industrial Special

Indemnity Fund (ISIF) pursuant to Industrial Commission JRP 16. Claimant argues that he
entered into good faith negotiations with the ISIF, and the parties submitted a lump sum
settlement agreement (LSSA) to the Commission. The Commission declined to approve the
LSSA, because the LSSA failed to meet the requirements of Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School
Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P. 3d 1008 (2009). Claimant requests that the Industrial
Commission award Claimant reasonable attorney fees, punitive costs/damages, and require the
ISIF to pay the Commission a reasonable sum to compensate it for the lost time the Commission

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS - 1

spent reviewing and considering the proposed LSSA.

Claimant attached documentation to

support his contention that the ISIP proceeded without good faith.
On May 27, 2011, ISIP filed a response to Claimant's motion. ISIP argues that Claimant
is not entitled to sanctions, an award of punitive damages, or costs to the Commission for the
LSSA. ISIP presents that the parties entered into settlement negotiations around September
2009. ISIP submitted a LSSA to Claimant for review around February 2010, which Claimant
rejected and filed a request for hearing. Around December 2010, Claimant accepted ISIP's
previous offer for settlement. ISIP did not guarantee that the Commission would approve the
parties' proposed LSSA, and expressed reservations of how the Commission would proceed, due
to the recent Wernecke decision. The ISIP declined to make certain admissions in the LSSA
requested by Claimant, in the event that the parties might litigate the matter. Ultimately, the
Commission declined to approve the parties' LSSA agreement.
On June 7, 2011, Claimant submitted a reply regarding his request for sanctions, and the
supplement affidavit of Claimant's attorney, Starr Kelso, on June 27, 2011.

Mr. Kelso stated

that Claimant could have avoided foreclosure had the proposed lump sum settlement agreement
been approved and paid, and attached documentation of foreclosure proceedings.
DISCUSSION

Rule 16 of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure grants the Commission power to
impose appropriate sanctions for any violation or abuse of its rules or procedures. Claimant's request
for sanctions following the Commission's decision to decline approving a LSSA is without
precedent. The Commission does not award punitive damages for an unapproved settlement or costs
to the Commission for the time spent reviewing and analyzing LSSAs.

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS - 2

The Commission notes that nothing in the regulatory or statutory scheme requires parties to
settle their disputes, just as nothing requires one party to accede to the terms of a settlement proposed
by the other. The Commission assumes that Claimant and his attorney discussed the terms of the
settlement, including its strengths and weaknesses, and that Claimant eventually decided to accede to
the terms of the proposed settlement despite evidently having some reservations about the same. By
its very nature, a LSSA is a compromise between the parties and has no binding authority until the
Commission reviews and approves the LSSA. The parties' submission of a LSSA does not guarantee
Commission approval of such agreement. The parties are correct that the Commission scrutinizes
ISIF settlements for adherence to the principles outlined by the Supreme Court in Wernecke v. St.

Maries Joint School Dist. No. 401, 147 Idaho 277, 207 P. 3d 1008 (2009).
It is evident from the submitted documents that Claimant did not receive all the desired
concessions from the ISIF regarding the wording of the settlement, and that Claimant felt that his
requested changes would have satisfied the Commission and prevented the foreclosure of Claimant's
house. Defendants were clear that they would not make the requested concession. Understandably,
Claimant was frustrated about the settlement, yet still chose to execute and submit the same to the
Commission. The Commission has no remedy for this situation.

The Commission does not and

cannot evaluate LSSAs on hypothetical terms from the parties. While the Commission is sensitive to
the financial constraints facing workers' compensation claimants, the Commission cannot simply
rubber-stamp a LSSA due to financial challenges of the parties. The Commission carefully reviews
all proposed LSSAs, pursuant to its statutory authority. In this case, the Commission declined to
approve the proposed LSSA, and the case will proceed to hearing.

Ill
Ill
Ill
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS - 3

Based on the foregoing, the Commission hereby DENIES Claimant's request for sanctions,
damages, and costs to the Commission.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED this-~- day of September, 2011.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

~w ,

I hereby certify that on the
day of
2011 a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Order Denying Request for Sanctions was served by regular U.S. mail upon:
STARR KELSO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 1312
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83816
THOMAS CALLERY
POBOX854
LEWISTON ID 83501
ERIC S BAILEY
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP
PO BOX 1007
BOISE ID 83701
cs-m

ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS - 4
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STARR KELSO
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Tel: 208-765-3260
fax: 208-664-6261

Attorney for Mr. Green

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO

ROY GREEN
Claimant,

vs_
ROY GREEN DBA ST. JOE
SALVAGE LOGGING,
Employer,

: Case No_ LC_ 06-07698

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS AND REQUEST FOR
HEARING

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety, and

ST ATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL

INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants
COMES NOW Claimant by and through his attorney of record and moves that the
Industrial Commission reconsider its denial of Claimant's motion for sanctions against the ISIP
and requests that a hearing be scheduled on the motion for sanctions.
The lndustrial Commission misperceives the basis of the motion for sanctions_ The basis is

not that the Industrial Commission denied the proposed lump sum settlement agreement. To the
contrary the basis of the motion is contractual and it is founded upon the following facts:

1. ISIF and Claimant agreed to settle the ISIF's exposure to Claimant for the sum of
$50,000.

1 CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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2. At the time of the offer and the acceptance there was no caveat made to the offer by the
ISIF that it would only agree to a lump sum settlement agreement that would not be consistent
with the Werneke v. St. Maries Joint School District No. 40 I, 147 Idaho 2 77, 207 P. 3d I 008
(2009) decision of the Idaho Supreme Court. To even suggest that it the offer was made wjth

such a caveat would be to be an implicit admission of bad faith and probably fraud. Claimant
entered into the h.unp sum settlement agreement in the belief, fully justified by the known

decision of the Idaho Supreme Court, that the offer necessarily was one that required a lump sum
settlement agreement to be prepared in compliance with Werneke.
As the Industrial Commission decision ''assumes", Claimant's counsel most certainly

"discussed the terms of the settlement." However, contrary to the Industrial Commission's
further assumption that "Claimant eventually decided to accede to the tenns of the proposed
settlement despite evidently having some reservations about the same" what the Claimant did
was sign the agreement because it was the last, and only, chance to save his family home. A

refusal by the Claimant to sign the agreement that the ISIF required would have been totally
contrary to his agreement to settle the claim and totally contrary to his extreme efforts

undertaken to save his family home. He simply had no choice but to sign the agreement, exhaust
all his efforts to obtain the contracted for payment, and hope that the Industrial Commission
would approve the agreement.

The Claimant is not suggesting, or requesting, that the Industrial Commission approve the
lump sum agreement that was presented to it. As the Commission correctly notes there is
"nothing in the regulatory or statutory scheme that requires patties to settle their disputes." That,
however, misses the whole point. The Claimant and the ISIF did settle their dispute. The ISIF
2 CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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just chose to subsequently sabotage the approval of the settlement agreement submitted to the
Industrial Commission. Further whether or not the contractual agreement is binding on the
Industrial Commission has no bearing on the contractL,al obligation of the ISIF to either provide
Claimant with an agreement that the Industrial Commission will approve consistent with

Werneke or pay him $50,000 subject to later setoff against a future award of benefits to the
Claimant.

Indeed the Industrial Commission has a very clear remedy for this situation. The Claimant
claims that the Industrial Commission must either order ISTF to provide Claimant with a lump
smn settlement agreement that complies with Werneke or pay to Claimant the amount of the

settlement contractually agreed to by the parties. If the Industrial Conunission choses to order
the payment of the contractual1y agreed amount instead of requiring the ISTF to submit a lwnp
sum settlement agreement in compliance with Werneke, the ISIF will be entitled to set-off
against the amount of benefits awarded by the Industrial Commission with the payment made
under the contract. The Commission decision comments that the "Commission is sensitive to the
financial constraints facing workers' compensation claimants" is without substance if the
Commission chooses to deny Claimant's request that the ISIF be ordered to comply with one of
the two remedies set forth by Claimant. The workers' compensation is a slow, cumbersome, and
financial nightmare for injured workers who arc left grasping at ways to save everything that
they have worked for their entire life to acquire. A failure to require the ISIF to choose •option A
or option B' can be viewed as nothing less than a rejection of the Commission's responsibility to
the injured workers ofldaho in favor of ensuring that a state agency, the ISIF, retains money that
wa~ provided by surcharges on other workers' compensation settlements or awards for the
3 CLAIMANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERAT ION
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express purpose of assisting workers who, despite prior impairmen ts and disabilities, continue on
and struggle to lead productive lives.
The matter before the Industrial Commissio n at this time is one of enforcing a contract
entered into between the ISIF and the Claimant_ The contract simply requires the ISIF to pay the
Claimant $50 000.00 for the dismissal of the claim against it
7

The Industrial Commission

correctly notes in its decision that after C]ajmant and the ISIF agreed to the settlement the ISIF
unilatera1Jy changed the contra.ct. The decision notes that the ISIF declined to make the
admissions necessary for the agreement to pass Werneke, "in the event that the parties might
litigate the matter."

As the Industrial Commission decision further notes the Commission

"scrutinizes ISLF settlements for adherence to the principles outlined by the Supreme Court in
Werneke."

If the agreement was prepared lawfully, by the ISTF's skilled counsel, to be in

compliance with Werneke there would there be a reason to reasonably suspect the Industrial
Commission would fail to follow its statutory mandates and approve it. There would be no
reason to suspect that the ISIP would have to later litigate the matter. The 'logic' behind the
submittal of the agreement by the IS1F must have been that it perceived there to be a reasonable
chance that the Industrial Commissio n would reject a lump sum settlement involving the JSIF,
even if it was in full compliance with Werneke. Such a position by the ISIF is nothing short of a
direct attack on the integrity of the Industrial Commission when it is acting pursuant to its
statutory mandates.

The fact that the TSIF chose to require that Claimant sign a lump sum

settlement that the Industrial Commissio n found did not comply with Werneke, does not relieve
the ISIF from its contractual obligation nor Claimant from his acceptance of the contract.

4 CLAIMAN T'S MOTION FOR RECONSID ERATION
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The Idaho Supreme Court, since at least 1959, in Wilson v. Bogert, 8 I Idaho 535, 347 P.

341 (1959) has mandated that when the parties to a legal controversy enter into a contract
compromising and settling their adverse claims, such agreement is binding and is enforceable at
law or in equity. Claimant and ISIF entered into an oral contract to settle their adverse claims in
this matter. That was the contract. The ISIF subsequently chose to require the Claimant to sign a
lump sum settlement agreement that it knew was not compatible with Werneke. The contracted
settlement was not contingent upon the Industrial Commission approving an agreement that did
not comply with Werneke. It was the ISIF's obligation, after agreeing to settle for the stated
amount, to provide Clajmant with a lawful agreement. The law is clear that a contract (here the

accepted offer to pay Claimant $50,000) consists not only of the expressed words (e.g. we will

pay Claimant $50,000 to be released from this claim) but it also consists of the obligations
reasonably implied (here it was reasonably implied that the ISIF would prepare and provide

Claimanl with an agreement that was consistent with the law). The ISIF, instead of submitting a
lawful agreement to Claimant to sign, demanded that he sign one that it knew, or should have
known, did not comply with Werneke. Claimant could not have, and did not, foresee that the
ISIF would proceed in such a bad faith manner. Claimant was entitled to presume that the ISIF
would provide a lawful agreement to memorialize the contract it entered into for submittal to the
Industrial Commission. The contract for payment is enforceable against the ISIF in law and in
equity. In equity, the ISIP is entitled to a set-ofT, equal to the amount of its contracted payment,
against a subsequent award by the Industrial Commission. The action of the ISIF in demanding
that Claimant sign an agreement, solely for the purpose of presenting it to the Industrial
Commission, vilates, nullifies and significantly impaired the benefit of the contract to Claimant
5 CLAIMANT' S MOTION FOR RECONSIDE RATION
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and it can only be presumed that it was done with malice aforethought knowing the requirements
of a lump sum settlement agreement under Werneke. The benefit of the contract was obvious.
Claimant was going to use the settlement money to save his family home. The ISIF's refusal to
provide an agreement memorializing its contract with the Claimant was a violation of the
implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing that exists in all contracls in Idaho. Idaho

First Nat. Bankv- Bliss Valley Foods, Inc_, 121 Idaho 266, 824 P. 2d 841 (1991)This is a proceeding to enforce the agreement of compromise and settlement. This is not a
proceeding demanding that the Industrial Commission approve an agreement memorializing a
settlement that does not comply with Werneke. In considering the motion

the Industrial

Commission does not evaluate the merits or the validity of the lump sum settlement agreement
forced upon Claimant, after the agreement to settle was made. see Wilson, supra. The Industrial
Commission only orders the ISIP to live up to its contractual obligation to the Claimant. The
Industrial Commission should either order the ISIF to submit a lump sum settlement agreement
to Claimant that is in full compliance with Wemekc and without regard to whether the ISIF
"might litigate the matter," or order the TSIF to pay Claimant the sum of $50,000 now subject to
potential offset.

Starr Kelso, Attorney for Claimant Mr. Green
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: A copy was faxed to Eric Bailey attorney for employer/surety
208-344-9670 and Thomas Callery attorney for ISIF 208u746-9553 on the 20th day of September,
2011.~~
Starr Kelso
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Thomas W. Callery, ISBN 2292
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, PL.LC.
1304 Idaho Street
P. 0. Box 854
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-3591
Facsimile: (208) 746-9553
tcallery@lewiston.com

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
) Case No. LC. 06 - 07698
)
)
)
)
)

ROY GREEN,
Claimant,
vs.

j

ROY GREEN DBA ST. JOBS SALVAGE
LOGGING,

RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
) DENYING MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
)
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING
)
)
)
)
)
)

Employer,
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety, and

j

STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
)

)

Defendants.

Comes now the Defendant, STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY
FUND, by and through its attorney of record, THOMAS W. CALLERY of Jones, Brower &
Callery, PLLC, and hereby responds to the Claimant's motion for reconsideration concerning the
order entered by the Commission denying a request for sanctions dated September 9, 2011. The
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
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Claimant had previously filed a motion requesting sanctions pursuant to Rule 16 of the Judicial
Rules of Practice and Procedure related to the ISIF's alleged misconduct surrounding the
preparation and submission of a proposed lump sum settlement agreement between the Claimant
and the Fund.
In its decision, the Commission noted that the Claimant's request for sanctions against a
party following a Commission decision to decline approval of a lump sum agreement was
without precedent. The Commission further ruled that a lump sum settlement agreement is a
compromise between the parties and is not binding until the Commission reviews and approves
the lump sum settlement. The Commission further declined to impose sanctions or costs related
to Commission time and expense reviewing lump sum agreements that are ultimately not
approved.
The Claimant's motion for reconsideration now appears not to request sanctions pursuant
to Industrial Commission Judicial Rule 16, but requests an order from the Commission requiring
the Fund to provide Claimant with a lump sum settlement agreement that complies with

Wernecke or, in the alternative, to pay the Claimant the $50,000.00 referenced in the lump sum
agreement. The relief requested in the motion for reconsideration is different than the relief
requested in the Claimant's original motion for sanctions. The Commission should summarily
deny this purported motion for reconsideration that attempts to raise completely new issues.
A motion for reconsideration brought pursuant to Idaho Code Section 72-718 and
Industrial Commission Rule 3(f) must be properly supported by a recitation of the factual
findings and/or legal conclusion with which the moving party takes issue.
The Commission does not re-weigh evidence and arguments during reconsideration
simply because the case was not resolved in a party's favor. A motion for reconsideration must
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
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present to the Commission new reasons factually and legally to support reconsideration rather
than rehashing evidence previously presented. Curtis v. MH. King Company, 142 Idaho 383
(2005).
The motion for reconsideration now requests that the Commission enforce a lump sum
agreement the Commission has refused to approve. The Claimant, in essence, is asking the
Commission to enforce the terms of the lump sum agreement even though the Commission
evaluated and rejected the agreement pursuant to Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District

No. 401, 147 Idaho 277 (2009). The fallacy of the Claimant's argument is that there is no
contract to enforce if the Commission does not approve of the lump sum agreement. As the
Idaho Supreme Court stated in Wernecke:
"Claimants and ISIF do not have absolute freedom to contract because the duties
of the parties arise under the act."

Further, the Court stated:
"Unless the Commission finds that the reqms1te elements exist, it may not
approve a lump sum settlement agreement involving ISIF. Such findings are for
the benefit of both the Claimant -- to protect him or her from himself or herself -and of ISIF -- to keep it from making unwarranted payments when there are no
findings establishing ISIF liability."

Without Industrial Commission approval there is no legal contract for the Commission to
enforce. The entire rationale of Wernecke would be negated if the Fund could enter into lump
sum settlement agreements with claimants that are contractually binding upon the parties but do
not generate Commission approval.
Moreover, the Claimant and his legal counsel knew full well that any agreement between
the Fund and the Claimant to settle the case on a lump sum basis required Commission approval
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and was not binding upon either party without Commission approval. Any agreement between
the ISIF and the Claimant was contingent upon Industrial Commission approval and an order
dismissing the complaint of the Claimant with prejudice. Without Industrial Commission
approval and without an order dismissing the Claimant's complaint with prejudice, there is no
agreement to enforce. The Claimant, in essence, is asking for a $50,000.00 cash payment without
the ISIF receiving any of its benefit of the bargain.
In addition, the Claimant conveniently ignores his letter of December 3, 2010, which is
attached to this brief as Exhibit A. In that letter, counsel admitted that discussions had occurred
between him and the ISIF that indicated that the Commission had been cautious in approving
settlements involving the ISIF in light of the Wernecke case. The Claimant was fully advised that
the lump sum agreement may very well not be approved due to the particular facts of the case.
The Claimant went on to condition his agreement to enter into a lump sum settlement agreement
with the following language contained in his December 3, 2010 letter to counsel for the ISIF:
"Thus of course if the Commission determines to not approve the settlement
agreement the offer and Mr. Green's acceptance will be null and void and we
will have to proceed to hearing."
It was clear to both parties to the lump sum agreement that if the agreement was not approved by

the Commission it wouid be null and void, not be binding, and that both parties were then free to
proceed to hearing. That is exactly what has happened.
An understanding of the factual history of this case is important to an understanding of
how the parties got to the point of submitting a lump sum agreement to the Commission that
eventually was rejected. Throughout his briefing, the Claimant has eluded to the financial
problems that the Claimant has and the length of the Industrial Commission process. The
Claimant and his counsel conveniently ignore the fact that the Fund made a settlement proposal
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
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to the Claimant at a mediation that occurred in Coeur d'Alene on September 29, 2009. This
settlement offer was neither accepted nor rejected by the Claimant, but was held open by the
ISIF after the mediation to give the Claimant additional time to think about the settlement. The
Claimant received an initial lump sum agreement for his review on February 24, 2010, which
was never signed. The Claimant eventually rejected the proposed settlement and on March 10,
2010, requested that the case be set for hearing.
The first indication from the Claimant that he would accept the ISIF settlement offer
came in a faxed letter dated December 3, 2010 (see attached Exhibit A), fifteen months later.
This letter contained numerous conditions that Claimant insisted be incorporated into the lump
sum agreement. The ISIF acquiesced to the Claimant's demands contained in the December 3,
2010 letter and incorporated those conditions into the proposed lump sum agreement. Contrary
to the assertion of Claimant, the Fund did not sabotage this lump sum agreement, but the
Claimant, in insisting that he had no restrictions of any kind prior to the last accident, and that he
became totally disabled solely as a result of the last accident, made the likelihood of Commission
approval remote in light of the Wernecke decision. The Claimant, in his December 3, 2010 letter,
demanded the following conditions:
1. If the matter proceeded to hearing solely against the Surety and the Commission

ruled that the Fund had no liability, the Fund would not receive any type of
refund on its $50,000.00 payment.
2. The acceptance by Mr. Green is not an admission or concession of any nature or
kind that the ISIF has any liability regarding Mr. Green's industrial accident
and injury of July 3, 2006.

The Claimant is asserting a position that the Fund has no liability and required that to be
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
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included into the lump sum agreement, and now complains that the Fund in some manner
sabotaged the lump sum approval process. It was the Claimant's insistence on settling the matter
on the conditions outlined in the December 3, 2010 letter which made it highly unlikely that the
Commission would approve the lump sum agreement.

3. I want to specifically recognize the fact that Mr. Green did not join the ISIF in
this matter.
4. Mr. Green's deposition testimony documents that he did not believe that his
physical condition prior to the accident and injury was a hindrance or obstacle
to his ability to obtain employment.
Under Idaho law it is clear that a Claimant must establish a pre-existing impairment that
constituted a hindrance and obstacle to employment or reemployment prior to the last accident.
This statement contained in the letter of counsel for the Claimant also made it highly unlikely
that the Commission would approve the lump sum agreement.

5. His current total permanent disability is solely caused by said July 3, 2006
accident.
Again, the Claimant is asserting that his pre-existing impairments did not contribute to
his total disability and that he is totally and permanently disabled based upon the effects of the
2006 accident alone. In other words, there is no combined with, which is a necessary prerequisite
to ISIF liability.

6. Mr. Green's belief that the ISIF has and had no liability in his claim arising out
of his accident and injury.
In essence, I'll take your money, but under Idaho law I am not entitled to it.

7. If the Commission determines to not approve the settlement agreement the offer
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
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and Mr. Green's acceptance will be null and void and we will have to proceed to
hearing.

Claimant recognized that if the Commission does not approve the lump sum settlement,
neither party will be bound by the agreement and both parties will be free to assert their position
at hearing. This is directly contrary to the position that the Claimant is now taking that there is an
enforceable contract when, in fact, the Claimant insisted that he had a right to pursue his case
against the Fund if the lump sum agreement was not approved. The Claimant's position now has
conveniently changed.
8. It is my understanding from our discussions that the Industrial Commission has
been cautious in approving settlements involving the ISIF.

The Claimant and his counsel were well aware of the Wernecke decision and had been
advised by the Fund that the Commission may very well not approve the lump sum agreement. It
is clear that under Idaho law there is no contract to enforce, nor any basis to order the Fund to
pay any funds to the Claimant. The Commission has properly exercised its role in reviewing
lump sum agreements, particularly in light of the Wernecke decision.
In Wernecke, the Court stated:
"ISIF's liability under Section 72-332 is not invoked unless the four elements
requisite to such a claim are found by the Commission to be present. If the
Commission does not make the requisite findings, it has no authority or
jurisdiction to hold ISIF liable on a claim. In this case the Commission merely
gave its stamp of approval to the agreement, making no findings as to whether
ISIF's liability under Section 72-332 had been properly invoked. Without such
findings the Commission lacks statutory authority to approve the agreement and
its order purporting to do so is void. Without Commission approval the lump sum
agreement is void."

RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
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As the Court went on to state in Wernecke:
"ISIF's liability may only be invoked when the conditions specified in the statute,
8
as defined in Garcia, are present. That requires findings by the Commission.
Unless the Commission finds that the requisite elements exist, it may not approve a
lump sum settlement agreement involving ISIF. Such findings are for the benefit of
both the claimant -- to protect him or her from himself or herself -- and of ISIF -to keep it from making unwarranted payments when there are no findings
establishing ISIF's liability. 9
In this regard, the Commission plays a gatekeeper role and must scrupulously
perform that function. The requisite findings may be made by the Commission
upon a hearing on the merits or upon a stipulation of the parties considered and
approved by the Commission.
9

These issues were recognized by Commissioner Maynard in his dissent:
The majority would have you believe that a claimant's assertion of total and permanent
disability is adequate information for all parties, including the Commission, to proceed
with the settlement. On the contrary, it is proper for the Commission "to consider the
underlying merits of the [claimant's} claims when making its statutorily required
determination as to whether the settlement agreements were 'for the best interest of all
parties. ' Without some preliminary inquire into the merits of the claim, the Commission
cannot properly judge whether an injured worker is surrendering a strong claim for too
small a settlement, or whether the ISIF is unwisely satisfying spurious claims at great
cost." (quoting Owsley v. Idaho Indus. Comm'n, 141 Idaho 129, 137, 106 P.3d 455,463
(2005)."

Finally, the Claimant asserts that the Fund acted in bad faith by not preparing a lump sum
agreement that complied with the requirements of Werneke, and further that the Commission
should order the Fund at this point in time to redraft a lump sum agreement that complies with
Wernecke. This allegation by the Claimant controverts the purpose of Wernecke and counsel's

duty to the Commission and to the court system. The purpose of Wernecke is to ensure that lump
sum agreements that compromise the rights of claimants to file future claims meet the strict
criteria of Idaho Code Section 72-332, which outlines the basis for liability of the second injury
fund. Counsel for the Fund will not construct a lump sum agreement that ignores certain facts in
the case, or make inaccurate and misleading statements to the Commission in an attempt to
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obtain approval of the lump sum agreement. What specifically does the Claimant want to change
in the lump sum agreement? The Claimant himself, in his letter of December 3, 2010 outlining
the various conditions attached to the lump sum agreement, made the likelihood of the
Commission approving this lump sum agreement remote. The Fund takes the preparation of a
lump sum agreement seriously and attempts to provide to the Commission a full factual basis for
the agreement. The lump sum agreement prepared by the Fund in the present case accurately
summarized the pre-existing condition, the July 3, 2006 accident and resulting surgery, and
included the various impairment ratings and restrictions that the Claimant sustained.
Frankly, ifthere were some small change in the lump sum agreement, or clarification that
would result in approval by the Commission, the Fund certainly would have made the correction
or change. However, it was clear that the Commission, under the facts of this case, chose not to
approve the lump sum agreement in large measure based upon the position of the Claimant,
where he was asserting total disability based upon the effects of the last accident alone.
The Fund in this case has acted both appropriately and ethically toward the Claimant and
the Commission. The Fund participated in a requested mediation which resulted in a settlement
offer made to the Claimant which the Claimant refused to accept for a period of fifteen months.
Ten days before hearing the Claimant finally accepted the Fund's offer, but inserted numerous
conditions as a basis for its acceptance. The conditions requested by the Claimant were
incorporated in the lump sum agreement but resulted in an agreement that was not acceptable to
the Commission in light of the Wernecke case. The Claimant knew full well that approval by the
Commission was not assured and that both parties reserved the right to bring the case to hearing
in the event the lump sum agreement was not approved. The Claimant, nevertheless, has brought
two motions in an attempt to force the Fund to amend the lump sum agreement in a manner
RESPONSE TO CLAIMANT'S MOTION
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which the Claimant does not specify. Frankly, it should be the Fund seeking sanctions for
attorney fees and costs for the meritless use of the legal process by Claimant in filing these two
motions.
The ISIF respectfully requests that the Commission deny the motion for reconsideration.
DATED this

day of September, 2011.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

THOMAS W. CALLERY
Attorney for Defendant ISIF

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the __ day of September, 2011, a true and correct copy of the Response to
Motion for Reconsideration was served by the method indicated below and addressed upon each of

the following:
~

STARR KELSO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 1312
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816

0
0
0

~

ERIC S. BAILEY
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP
P.O. BOX 1007
BOISE, ID 83701

0
0
0
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Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
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INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ROY J. GREEN,
Claimant,
V.

ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOE
SALVAGE LOGGING,
Employer,
and
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
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ORDER DENYING
RECONSIDERATION

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, Claimant moves for reconsideration of the
Commission's Order Denying Request for Sanctions ("Order") in the above-captioned case.
Defendant Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") objects to the motion and asks that the
Order be upheld.
A decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive,
provided that within twenty days from the date of filing the decision, any party may move for
reconsideration. Idaho Code § 72-718. A motion for reconsideration must "present to the
Commission new reasons factually and legally to support [reconsideration] rather than rehashing
evidence previously presented." Curtis v. MH. King Co., 142 Idaho 383, 128 P.3d 920 (2005).
The Commission is not inclined to reweigh evidence and arguments simply because an issue was
not resolved in the party's favor.
ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION - 1

On May 20, 2011, Claimant filed a motion for sanctions against ISIF. Claimant had
previously entered into a lump sum settlement agreement ("LSSA") with ISIF, but the
Commission declined to approve the LSSA because it failed to meet the requirements set forth in
Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District No. 401, 147 Idaho 277,207 P.3d 1008 (2009). In

his subsequent motion for sanctions, Claimant stated that he had suffered financial hardship
because the LSSA was not approved, and he argued that the failure of the LSSA was due to
ISIF's refusal to insert language in the LSSA that would have rendered it consistent with
Wernecke. Essentially, Claimant blamed ISIF for his hardship. Claimant asked the Commission

to order ISIF to 1) pay Claimant reasonable attorney fees, 2) pay Claimant punitive costs and
damages, to be determined at a hearing, and 3) compensate the Commission for the "lost time" of
the Commissioners and staff who considered the LSSA.
ISIF responded that Claimant and Claimant's counsel were aware at the time the LSSA
was submitted that it might not be approved under Wernecke, but Claimant chose to sign the
agreement anyway. ISIF disagreed that its actions caused Claimant hardship, characterizing
Claimant's motion as "frivolous."
Claimant replied that ISIF had a duty to prepare the LSSA in a manner that would be
consistent with Wernecke. However, ISIF refused to do so. Such refusal constituted bad faith and
caused the LSSA to be disapproved by the Commission. Claimant argued that his settlement
agreement with ISIF was a legally binding, enforceable contract, that good faith and fair dealing
are implied obligations in every contract, and that ISIF acted in bad faith by not inserting
language consistent with Wernecke in the LSSA. Consequently, the Commission should order
ISIF to "submit ... a lump sum settlement agreement that complies with the standards expressed
in Wernecke." In the alternative, the Commission should hold a hearing to determine the "nature
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and extent of damages suffered" by Claimant "as a result of ... ISIF's actions." See Claimant's
Reply to ISIF's Response to Motion for Sanctions, p. 7.
On September 9, 2011, the Commission issued the Order Denying Request for Sanctions,
noting that the Commission "does not award punitive damages for an unapproved settlement," as
there is "nothing in the regulatory or statutory scheme [that] requires parties to settle their
disputes." See Order, pp. 2-3. Whatever Claimant's reservations about the LSSA, he voluntarily
signed it, thus subscribing to the language therein. Claimant failed to cite a basis for which
sanctions could be imposed.
On reconsideration, Claimant argues that the Commission misunderstood the basis of his
motion for sanctions. Claimant did not ask that sanctions be imposed because the LSSA was not
approved. Rather, sanctions should be imposed because ISIF knowingly "sabotaged" the LSSA
by refusing to insert language that would satisfy the Wernecke requirements. Claimant repeats
his argument that when ISIF agreed to settle the case, it formed an oral contract with Claimant
and was thus obliged to act in good faith under the law of contracts. By refusing to include
language consistent with Wernecke, ISIF acted in bad faith, as it knowingly caused the LSSA to
be disapproved, causing hardship to Claimant. Therefore, Claimant is entitled to one of two
remedies: either the Commission should order ISIF to submit an LSSA that complies with
Wernecke, or the Commission should order ISIF to pay to Claimant the sum of $50,000.00,

which Claimant would have received had the LSSA been approved.
ISIF denies that it acted in bad faith. It notes that Claimant and Claimant's counsel were
aware that the LSSA might not be approved by the Commission, and that the agreement was not
binding or enforceable without Commission approvaL In the absence of a binding agreement,
ISIF is not obliged to pay anything to Claimant, because there is no contract to enforce.
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Furthermore, ISIP argues that Claimant's motion for reconsideration should be denied because
the requested relief is not the same as the sanctions requested in the original motion for
sanctions.
Regardless of the relief requested, we find that reconsideration is not warranted. Claimant
1s incorrect that his motion for sanctions was misunderstood. The Commission addressed
Claimant's argument about ISIP's refusal to include certain language in the agreement when the
Commission observed:

It is evident from the submitted documents that Claimant did
not receive all the desired concessions from the ISIP
regarding the wording of the settlement, and that Claimant
felt that his requested changes would have satisfied the
Commission and prevented the foreclosure of Claimant's
house .... Understandably, Claimant was frustrated about the
settlement, yet still chose to execute and submit the same to
the Commission.
See Order, p. 3. Thus, the Commission has already considered Claimant's arguments concerning
the language of the LSSA and ISIP's alleged bad faith, but was not persuaded by them.
Claimant's argument about bad faith might be more compelling if ISIP had promised to include
language consistent with Wernecke in the LSSA, only to renege on that promise; however,
Claimant has not shown that ISIP made such a promise, and Claimant has not offered additional
arguments that would support imposing sanctions. Therefore, Claimant's motion for
reconsideration is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

day
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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Assistant Commission Secretarf
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

, 2011, a true and correct copy of the
I hereby certify that on the {~day
foregoing ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION was served by regular United States
Mail upon each of the following:
STARR KELSO
PO BOX 1312
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83816
THOMAS CALLERY
POBOX854
LEWISTON ID 83501
ERIC S BAILEY
PO BOX 1007
BOISE ID 83701
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BEFORE

ROY GREEN,
Claimant,

IC 2006-007698

ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOE SALVAGE,

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

V.

Employer,
and
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-506, the Idaho Industrial Commission assigned the aboveentitled matter to Referee Rinda Just, who conducted a hearing in St. Maries on August 21
and 22, 2012. Claimant was present at the hearing and represented by Starr Kelso of Coeur
d'Alene. Eric S. Bailey of Boise represented Employer and Surety (referred to collectively as
Surety), and Thomas W. Callery of Lewiston represented the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
(ISIF). The parties presented oral and documentary evidence and five post-hearing depositions
were taken. Post-hearing briefs were filed, and the matter came under advisement on March 21,
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13.

Upon

retirement

the Commission

April 20 I

the case was

reassigned to the Commissioners.
ISSUES
By agreement of the parties, the issues to be decided are:
1.

Whether Claimant's condition is due in whole or in part to a pre-existing or

subsequent injury or condition;
2.

Whether and to what extent Claimant is entitled to benefits for:
a. Medical care;
b. Temporary partial and or temporary total disability (TPD/TTD);
c. Permanent partial impairment (PPI); and
d. Disability in excess of impairment, including total permanent disability
pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine;

3.

Whether apportionment for a pre-existing condition pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-

406 is appropriate;
4.

Whether ISIF is liable under Idaho Code § 72-332; and, if so,

5.

Apportionment under the Carey formula; and

6.

Whether Claimant is entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 72-804.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES

Claimant contends that he is totally and permanently disabled as an odd-lot worker due,
at least in part, to his 2006 industrial injury to his cervical and lumbar spine. He primarily relies
upon the opinions of Dr. Dirks, his treating orthopedic surgeon, as well as those of Dan
Brownell, vocational consultant.

Claimant does not advance any arguments regarding ISIF
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liability.

Claimant

asserts

1s entitled to an

attorney

unreasonable adjustment of his claim.
Surety contends that Claimant suffered no permanent impairment (and, therefore, no
disability) due to his 2006 industrial injuries and, further, that Claimant is not totally and
permanently disabled. In the event the Commission disagrees on both of these issues, then
Surety asserts that ISIF is liable for 57% to 67% of Claimant's benefits because Claimant's total
and permanent disablement is due to a combination of Claimant's 1) pre-existing permanent
impairments due to prior injuries to his cervical, thoracic and lumbar spine, both of his upper
extremities and both of his lower extremities, and 2) the cervical and lumbar injuries Claimant
sustained in his last industrial accident in 2006.

Surety seeks findings that Claimant's pre-

existing impairments were manifest, constituted subjective hindrances to employment, and
"combined" with injuries sustained in Claimant's last accident such as to trigger ISIF liability.
Surety also seeks a credit for overpaying temporary disability benefits.
ISIF joins Surety in maintaining that Claimant is not permanently and totally disabled
under either the 100% method or the odd-lot doctrine. However, if the Commission finds that he
is, then ISIF contends it is nevertheless not liable because 1) the evidence fails to establish
Claimant had any pre-existing permanent impairments that meet the first three requirements of
the Dumaw test, and 2) any pre-existing impairment did not combine with Claimant's 2006
industrial accident to cause total and permanent disability.
Surety and ISIF both rely upon the vocational opinions of Nancy Collins, Ph.D.
OBJECTIONS

All pending objections preserved in the deposition transcripts are overruled.
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record in
1.

matter consists of the following:

The pre-hearing depositions of:
a. Claimant dated January 5, 2007 and February 20, 2009;
b. Michael Ludwig, M.D. dated January

2007;

c. Bret Dirks, M.D. dated December 23, 2004; and
The testimony taken at hearing of:
a. Claimant;
b. Robby Macklin;
C.

Randy Reynolds;

d. Dewey Shawver;
e. Shelby Green;
f.

Wesley Green;

g. Mike Roland;
h. Dan Brownell; and
1.

3.

Nancy Collins, Ph.D; and

Joint Exhibits 1-91 submitted after the hearing, which consist of the following

exhibits admitted at the hearing:
a. Claimant's Exhibits 1-59;
b. ISIP and Employer's Exhibits 1-32; and
c. Employer's Exhibits 1-12; and
4.

The post-hearing depositions of:
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a. Nancy J. Collins, Ph.D. taken J../'"'''""''

2011;

Carrie Nordin taken October 5,201
c. Don Williams, D.O. taken September 17, 2012; and
d. Bret Dirks, M.D. taken September 18, 2012.
After having considered all the above evidence and briefs of the parties, the Commission
renders the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
PRE-INDUSTRIAL INJURY VOCATIONAL AND MEDICAL HISTORY

1.

Claimant was 53 years of age at the time of the hearing and resided in St. Maries,

the seat of Benewah County. He was 46 at the time of his relevant industrial accident in 2006.
2.

Claimant left high school after the 11th grade (in 1976) to go to work to help

support his parents. He later obtained a GED. He has no fmiher formal education.
3.

While in high school, Claimant began working at a service station where he

changed oil, pumped gas, checked tires, filled propane tanks, and performed other service station
work. He left to work in saw mills, including the Potlatch saw mill.
4.

In 1980, Claimant was incarcerated for grand larceny after he cut cedar trees from

federal land and sold them. He testified that he did it to support two families of cousins who
were starving. Claimant has had no other problems with the law. While he was incarcerated, he
got his GED and did some teaching. Later, in 1981, Claimant took a job operating a Caterpillar
tractor (Cat).
5.

Claimant's pre-existing medical history is long and complicated.
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6.
~~,..~,,.. ,

In 1981, Claimant underwent

imaging that,

to Drs. Westbrook,

and Barnard, evidenced some sort of neck injury. (No accompanying medical records

were available.)
7.

In 1982 and 1983, Claimant worked in Alaska as a night shift foreman on a fish

butchering line. He also ran a forklift and organized cold storage, among other things. In
addition, Claimant performed some electrical work and "engineered a fishing boat." JE-339.
8.

In 1984, Claimant was seriously injured when a choker belt struck him in the low

back, causing him to fall down a mountainside. Claimant was off work for 245 days in recovery.
With assistance from the Industrial Commission Rehabilitation Division (ICRD), Claimant
received on-the-job training with CC Services, a vehicle repair shop, but he soon left to take
another logging job because the pay was too low. Claimant testified that he made a full recovery
and returned to logging without further difficulties.
9.

Thereafter, Claimant began working as a sawyer and operator of logging

equipment including skidders, Cats and log processors, among other machines. Notably, he ran
Mike Roland's salvage logging operation for several years, during which he also logged the
timber he used to build his own house.
10.

In 1987, Claimant injured his neck and jaw when he was involved in a rollover

skidder accident. He initially reported symptoms including right arm and hand pain which his
physician ultimately deemed to be unsupported by findings evidencing true neurologic deficits in
sensation.

Claimant received conservative treatment, including physical therapy (which

worsened his symptoms) and medications (including Flexeril, Tylenol 4 and Motrin 800).
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11.

As

passed, Claimant developed additional symptoms including pain in his

right scapula and shoulder, paresthesia in his right upper extremity (RUE) without radiation, and
low back pain. He then developed pain in both upper extremities with spasm in his left posterior
cervical dorsal muscles, crepitus in his neck and upper back, and neurologic complaints without
objectively identifiable source. Claimant's complaints grew to include ear-ringing (worse with a
wide open mouth), but his neck and shoulder symptoms remained his worst problems. Claimant
also reported temporomandibular joint (TMJ) symptoms that Dr. Westbrook could not connect to
an objectively identifiable injury. In addition, Claimant reported his arms would fall asleep if he
slept on his back and that he could not carry a half gallon of milk with his right arm because it
was too heavy, among other intensifying symptoms, all of which Claimant attributed to the
skidder rollover.
12.

A panel evaluation by Drs. Powell and Clark on February 29, 1988 produced

opinions that Claimant's subjective complaints were out of proportion to the (lack of) objective
findings.

The panel returned Claimant to work with no impairment and no restrictions.

Nevertheless, Claimant continued to report symptoms and obtain medical treatment. In March
1988 Claimant advised Dr. Westbrook that he intended to pursue the matter in the courts. In
April 1998, Dr. Lea opined that Claimant's bizaiTe complaints were likely due to
psychophysiologic factors aggravating his pain, but he later opined that EMG findings were
consistent with mild right carpal tunnel syndrome. In May 1988, a functional capacity evaluator
opined Claimant exaggerated his pain and recommended, among other things, a psychological
assessment.

Thereafter, Claimant sought treatment from Dr. Gould, a chiropractor, and

Drs. Hopwood and Henriksen, who recommended more treatment for cervical strain, chronic
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pain, and left carpal tunnel syndrome. Dr. Henriksen and

Gould advised Claimant not

to return to skidder operating.
13.

In 1988, Dr Gould, a chiropractor, opined that Claimant had weakness at L4-5

that would likely result in a disc problem if not stabilized, and thinning at L5-S 1.
14.

In approximately October 1988, Claimant submitted a lump sum settlement

agreement (LSSA), which was approved by the Commission on November 10, 1988. Claimant's
settlement included a general 5% whole person PPL The LSSA states that Claimant alleged he
incurred injuries to his head, neck, back, knee, fingers, shoulder and right arm, specifically
including acute strains of his neck and dorsal areas, mild concussion, and residual tinnitus. In
addition, Claimant received $6,147.18 via the LSSA for retraining (presumably truck driver
training recommended by ICRD).

For whatever reason, Claimant did not follow up after

receiving his settlement funds. He testified at the hearing that he did not pursue this option
because he could not afford it, he was not interested in a sedentary job, and furthermore, he felt
uncomfortable (fearful) with the idea of driving a big rig truck. However, ICRD records indicate
that Claimant, at the time, told the consultant that he was very interested in truck driver training
and intended to pursue it. By December 9, 1988, Claimant still had not returned to work;
however, he ceased obtaining treatment for neck, TMJ, or back conditions. Claimant returned to
logging and testified that he was able to perform his job without difficulty.
15.

In approximately 1992, Potlatch contracted Claimant to log its property.

Claimant hired a sawyer, obtained a business loan and workers' compensation coverage, moved
his Cat trailer to Mica Meadows, and went to work. He nan1ed his sole proprietorship St. Joe
Salvage.
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Claimant

16.
equipment.

work

a crane,

a

and cleanup, almost

among
for

Potlatch. "I go through - - they give me areas that the wind blows trees down, or that we have
bug kill, and I just pretty much - - they start me in an area and I work my way." 2007 CL Dep.,

p. 8.
17.

Potlatch provided 90 to 95% of the logging salvage work for St. Joe Salvage.

Claimant did not need to bid jobs; Potlatch contacted him when logging work was available and
paid just under $40 per ton delivered to the mill. After expenses, such as a 34% charge for
loading and hauling, fuel costs, payroll, payroll taxes, and workers' compensation, Claimant
figured he averaged $314 or $340 (apparently he could not remember which) per day over five or
six years.
18.

Claimant developed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome while working for

Mr. Roland's salvage logging operation. He underwent bilateral corrective surgeries in 1993.
The surgeries were ultimately successful. Claimant testified he fully recovered from his carpal
tunnel conditions, with no residual difficulties and no PPL
19.

In August 1995, Claimant separated his right AC (shoulder) joint while running

down a hill with chokers, when the line tangled and abruptly stopped, yanking his ann. Claimant
underwent surgery by Dr. Cody in Spokane. The surgery was successful and Claimant returned
to work without permanent restrictions or pain.
20.

In February 2000, Claimant was diagnosed with a hernia. He underwent hernia

repair surgery, after which he returned to logging work. Complications with the repair mesh
ensued, and Claimant underwent a second hernia surgery. Following this procedure, Claimant
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to logging.
medical
21.

or

were assessed.
On September 25, 2001, Claimant separated his left AC joint pulling on a winch

line. At his 2009 deposition, Claimant described being hit by a root wad (stump with roots
attached) rolling down the mountain. At the hearing, however, Claimant described the accident
differently. "Running down the mountain with a choker and the winch came loose and stopped,
and it just yanked you [sic]." TRI, p. 80. "[S]o I'm kind of just like hanging by one arm, but
you [sic] don't know it's coming, so ... [y]our [sic] collar bone just pops out of that socket right
there and pops up." Id. Claimant also described wrapping his collar bone with an Ace bandage
to keep it stable, and using his other arm at work until breakup in March or February because he
did not want to take time off from work to have it repaired. Apparently, Claimant did not
accurately remember which of his shoulder injuries occurred first. In any event, on March 14,
2002, Claimant underwent left AC repair surgery with Dr. McNulty.
successful.

The surgery was

Claimant returned to work without restrictions or residual pain.

The date of

Claimant's return to work is not discernible from the record.
22.

On January 14, 2003, Claimant reported to William Ganz, M.D., a neurosurgeon,

that he had injured his mid-back limbing a tree on April 29, 2002:
I was just cutting a big bull pine limb, pulling up on it, because the way it was
bent, I couldn't cut it down, I had to pull up. And it felt like somebody shot me
right in the back and paralyzed me. And I ended up in a puddle on the ground.
And three days later I could work and I went back to work. I laid on the couch for
three or four days, though.
TRI, p. 82. Claimant was eventually diagnosed with a herniated disc with spurring at Tl2-Ll,
for which Dr. Ganz performed a T12-Ll fusion surgery in January 2003. After conducting a
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not
problem was the result

an April

industrial

claim that

Claimant first reported

back pain in May 2002; however, at that time, he attributed it to a November 2001 accident.
Also, Dr. Weiss opined that Claimant's long history of arthritic problems in his neck and
shoulders, long smoking history, the suggestion of a chronic degenerative process not yet ruled
out, and Dr. Ganz's intraoperative findings of significant osteophytes suggesting an underlying
degenerative process all complicated the question of what brought on Claimant's disc herniation.
As well, after reviewing Claimant's prior records that were not available to him at the time he
performed surgery in 2003, Dr. Ganz became suspicious that Claimant's injury was due to
natural degeneration, and not an April 2002 injury.
23.

In recovery, Claimant wore a back brace for four months. Dr. Ganz initially

restricted Claimant from heavy lifting and bending on a regular basis; however, Claimant did not
heed these restrictions. "Well, that's impossible. That entails tying your shoe. You know? So I
just ignored him and took my time and got better because I could." TRI, p. 85.
24.

Claimant returned to work after about four months. As detailed in the Safety

Video section below, Claimant testified inconsistently in these proceedings with respect to his
actual abilities following his thoracic spine surgery. However, he consistently testified that he
does not believe he was employable by anyone else as a logger following his 2003 spinal fusion,
regardless of his actual abilities, because of the perception that he was an unreasonable insurance
risk. Claimant believed that, had he not been running his own logging business, he could have
obtained employment as a mechanic or mill worker running a debarker, forklift, or other
equipment in 2003.
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Shelby
did not know how

his

dad

his 2003 back surgery

because she was only 10 years old at the time. Wesley was 11 years old at the time.

recalled

that his dad worked just about every day, but when he got home he mostly just relaxed. "He
wouldn't do as much after that." TR2, p. 17. Dr. Williams (see below) recalled that Claimant
told him he no longer did any heavy work after the 2003 surgery.
26.

Dewey "Duke" Shawver, a long-time salvage logger in the St. Maries area who

has worked with Claimant and respects his work ethic and logging abilities, agreed that Claimant
was not employable as a logger following his 2003 surgery.
27.

No PPI has been assessed to Claimant's thoracic spine condition, and Dr. Ganz

released Claimant without restrictions in 2004.

On the other hand, Dr. Dirks endorsed

restrictions for Claimant following his 2003 thoracic spine surgery of no heavy lifting and
limited bending. Dr. Ludwig agreed that he would assess similar restrictions, but deferred to Dr.
Ganz in Claimant's case.
28.

Claimant received a check for temporary disability benefits related to his surgery

with Dr. Ganz because he had been required to miss ten weeks of work. Claimant testified that
he refused the check, however, because he had saved enough money to cover his wage loss.
"Associated Loggers, yeah. They told me, "Well, you got 10 weeks coming." And I said, "Well,
I don't need it, man. Put it somewhere else." They thought I was crazy." TRI, pp. 84-85.
29.

MRI and other imaging techniques in 2003 and 2004 revealed diffuse disc bulges

at every lumbar level, and other pathology, but no spinal impingement. By November 2004,
Claimant's L4-5 diffuse posterior disc bulge was accompanied by moderate bilateral apophyseai
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to mild
a

canal

2004 EMG nerve conduction study

produced findings consistent with right-sided SI radiculopathy, according to

Dirks, even

though his lumbar spine MRI revealed no impingement.
30.

In 2004, Claimant fractured his right calcaneus showing his son how (not!) to

jump a motorcycle. He worked in a cast for a period before fully recovering without work
restrictions or limitations. Following this event, however, Claimant cut down on his motorcycleriding. He also contracted pneumonia, from which he fully recovered with no residual effects.
31.

In November 2004, Claimant hit his head while getting into the cab of his dozer.

Dr. Dirks obtained an MRI on November 24, 2004 that identified minor disc bulging and minor
arthritic changes, but no frank disc herniations or compression on the spinal cord. "I did not see
anything that was surgical or might explain any of his pain complaints." 2004 Dirks Dep., p. 10.
Further, he opined that any future care related to Claimant's neck would be due to a new
accident.

Claimant's industrial claim related to this injury was settled by LSSA approved

January 27, 2005. No related PPI or medical restrictions were assessed.
32.

Claimant also complained of numbness in his feet in 2004 that Dr. Dirks opined

could not be explained by his MRI findings. "It may be residual problems from the previous
surgery and herniated disk problems." 2004 Dirks Dep., p. 12. Claimant also reported persistent
pain down his back and into his legs with numbness, increased electrical shocks down the back
of his thighs, calves, and into his heels (right worse than left), incontinence, sleeping problems,
and tingling with motion, which Dr. Dirks opined were attributable to his injuries and surgery at
Tl2-Ll, from which he had reached medical stability.
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to

spine) and 2004
acknowledged

PPI of

of the whole person due to his 1984 back injury.
34.

In 2005 and 2006, Claimant was awarded the Potlatch Logger of the Year Award.

To Claimant's knowledge, no one else has been twice honored with this distinction.
35.

At the hearing, Claimant testified that there isn't much salvage work left anymore

because "they're" now "fjlust clear cutting everything." TRI, p. 170. Mr. Shawver agreed.
"Getting to be less and less all the time." TRI, p. 214.
36.

Claimant's tax returns show his gross receipts/adjusted gross income (AGI) from

2001 through 2008:
2001 - $187,349 I $53,286
2002 - $204,757 I $41,052
2003 - $346,596 I $17,180
2004 - $303,757 I $60,107
2005 - $200,288 I $27,345
2006 - $150,177 I $42,321
2007 $244,396 I $70,295
2008 - $187,673 / $50,016
SAFETY VIDEO: JUNE 25, 2006

37.

On June 25, 2006, just eight days before his industrial accident, Claimant and his

employee made a Safety Video that captured images of Claimant doing salvage work. He is
featured climbing, jumping down from logs, walking across logs, and falling and limbing trees
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m a canyon, as

a

among other
could

immediately
do everything he used to do, except install a winch line on a Cat.

"I could run and jump.

Everything. Ride motorcycles. I could do anything I wanted to." JE-345. He said he could still
hook a tree, set chokers, saw down and skid trees, limb trees, and carry buckets of oil, and he did
not feel at all disabled. He recalled that Dr. Ganz told him to avoid only extremely heavy lifting,
which he did:
Q. And what do you mean by extremely heavy lifting?

A Oh, like putting a winch line on a Cat. Eighty, ninety, hundred pound winch
line.
Q. So you did avoid that?

A Yes, I did.

Q. Anything else?
A. No.

Q. Did the doctors recommend that you get out of logging?

A Yeah, possibly. I don't remember.
Q. Did you ever think about getting out oflogging after the T-12 L-1 surgery?

A No, sir.
JE-345.
38.

At the hearing, Claimant contradicted his 2009 testimony:

Q. . .. Does the video accurately reflect what you were doing on a regular eighthour-a-day basis?

A Well, no. I didn't - - that was a - - I didn't saw much. I mostly run the Cat. I
sawed maybe two hours a day, if that.
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was there a reason - was
most of the falling?
me.
it did
Well,
to cut the stump or get on your hands and knees or on your knees.

to

Q. So would it be fair to say two hours a day you did the activities in the video
and the rest of the time you would work on the Cat or the log processor?

A. Not every day. Some days I didn't even saw.
Q. Some days you did no sawing?
A. Yeah.
Q. Would there be some days you did eight or ten hours of sawing?
A. No. Never. Two is about tops.
Q. Did you ever think about getting out of logging after the Tl2-Ll surgery?
A. No, not really. I figured I'd give it a shot anyway and see ifl could do it.
Q. Your testimony is that you avoided the sawing part of the job after your Tl2Ll surgery. Correct?
A. Yeah.

TRI, pp. 161-162.
SUBJECT INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT: JULY 3, 2006
39.

On July 3, 2006, Claimant was working alone when he was struck on his hardhat

by a falling tree. Claimant's employee had previously cut the tree that hit Claimant, but left it
standing. The draft created by a tree Claimant had just fallen apparently knocked the rogue tree
loose, unbeknownst to Claimant. Fleeing the tree he had just cut, Claimant ran smack into it. A
nearby stump prevented the tree from crushing Claimant. When he came to, Claimant wriggled
out from under the tree. His legs were tingling and numb. He couldn't lift his chainsaw. He
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made his

to his pickup and

he tried to

a soda.

was clumsy

were

he knew he
done."

- - it was

seriously
'pp. 1

103. Claimant drove to the emergency department at Benewah Community Hospital in St.
Maries.
POST-INDUSTRIAL INJURY MEDICAL CARE
40.

July 3, 2006 initial evaluation (Dr. Katovich).

At Benewah Community

Hospital, Claimant was examined by John R. Katovich, Jr., M.D. Claimant reported he had been
momentarily stunned by the accident, but he did not believe he had lost consciousness for a
significant period of time, and he remembered everyihing after the event.

He had a 9/10

headache, as well as pain in his neck, elbow, and back. He was taking Neurontin daily. He
smoked two packs of cigarettes and drank a six pack of beer per day. On exam, Claimant had
"no evidence of ecchymosis, swelling or anything on the scalp and occiput, evidently to the
credit of his hard hat. Tenderness to the neck but full range of motion." JE-2. Claimant did
have a small bruise on his left side at the pelvic brim. A cervical x-ray revealed degenerative
changes, but no fracture. Dr. Katovich diagnosed multiple contusions, prescribed medications
(Flexeril and Lortab ), took Claimant off work for 24 hours, and recommended follow-up with his
primary care physician.
41.

July 7, 2006 follow-up (Dr. Ludwig). Claimant was certain he had injured his

back, but he felt Dr. Katovich had not properly evaluated him for a spinal injury. Claimant
testified at the hearing for the first time that, the next day, he had clear fluid running out of his
ears, so he called Mary Cronin, adjustor.

She approved an evaluation by Dr. Ludwig, a

physiatrist, in Coeur d'Alene.
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Dr.

0

evaluated Claimant on July
worse while standing and looking up/down, walking or

m

uvJLi'4JLHf',

forward. He also reported bladder incontinence, but no worse than before the tree hit him. There
is no mention of ear drainage in these or any other medical records. Claimant was taking three
Neurontin pills per day. On exam, Dr. Ludwig noted no gross ecchymosis over the area of
impact, pain localized to the left temporal region, diffuse tenderness over the cervical spine,
tenderness over the vertebral prominence, no evidence of instability, good bilateral upper limb
strength, lower extremity strength testing inhibited by pain, diminished Achilles reflex on the
1
right as compared to the left, mildly positive adverse neural tension to seated slump exam,

tenderness over his lower lumbar spine "well inferior to the area of his previous surgery," no
rash or erythema, intact distal pulses and no edema or swelling.

Dr. Ludwig reserved his

diagnosis, but recommended cervical and lumbar MRls due to the nature of Claimant's recent
trauma, his vague symptoms including pain, his recurrence of problems similar to those he
experienced prior to his 2003 spinal fusion surgery, and his asymmetric reflexes, which Claimant
could not identify as either pre-existing or new. In the meantime, Dr. Ludwig returned Claimant
to work, restricting him from overhead work, bending and lifting no more than 30 pounds.
43.

July 11, 2006 lumbar spine MRI. The radiologist's report indicates Claimant

had lower extremity pain, worse on the left, and that Claimant's March 17, 2004 lumbar spine
MRI (or at least its report) was available for comparison. The radiologist noted four findings in
his "Impression" section. At L4-5, a left lateral disc extrusion was compressing the left L4 nerve
1

Dr. Ludwig described the seated slump exam: 'The patient is in a seated position and with cervical flexion and
concomitant extension of a leg at a time. They have varying degrees of pain and reproduction of back pain, leg pain
with extension of the knee. A grossly positive test is reproducible at the same angle usually corresponding to exact
symptoms. A mildly positive test usually refers to some diffuse pain either nonlocalizing to a nerve distribution or
with varying reproducibility." Ludwig Dep., p. 42.
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narrowing. There was mild worsening at TI0-1 I with a left paracentral disc protrusion that
might be contouring the thoracic cord. Finally, the radiologist noted a mild left lateral disc
protrusion at L5-S 1.
44.

July 11, 2006 cervical spine MRI. The radiologist's report indicates Claimant

had neck pain following his industrial injury and that Claimant's July 3, 2006 cervical spine xray film and November 24, 2004 cervical spine MRI report were available for comparison. The
radiologist noted three findings in his "Impression" section.

At CS-6 Claimant had an

interspinous ligament sprain with adjacent paraspinous musculature strain involving C4-5
without malalignment or evidence of longitudinal ligament disruption. Also at CS-6, a broadbased right paracentral disc bulge causing mild contouring of the cervical cord was identified, as
was minimal spinal stenosis.

There was also multilevel facet arthropathy and variable-to-

moderate foraminal narrowing at other cervical levels.
45.

Dr. Ludwig's initial diagnoses.

Claimant followed up with Dr. Ludwig on

July 12, 2006. Claimant's Achilles reflexes were symmetric on this exam, and he had tenderness
over his mid cervical spine.

Given Claimant's imaging results and his exam findings,

Dr. Ludwig diagnosed a CS-6 ligament sprain and a left L4-5 disc extrusion, consistent with his
left leg complaints, along with mild progression of the same degenerative changes demonstrated
on his November 2004 lumbar spine MRI. As to Claimant's left leg complaints, Dr. Ludwig
clarified in his deposition that Claimant's reported pain did not follow the typical dermatornal
pattern associated with compression of the L4-5 nerve root. The typical expectation is pain in
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recommended relative rest for Claimant's neck, which he believed would heal on its own.
46.

For

Claimant's

lumbar

disc

extrusion,

Dr.

diagnostic/therapeutic transforaminal epidural steroid injection.

Ludwig

recommended

a

A positive response to the

injection would indicate an inflammatory component to Claimant's pain, signaling an acute
(within six months) injury. Chronic conditions, on the other hand, like chronic herniations, are
associated with less inflammation and do not respond well to steroid injections.

"Lack of

response to the injection is also helpful in that it may not be the structure causing the pain."
Ludwig Dep., p. 59. "Pain could be coming from other structures; bone, muscle." Id.
response to the injection, Claimant had "[m]inimal improvement, at best." Id., p. 56.

In
Dr.

Ludwig released Claimant to modified duty work as described above, and prescribed 70 more
Lortab pills for pain control.
47.

On July 27, 2006, Dr. Ludwig noted Claimant still had pain in his neck, but his

motion was improved and there was no evidence of instability or step-off. Claimant still had
positive adverse neural tension bilaterally to seated slump exam and diminished sensation in a
"subjective pattern in the bilateral thighs." JE-19. Dr. Ludwig recommended an EMG study to
confirm whether or not there was acute axonal loss or denervation in the IA myotomal
distribution and to reevaluate Claimant's right leg.

He also noted Claimant's history of

underlying peripheral neuropathy diagnosed via EMG testing several years previously.
48.

Claimant returned to work at some point, but he was still having trouble walking.

"I tried, yes, and I - - my legs wouldn't work, and I couldn't - - I was floundering half the time."
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arm
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son,

Wesley, testified that Claimant's arm was pretty torn up as a result. The next day, Claimant
attended the Idaho State Championships at Fossil Bowl, a motorcycle race in which his son was
competing. There, Claimant spoke to a nurse about his left arm swelling. She encouraged him
to seek medical treatment. Surety obtained surveillance video of Claimant attending this event,
among other things (see below).
49.

On July 30, 2006 Claimant sought treatment for his left forearm injury. X-ray

imaging showed no acute changes, and he was diagnosed with contusions and abrasions of his
left forearm and wrist.

Claimant's arm was placed into a sling, Norco (26 pills total) was

prescribed, and Claimant was instructed to rest and ice the arm.
50.

July 29 and 30, 2006 Surveillance Video. Surety obtained video recordings of

Claimant on July 29 and 30, 2006, as he drove in his truck and attended his son's motorcycle
competition. The video is of poor quality for the most part, apparently shot from a significant
distance, and most of the frames are shaky. Claimant is depicted standing and walking around
without a limp, talking to people, and a couple of times he bent deeply at the waist to look more
closely at the engine areas on motorcycles. At one point, it appears as if Claimant is limping and
the camera is shut off for no reason that is apparent from the video. Claimant is also depicted
climbing a mobile stair unit, standing on it videoing the action, and sometimes sitting down on
one of the steps.
51.

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI).

Claimant applied for SSDI

benefits on July 31, 2006, alleging disability based upon a broken back and a neck injury. His
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October

2008, he was denied because he was still making management decisions for St Joe Salvage.
Around this same time, Claimant ceased operations.

Following Claimant's retention of an

attorney in 2009, and his subsequent non-industrial accident in 2010 (see below), his SSDI
application was eventually approved.
52.

Follow-up with Dr. Ludwig. On August 7, 2006, Claimant followed up with

Dr. Ludwig. His cervical sprain was unchanged, with some stiffness but not much interference
with his range of motion. He still had tenderness over his occiput and claimed he could make his
legs go numb by pressing on it. With respect to his low back, Claimant had numbness and
tingling in his right leg and left posterior calf and thigh. Claimant's recent EMG testing revealed
no evidence of acute denervation of his left leg. On exam, Claimant's Achilles reflex testing
revealed symmetric results, and he no longer demonstrated adverse neural tension to seated
slump examination. Claimant walked without significant foot drop. Dr. Ludwig noted some
twitching of the left medial gastrocnemius, but no edema or swelling. Claimant had a little
crepitus over his posterior cervical spine to active motion, with no instability and no upper limb
weakness.
53.

Dr. Ludwig diagnosed, among other things, multi-level lumbar degenerative disc

disease. Given Claimant's EMG results, he was uncertain whether his L4-5 herniated disc was
acute.

He wrote, "Interval development of a left L4-5 herniated nucleus pulposus without

evidence of acute denervation. It is unclear if this actually [sic] from his trauma or if he had
developed this in the interval." JE-22. "At this point, the L4-5 [ ... herniation] does not appear to
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acute in
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acute denervation potentials into the

that Claimant's

would reach medical stability from his July

was stable.
2006 injuries

that Claimant

about a month, prescribed pain

medications, including gabapentin and 50 hydrocodone pills, and returned him to modified duty
work. "I do feel that Roy has a number of medical problems pre-dating his on-the-job injury
which are contributing to his ongoing problems including his peripheral neuropathy and known
right SI radiculopathy." JE-23.
54.

On August 24, 2006, Dr. Ludwig agam evaluated Claimant.

Since the last

examination, Dr. Ludwig learned that Claimant obtained unauthorized refills of his prescription
pain medication.2

Accordingly, he ceased Claimant's Lortab prescription and looked into

Claimant's past medical records, which evidenced 1) Dr. Lea's opinion in April 1988 that
Claimant demonstrated significant symptom amplification, and 2) left leg numbness following
his 2003 spinal fusion surgery, among other things. Dr. Ludwig administered Waddell's testing
on exam, which he detailed in his report and summarized was "positive by multiple accounts."
JE-29.
55.

Dr. Ludwig opined that Claimant's cervical sprain appears acute on his July 2006

MRI, but those findings are insufficient to explain his current cervical symptoms of tingling in
his hands, in his legs with motion, and when pressing on his back. Along those lines, he noted
Claimant's "motion with distraction is significantly improved as opposed to his motion during
active testing." JE-30. With respect to Claimant's left leg numbness, "His interval MRI does
show a left L4-5 disc extrusion but there is no correlation with his electromyelogram findings
2

Dr. Ludwig believed at the time that Claimant had altered his prescription to obtain more narcotic pain medication.
By the time of his deposition, however, the parties agreed that Claimant's friend had admitted to altering the
prescription to obtain more medication for Claimant.
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of
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Id.

"At this point I feel that the patient is manifesting significant symptom

amplification of his relatively benign injuries." Id. Dr. Ludwig opined Claimant had reached
maximum medical improvement (MMI), recommended an impainnent evaluation, and released
Claimant to modified duty work of "no significant repetitive bending or heavy lifting due to his
ongoing condition of chronic S 1 radiculopathy on the right as well as his history of lumbar
fusion, but not due to his date of injury of 07/03/2006." Id.
56.

At his deposition, however, Dr. Ludwig had softened his stance. "I do not know

whether or not that disc herniation occurred with his work injury dated 7/3/06 and whether or not
the surgery recommended by Dr. Dirks is required for the work injury or for the preexisting
condition." Ludwig Dep., p. 34. He pointed out that disc herniations are not always due to a
traumatic event, and can be due to degeneration. Although Claimant's MRI showed an L4-5 disc
herniation impacting the nerve, Claimant's response to the diagnostic nerve block did not
confirm that this was the source of his pain, and his EMG did not suggest any acute nerve
damage, which Dr. Ludwig opined would be expected. "So I had nothing at that point to date his
pain or the change of the disk at the L4-5 level to his date of injury. It was new since '04. That
was all I knew." Id., p. 74.
57.

Dr. Ludwig did not consider somatoform disorder in diagnosing Claimant's

conditions.

Somatoform disorder as "[a] pain process that is - - has a large psychogenic

component not necessarily from a[n] anatomic defect or disease." Ludwig Dep., p. 92.
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that the L3-4, L4-5 bi-level fusion performed by Dr. Dirks in 2007 was reasonable. His change
of hemi was based upon new information, including Dr. Dirks' opinion, Claimant's history of
left leg radicular symptoms (indicating a chronic problem), and Claimant's pre-injury
functionality as depicted on the Safety Video. "His previous level of function was - - did not
appear to be significantly inhibited by his stenosis that was known to be present at that time. So
being the new change being [sic] the disc herniation, that appears to be what was likely due to
his injury dated 7/3/06." Ludwig Dep., p. 114.
59.

September 11, 2006 IME (Dr. Stevens). On September 11, 2006, Claimant

underwent an independent medical evaluation (IME) at Surety's behest by Craig Stevens, M.D.,
Dr. Stevens reviewed medical records pertaining to Claimant's pre-existing

a physiatrist.

conditions prior to examining Claimant.

He apparently did not have the chart note

corresponding to Claimant's initial evaluation by Dr. Katovich or Dr. Ludwig's records prior to
July 12, 2006, but he did review the July

2006 cervical spine x-ray films and the July 11, 2006

cervical and lumbar spine MRI films.
60.

Claimant reported continuing back and neck pain.

61.

On exam, Dr. Stevens noted positive Waddell's signs and nondermatomal sensory

loss, among other things. Dr. Stevens found Claimant's presentation lacking in credibility:
I did note signs of malingering and symptom magnification, in particular the
positive Waddell's signs as noted above with multiple inconsistencies noted on
the physical examination including inconsistency of SLR, nondermatomal sensory
loss, described pain m1d numbness of the entire left leg with grams of pressure
applied to the top of his head and description of increased low back pain on
various postural maneuvers that in no manner stress the low back.
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considerations:
I have come to these conclusions independent of his previous medical records
which reveal multiple previous workmen's compensation claims which I feel may
cause me to become biased in my approach to this evaluation. I tried to maintain
an unbiased approach and come to my conclusions separately from knowledge of
those previous events.

Id
62.

Dr. Stevens diagnosed chronic pre-existing cervical and lumbar disc degeneration

and left S 1 radiculopathy.

In addition, he diagnosed cervical strain (temporary and now

medically stable), as a result of the July 3, 2006 industrial accident, with no permanent
impairment related to his industrial injury and no recommendation for further treatment.
"Certainly he may eventually experience some increase in impairment as a result of his
progressive lumbar degenerative disc disease but again no further impairment has occurred as a
result of the date of injury of July 3, 2006." JE-46.
63.

Dr. Stevens also noted, in his answers to questions posed by counsel for Surety,

that Claimant's prior injuries precluded him from heavy lifting and heavy work. "Certainly it
had already been established previously that the claimant not engage in heavy lifting or heavy
work because of his prior injuries. It is very likely that, if the claimant were not to engage in
such work, he would be less likely to have sustained cervical strains or other injuries such as
occurred on the date associated with this injury." JE-46.
64.

Additional treatment sought by Claimant (Drs. Norce and Dirks).

On

September 11, 2006, Claimant consulted Brian Norce, D.C., who referred him to Dr. Dirks. (As
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discussed, above, Claimant had previously seen
regarding

in 2004.)

Dirks and his nurse

on September 18,

long-standing pain and numbness in his right heel, for which he was taking Neurontin, as well as
details concerning his industrial accident. He had some neck and elbow pain, and back pain, and
he reported that his left leg just did not work anymore. Dr. Dirks' nurse practitioner diagnosed
neck pain without radiculopathy ("He does have a disc bulge at C5-6, but this does not seem to
be clinically significant for the patient") and back pain with a radicular component and weakness
("left leg sensory dysesthesias, longstanding in the right leg, correlating with MRI findings of
disc bulges at L3-4 and L4-5 with moderate to severe neural foraminal [sic] as well as central
canal stenosis from L3 to L5"). JE-54.
65.

On September 26, 2006, Dr. Dirks recommended lumbar fusion surgery, from L3

to L5 with decompression. On October 5, 2006, Claimant left a telephone message for Dr. Dirks
advising that his left leg was sore, and very weak. Claimant sought an estimate for surgery,
because Surety denied benefits for further treatment. On November 10, 2006, Dr. Dirks wrote to
Claimant's attorney, "Roy Green has bee [sic] a patient of mine for quite some time ... .I believe
his current injury in his lower back requiring surgical intervention, which would include a
lumbar decompression and fusion from L3 to L5, is directly related to his worker's compensation
injury that he sustained on July 3, 2006." JE-59. At his 2012 deposition, Dr. Dirks reasoned that
the changes demonstrated on Claimant's July 2006 MRI, in comparison to his former MRI
studies, were consistent with further injury to Claimant's lumbar spine due to a tree falling on his
head in July 2006.
So if I put together the mechanism of injury, in this case the tree falling on him,
the temporary relationship of that, knowing I have a previous MRI before that
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does not show a herniated disc, then on a 51 percent basis or better, I have to
to come and see me,
the accident caused the current problem and caused
which culminated the onr,>yofl
2012 Dirks Dep., p. 20.
66.

On October 4, 2006, Dr. Ludwig responded to a letter from Surety's counsel,

essentially confirming opinions he set forth previously in Claimant's chart.
67.

By the time of his deposition in January 2007, Claimant had two employees to

assist him at work (instead of his usual one) because he had to hire someone to replace himself.
Claimant testified that he had no problems driving out to the job sites or managing his business.
His symptoms included peripheral neuropathy in his right foot, shocks and nerve damage in his
calf from his prior injury; right-sided pain from his spine surgery; "dead" feeling left leg with
pins and needles (new with the 2006 accident); and grinding noises and pain in his neck and low
back.
68.

Claimant never returned to manual logging work.

69.

Lumbar fusion surgery, L3 to LS (February 21, 2007). Following Dr. Dirks'

surgical recommendation, Claimant underwent testing with Bruce Woodall, M.D., a family
practitioner, to obtain medical clearance. On January 31, 2007, noting Claimant was a heavy
smoker, Dr. Woodall diagnosed chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) with acute
bronchitis, which he treated with Rocephin. No PPI has been assessed to Claimant's COPD. In
response to Claimant's request for pain medication, Dr. Woodall prescribed 120 Lortab pills.
However, he declined to undertake long-term management of Claimant's pain.
70.

On February 21, 2007, Claimant underwent a bi-level lumbar fusion with

decompression surgery, from L3 to L5, with Dr. Dirks. Claimant's recovery was complicated by
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1

Claimant was doing fine in regard to his back, but

reported

still had "complaints of leg pain from

before and he has low back pain." JE-103. On exam, Claimant had good leg strength and was
walking. Also, "He has right-sided neck pain that goes into the right arm and makes it feel like
jelly," with right deltoid, triceps, and biceps weakness on exam. Id.
71.

Cervical fusion surgery at CS-6 (Julv 16, 2007).

Dr. Dirks ordered a new

cervical spine MRI, performed on May 23, 2007. The images demonstrated motion; however,
the radiologist reported they revealed bony changes at C3-4, C4-5, and C5-6, as well as
"moderate narrowing of the bilateral C3-C4 neuroforamen and moderate narrowing of the C5-C6
right neural foramen." JE-104. On June 7, 2007, Claimant continued to have pain in his neck
and down his right arm "since his accident." JE-106. Claimant explained that previously, when
he had neck pain, he could alleviate it by lying on a rolled-up towel. After his 2006 industrial
injury, however, this procedure provided no relief "If I lay on that towel now with stenosis, or
whatever is going on in there now, I can't - - everything goes numb." 2007 CL Dep., pp. 26-27.
72.

Upon review of the latest MRI, Dr. Dirks opined Claimant's neck and right arm

complaints were the result of a "right, greater than left, radicular component correlating with a
C5-6 disk bulge on the right." JE-110. Dr. Dirks recommended an anterior cervical discectomy
and fusion at C5-6 with plating and cadaver bone. He attributed the need for surgery to the 2006
industrial injury.
73.

On June 14, 2007, Claimant sought pam medications from Dr. Woodall.

Dr. Woodall complied, cautiously, by prescribing 60 Lortab pills and 10 Duragesic patches,
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repeatedly

conflicting demands."

strongly encouraged Claimant to quit smoking in order to prevent progression of his
and reduce his chronic pain. Dr. Woodall again provided pain medication to Claimant on June
28, 2007 (100 Norco 7.5 mg., 1-2 every six hours as needed, or 100 per month, with two refills).
"Patient understands that I am only providing analgesics until Dr. Dirks gives him definitive
treatment." JE-13 5.
74.

On July 16, 2007, Claimant underwent cervical fusion surgery, at C5-6, with

Dr. Dirks. A week later, Claimant sought stronger pain medication from Dr. Dirks for continued
right arm pain and mostly posterior bilateral shoulder pain. Claimant was also experiencing
numbness into his hands. Dr. Dirks prescribed Norco 10. On August 7, 2007, Claimant sought
pain medication from Dr. Woodall, who prescribed MS Contin and Duragesic patches. "He has
an appointment with Dr. Dirks for follow-up on 08/30 .... Patient anticipates that he will ask
Dr. Dirks to make a referral to a pain management center. If Dr. Dirks declines, we will make
the referral as my continuing to provide him with large quantities of synthetic opiates for a
permanent condition is not an option." JE-135. Dr. Woodall also noted, "In February he had
L3-L5 fusion which he states was fabulously successful and alleviated his lower body pain." Id
75.

On August 14, 2007, Dr. Dirks observed that Claimant was doing better pain-

wise, having procured MS Contin, a long-acting pain reliever, from Dr. Woodall. However, he
still had pain across his shoulders. Dr. Dirks prescribed physical therapy, twice weekly for four
weeks. Claimant did not follow up.
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As with
encounter for the past year, patient is in seeking pain
medications .... Taking him at his word that he sees Dr. Dirks on 09/13, I provided
MS Contin ... Since chronic pain management with opiates such as MS Contin is
not part of my practice scope, I will not be providing any opiate narcotics for
patient beyond today. If this issue is not addressed with Dr. Dirks, patient will
need to see a pain management consultant or perhaps seek a different primary
care provider.
JE-137.

77.

Surveillance video (September 11 and 12, 2007).

Surveillance video taken

September 11, 2007 shows Claimant, alone, backing his boat and trailer into the water, getting in
and out of his truck multiple times, jumping from his truck cab a few feet over to the dock to
avoid getting into the water, tugging on the boat to get it off the trailer, lowering himself to his
stomach on the dock to retrieve a hubcap from the water, and other activities. It is not apparent
that Claimant ever bent at the spine below approximately shoulder-level.

He maintained a

straight low and mid spine throughout his activities. Claimant thinks he was wearing a back
brace. In addition, he recalls wearing a Fentanyl patch and having taken morphine, an antiinflarnmatory, Gabapentin, and Neurontin that day.
78.

Video footage taken September 12 shows Claimant carrying a gallon of milk in

his right hand and a small sack in the other. When he got to his pickup, he smoothly lifted the
milk jug to chest-height and tossed it into the passenger seat. Claimant described his symptoms

Well, I was ruined. My shoulder would get - - it was the weirdest thing. It would
get so bad that I couldn't move. All my body wanted to do was lay there with
heat on it. And after a couple days of that, I could go out and do some - - you
know. I was trying -- the more I - ifl used it, it would get better. That's what I
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79.

In 201

Dr. Dirks opined that Claimant's functionality as depicted in the

surveillance videos was consistent with his recollection of Claimant's presentation, on pain
medication, on August 14, 2007. As discussed below, Drs. Zoltani and Barnard disagreed. They
opined these videos evidenced what they had already concluded based upon their evaluation of
Claimant: that he was faking his symptoms.
80.

MRis of cervical and lumbar spine {September 12, 2007). On September 12,

2007, Claimant underwent MRis of his cervical and lumbar spine. The cervical studies revealed
slight anterior subluxation of C4 relative to C5 with flexion. The lumbar studies revealed a wellseated L3-5 laminectomy and posterior fusion with no definite subluxation on flexion or
extension, as well as an unchanged T12-Ll right-sided bone graft with metallic plates and
screws.
81.

Pain management. On September 13, 2007, Claimant returned to Dr. Dirks, who

provided him with a prescription for 20 Norco tablets with instructions to make them last for at
least a couple of weeks. He also referred Claimant to Dr. Magnuson for pain management. "He
is hurting quite a bit in his neck and along the top of his shoulders .... He is difficult to assess
because he hurts so much." JE-123.
82.

MRI of cervical spine {September 19, 2007) and EMG study {October 2007).

Due to ongoing neck pain complaints, Dr. Dirks ordered another cervical MRI, which was
performed on September 19, 2007. It demonstrated mild narrowing of the bilateral C3-4 neural
foramina, with no significant impinging lesions. Dr. Dirks summarized, " ... good decompression
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back was doing quite nicely. At Claimant's attorney's prompting, Dr. Dirks ordered an EMG
study to further evaluate Claimant's nerve condition. On October 30, following the EMG study,
Dr. Dirks wrote, "As far as his arms are concerned, the EMG studies were unremarkable and do
not show any sort ofradiculopathy." JE-129. He ordered a thoracic MRI to rule out problems at
that level, "although I doubt this will be the case." Id.
83.

Pain management.

On October 1, 2007, Claimant was evaluated by Scott

Magnuson, M.D., a pain specialist. According to the chart note, the purpose of the visit was
(contrary to Dr. Woodall's repeated instructions) "simply to have a recommendation back to
Dr. Woodall to prescribe." JE-142. Following an examination, Dr. Magnuson recommended to
Dr. Woodall that he continue prescribing pain medications for 3 to 6 months in tandem with
physical therapy. Dr. Magnuson opined that Claimant had obtained good relief of his cervical
radicular symptoms following surgery, but was now experiencing severe chronic myofascial pain
in his shoulders and thoracic back area.
84.

On October 8, 2007, Claimant again sought pain medication from Dr. Woodall.

This time, Claimant specifically requested oxycodone. Dr. Woodall complied, but reluctantly.
"Chronic pain and opiate seeking behavior.

I shared with him Dr. Magnuson's written

communication of the non-advisability oflong-term opiate use ... Also at his request I am making
a referral to a pain management consultant in Moscow who may be more willing to accept his
management than Dr. Magnuson was."

JE-136.

He also noted that, as far back as 2003,

Claimant had been receiving large amounts of narcotic pain medications. The record does not
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85.

On October 18, 2007, Claimant was reporting bilateral shoulder pain, neck pain,

and bilateral arm weakness, worse on the right. An EMG nerve conduction test by R. Clinton
Horan, M.D., revealed mild nerve conduction abnormalities that he opined did not meet criteria
for an entrapment neuropathy, and are of questionable clinical significance. An underlying
peripheral neuropathy could not be ruled out, but would be unlikely to explain arm weakness.
No electrodiagnostic evidence of cervical radiculopathy or brachial plexopathy existed.
86.

On December 18, 2007, Dr. Woodall again declined to continue prescribing pain

medications and advised Claimant to return to Dr. Magnuson or Dr. Dirks.

Claimant also

requested an MRI of his thoracic spine, as Dr. Dirks' request had been denied by Surety.
(Dr. Woodall made the MRI recommendation; however, Surety denied this request, as well.)
Ten days later, Claimant returned.

He had been unable to get in to see Dr. Magnuson.

Dr. Woodall prescribed ten days worth of MS Cantin to tide him over.
87.

On January 3, 2008, Dr. Dirks' nurse practitioner contacted Dr. Woodall's office

to advise she had prescribed 40 Norco 7.5 mg. and concurrently advised Claimant that she would
not prescribe any more pain medications and that he should not be going around to other
physicians and "double dipping." JE-138.
88.

Continued right arm/shoulder and neck pain.

Also on January 3, 2008,

Dr. Dirks evaluated Claimant for right arm and shoulder pain, as well as neck pain. Dr. Dirks
found "severe atrophy of his arm and in the deltoid and biceps area. He also has strength loss in
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89.

for a shoulder

to

On January 10, 2008, Dr. McNulty evaluated Claimant's right shoulder.

"[Claimant] states during the original injury he did not hurt his shoulder. He is having pain
mostly in the trapezial area, radiating to his neck." JE-515. Dr. McNulty diagnosed tendonitis
and injected Depo-Medrol and Lidocaine.

He denied Claimant's request for narcotic pain

medication.
90.

On January 16, 2008, Dr. Woodall declined to make an appointment for Claimant

to discuss refilling his pain medication. Instead, he referred Claimant to Don Williams, D.O., for
pain management.
91.

January 31, 2008 initial evaluation by Dr. Williams for pain management.

Dr. Williams undertook Claimant's pain management treatment on January 31, 2008. At this
visit, Claimant reported almost complete loss of use of his right shoulder.
92.

Thoracic MRI (February 5, 2008). On February 5, 2008, Claimant underwent a

thoracic MRI, which revealed normal findings except for a small left posterior disc protrusion at
the Tl0-11 level that mildly contoured the ventral aspect of the thecal sac on the left, resulting in
mild encroachment of the inferior recess of the left neuroforamen.
93.

February 13, 2008 panel evaluation (Drs. Barnard and Zoltani).

On

February 13, 2008, Claimant underwent a panel evaluation arranged through Inland Medical
Evaluations by Surety. The panelists were J. Greg Zoltani, M.D., a neurologist, and Michael
Barnard, M.D., an orthopedist.

The panelists reviewed Claimant's industrial injury-related

medical records through December 18, 2007, when Dr. Woodall diagnosed chronic pain and
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among other things: low back symptoms, neck pain and headaches, left hand and right arm
numbness, chronic pain disorder in the absence of any objective organic cause, generalized
axonal motor neuropathy (as suggested by EMG findings), thoracolumbar disc fusion followed
by physician restrictions of no regular heavy lifting or bending at the waist plus a
recommendation to obtain retraining assistance, residual right Sl radiculopathy (as demonstrated
by November 1, 2004 EMG study), and multilevel degenerative changes (as demonstrated by
lumbar spine MRis dated January 8, 2003 and November 10, 2004). Claimant brought in his
February 2007 lumbar MRI films, but no cervical spine films. The panel also had a report of the
February 2008 thoracic MRI identifying a small disc protrusion at Tl0-11. In addition, the
panelists reviewed Dr. Dirks' December 23, 2004 deposition and interviewed and examined
Claimant.
94.

According to the report, Claimant told the panel physicians that he was still

having pain in his neck, mid back and low back, with crunching and snapping in his neck, and
that his symptoms had worsened since his neck surgery. Also, "He notes that he had symptoms
previous to this incident in both legs prior to his fusion at Tl 2-L 1, and following that surgery he
had improvement in his left leg, but had no improvement in the right leg.

He notes that

following the incident, his left leg was then worse than the right." JE-166.
95.

Functionally, Claimant told the panel physicians that he was unable to do any

neck or back exercises, clean fish, carry or lift items ("Even lifting a carton of milk would be
impossible for him with the right arm," Id.), do bookwork (because he cannot look down), or
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Claimant could do

included fishing, cooking (some), and walking out and getting the mail.
96.

On entering the exam room, the panel physicians noted Claimant was lying on the

exam table. Claimant's sensory exam revealed, among other things, "subjectively decreased"
feeling in the right arm that "does not follow any specific dermatomal pattern," and was negative
for Tinel's sign. Claimant had heavily callused hands.
It is noted that the claimant's hands are not only callused but they are extremely
heavily callused and extremely dirty. There is ground in dirt, there is subungual
dirt, and there are heavy calluses which are discolored. The claimant states that
all of the calluses on his hands, which are several millimeters thick, and all of the
dirt is from a recent snowfall where he had to move snow. This is not possible.
The Claimant is, in my opinion, purposefully misrepresenting his history. There
is no way he would develop multiple thick calluses on his hands and fingers in the
period of the last week.

JE-169.
97.

During his orthopedic exam, Dr. Barnard noted, "The claimant moans, groans,

grunts, and complains of pain throughout the entire examination, no matter what position he is
in." JE-168. Claimant demonstrated positive Waddell's signs at the shoulders and in en bloc
rotation, with complaints of severe pain.

Claimant refused the lumbar range of motion test

because he was unable to do it. Asked to demonstrate what he could do, Claimant rotated
bilaterally approximately 30 degrees, but exhibited O degrees of flexion, extension, right tilt, and
left tilt. "It is interesting to note that he would have to have far more motion in his lumbar spine
to get on and off the table than demonstrated when he was asked to do so. These measurements
are felt to be completely invalid, with no effort on the part of the claimant." JE-168. Likewise,
Claimant's cervical range of motion testing was deemed invalid. Claimant complained of severe
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range of motion, the claimant does not paiiicipate fully in the examination. He claims he cannot
move his shoulders." JE-169. However, with encouragement, Claimant demonstrated motion in
all planes. "Again, it is felt that all of these measures are invalid, as the claimant does not appear
to be participating fully and does appear to be manipulating the examiner." Id. "The claimant
has 'total body jolting' with his movements. He has cogwheel motions with his neck, back,
shoulders, etc., which are nonanatomical." Id.
Overall, the orthopedic examiner found no objective findings consistent with the
claimant's current complaints, and found multiple findings which I feel are
manipulated by the patient and are false. I carmot give any valid rating for his
neck, back, shoulders, etc., based upon my examination, as I do not feel the
findings are correct. I am mystified by the claimant's statement that he does no
work whatsoever and has not worked for several years, although he claims that
calluses on his hands, which are obviously months or years old, are recent in the
last snow storm. This is blatantly false.
JE-170.
98.

The panel concluded that Claimant was medically stable from his 2006 industrial

accident. Drs. Barnard and Zoltani opined Claimant's subjective complaints were far out of
proportion to any objective findings, that he is more functional than he reports he is, and that he
inaccurately reported his symptoms in relation to his prior injuries and pre-existing conditions,
including chronic pain syndrome.

Further, Claimant suffered only muscle strains that had

resolved, with no permanent aggravation of any pre-existing conditions, and no permanent
impairment as a result of his 2006 industrial injury.
99.

The panel approved Claimant to return to his time-of-injury job as a full-time

owner/operator of his salvage logging company, as described on a Job Site Evaluation (JSE)
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continuously; climb, kneel, reach at shoulder height or above, and grasp/handle frequently; finely
manipulate/finger occasionally; and crouch rarely.
100.

Subsequently, Drs. Barnard and Zoltani reviewed the September 11, 2007

surveillance video depicting Claimant launching his boat. They appended individual notes to the
end of the panel report in which each, in the strongest possible terms, opined that Claimant lied
in his IME and that he is not disabled. According to Dr. Barnard:
There is no doubt in this examiner's ... mind that the claimant is willfully and
deliberately misrepresenting his claim for secondary gain. He has, in my opinion,
absolutely nothing to justify his cun-ent claimed disability ... .It is impossible to
believe that a person with his claimed disabilities could do any of these activities,
which included jumping out of a pickup truck onto a stone wall, pulling on a
leader for the boat, and launching the boat by himself. His activities, as
demonstrated in the video, demonstrate in my opinion complete and total
misrepresentation on his part.
JE-172 to 173. According to Dr. Zoltani:
The diagnosis he best fits at this time is a willful misrepresentation of his medical
condition to his providers. It is our opinion that this further confirms our opinions
that he is fully capable of continuous gainful work activity and is not in need of
any formal treatment to his spine nor is it indicated that he should continue to
receive narcotic medications.
JE-173.
101.

February 21, 2008:

Claimant reached MMI as per Dr. Dirks. Dr. Dirks

opined that Claimant reached MMI following his July 3, 2006 industrial accident on February
21, 2008 (one year following his February 2007 lumbar spine surgery).
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2012 Dirks Dep., pp. 10-1 L However,

he speculated that Claimant could have probably returned to work in some capacity as of
February 2008.
103.

Dr. Dirks believes Claimant would be back at work, apparently in his time-of-

injury position, if he had not injured his lumbar spine in 2006 .
. . .lf you talk to [Claimant] now I don't think he has a lot of complaints in the
cervical region. I don't think - let's put it this way. lf you measure what I was
saying about the success of the surgery or not, if he just had had the cervical
surgery do I think he would be back to work today. [sic] Yes.

Dirks Dep., p. 23.
104.

Functional capacity evaluation by Dr. Williams.

On February 28, 2008,

Dr. Williams prepared an estimate of Claimant's physical capabilities at Surety's request. He
opined that, in an eight-hour workday, Claimant could sit a total of two hours, stand one hour out
of each four-hour segment, and walk one hour out of each four-hour segment. He could carry up
to five pounds continuously (67% to 100% of the day), up to 10 pounds occasionally (2% to 33%
of the day), and up to 20 pounds seldom (0 to 1% of the day).

(See JE-155.) In addition,

Claimant could occasionally bend, squat, kneel, crawl, and crouch, but could not reach above
shoulder level at all. Dr. Williams did not restrict Claimant's left hand use, but opined that he
could not push, pull, or execute fine manipulations or simple grasping with his right hand. Dr.
Williams opined Claimant could work at unprotected heights and around moving machinery, and
in environments with marked changes in temperature and humidity.

As well, Dr. Williams

opined Claimant could drive automotive equipment.
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and, in the meantime, would require ongoing care.
106.

CT myelogram of cervical and thoracic spine (April 10, 2008). On March 25,

2008, Claimant sought treatment from Dr. Dirks for ongoing pain in his neck and down his right
arm primarily, but also into the left arm. Dr. Dirks ordered a CT myelogram.
107.

On April 10, 2008, Claimant underwent a CT myelogram of his cervical and

thoracic spine. The cervical myelogram demonstrated small ventral impressions on the thecal
sac at the C4, 5, 6, and 7 levels consistent with small disc protrusions, with normal filling of the
nerve root sleeves. The thoracic myelogram returned results within nonnal limits. "There are no
significant abnormal impressions on the thecal sac." JE-293. The post myelogram CT of the
thoracic spine revealed a moderate, focal, central disc protrusion at Tl 0-11. "The protrusion, in
combination with posterior osteophytic spurring results in ventral impression on the thecal sac
with abutment and mild contouring of the ventral cord. The clinical significance of this lesion is
uncertain."

JE-288.

The post myelogram CT of the cervical spine revealed facet joint

arthropathy at C3-4 on the right and at C7 and Tl on the left, as well as small focal central disc
protrusions at C4-5 and C6-7. "These result in mild contouring of the ventral thecal sac but do
not appear to significantly focally impinge on the neural structures." JE-297.
108.

On April 22, 2008, Dr. Dirks opined, "His CT scans of his cervical and thoracic

spines do not show any evidence of neural element compression at this time. They show good
decompression where the surgical sites are." JE-298. Nevertheless, because Claimant continued
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MRis of cervical and thoracic spine (April 25, 2008). On April

2008,

Claimant underwent MRls of his cervical and thoracic spine. At the cervical level, there was
broad-based bulging (a protruding disc), accentuated on the extension views at C4-5, abutting the
ventral cord.

In addition, foraminal stenosis was noted at this level and mild subluxation

between the flexion and extension data suggested ligamentous laxity at C4-5. "Facet arthrosis
may contribute to the listhesis." JE-299. At the thoracic level, a broad-based leftward eccentric
spondylotic disc protrusion at Tl 0-11 effacing the ventral and leftward aspect of the thecal sac,
along with mild foraminal encroachment, was identified. "Otherwise, spondylosis is of mild
severity and includes shallow noncompressive spondylotic disc displacements at several levels
without central or lateralizing soft disc herniation or soft disc extrusion." JE-300.
110.

On May 8, 2008, Dr. Dirks opined, "His cervical and thoracic spine MRis shows

[sic] multilevel minimal disk degeneration. He shows good postoperative decompression." JE-

301. Dr. Dirks recommended no treatment, but instructed Claimant to follow up in three months.
He also encouraged Claimant to file for SSDI "as he hurts and is not able to do any heavy labor
activity at this time. He has had multiple surgeries on his cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spines
and I believe he is disabled and unable to return back to work at this time." JE-301. Dr. Dirks
was apparently unaware that Claimant had been pursuing an SSDI award since July 2006.
111.

Dr. Williams continued to treat Claimant periodically with narcotic pam

medications and osteopathic manipulations for his lumbar, thoracic, and cervical pain, as well as
for his right shoulder pain and rotator cuff-like symptoms.
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did not believe that the current MRI findings were contributing to

Claimant's cmTent symptoms or that further surgical intervention was warranted. He opined that
physical therapy, injection therapy, and anti-inflammatory medication were reasonable options to
treat Claimant's neck pain.
113.

On July 21, 2008, Dr. Williams took Claimant off logging work for six months.

114.

On August 7, 2008, Dr. Dirks wrote an open letter confirming that he does not

believe Claimant can return to his time-of-injury job and that he suggested Claimant file for
SSDI.

The coffesponding chart note indicates that, on exam that day, Claimant had good

strength and his incision was well-healed. Claimant was seeing a chiropractor, "which seems to
help him as far as keeping his head in alignment." JE-304.
115.

On October 1, 2008, Dr. Ganz evaluated Claimant, at Claimant's request.

Following review of Claimant's imaging and an examination, Dr. Ganz opined that Claimant's
persistent neck pain is due to musculoskeletal factors, not neurogenic causes. To be certain, he
recommended an EMG study "to confirm that there is no radicular component to his pain." JE309. He recommended that Claimant get back into physical therapy. "After his neck surgery he
only had two sessions ... and then he quit because it hurt. I have explained to him that the muscle
spasm is the main cause of his pain and that he needs to give therapy another try and I think his
symptoms will significantly improve." JE-309. He wrote Claimant a prescription for physical
therapy two to three times per week for six to eight weeks. Dr. Ganz also opined that Claimant
should not return to logging work or heavy labor because of his prior back surgeries. "The only
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On November 11, 2008, counsel for Defendants enclosed the February 2008 IME

report in a letter to Dr. Dirks seeking information regarding an impairment rating. Dr. Dirks did
not respond because he does not do impairment ratings. At his 2012 deposition, he could not
recall anything about the IME report.
117.

Also in November 2008, Claimant underwent an appendectomy. He does not

allege that this procedure was related to an industrial injury. No related PPI was assessed, and
no permanent medical restrictions were issued.
118.

Functional capacity evaluation by Mark Bengston, MPT (March 31, 2009

and April 2, 2009). On March 31, 2009 and April 2, 2009, Claimant underwent a functional
capacity evaluation (FCE) by Mark Bengston, MPT, at the request of Claimant's attorney, to
determine his physical abilities and limitations. Mr. Bengston opined that Claimant gave 100%
maximal effort on all test items, that his performance was consistent among FCE items, as well
as from the first to the second day of testing (indicating Claimant should be able to perform at
the tested levels sustainably day-to-day), and that his functional abilities as measured by the
Spinal Function Sort were consistent with his perceived abilities, among other things.

Mr.

Bengston administered Waddell's tests, opining that five of five were negative.
119.

Mr. Bengston opined that Claimant had high hand function and coordination,

"occasional" sitting tolerance, "frequent" walking tolerance, and "prolonged tolerance to activity
was noted with a myriad of position and activity changes instead of maintaining sustained
postures and repetitive lifting and Right [sic] hand use." JE-679. Claimant could sit/stand/walk
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frequently), and could bend and stoop occasionally. However, Mr. Bengston also opined that
Claimant was significantly limited in activities requiring him to shift from a neutral spine
position (i.e., bending, twisting), as well as in repetitive grasping and handling with his right
hand, due to right cervical pain and numbness in the C7 distribution.
120.

Given Claimant's limitations, Mr. Bengston did not entirely rule out the

possibility of Claimant someday returning to logging, but given "the large discrepancy between
[Claimant's] abilities and job demands," he may be better off to look for alternate employment,
rather than to attempt to rehabilitate himself to his prior level of function.
121.

On May 7, 2009, Dr. Dirks had an informal conversation with Claimant about his

right shoulder. Claimant asked for a right shoulder MRI, and Dr. Dirks complied by making the
recommendation. "I have suggested that he get this looked at in the past." JE-314. Also,
Dr. Dirks commented, "He is actually happy with his neck and his back at this stage." JE-314.
122.

On September 8, 2009, Claimant underwent an IME by John McNulty, M.D., an

orthopedic surgeon.

Following a medical records review and examination of Claimant,

Dr. McNulty opined that the injuries requiring surgeries in 2007 were due to the 2006 industrial
accident. "The mechanism of injury of being hit on the head with a tree in parts [sic] axial load
throughout his spine. The injuries he sustained to his cervical and lumbar spine that resulted in
surgical treatment are on a more probable than not basis the result of being struck on the head by
a tree." JE-331.
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He did not apportion any impairment to pre-existing degeneration

because he believed this was asymptomatic prior to the industrial injury. In the event Claimant
is found to have lumbar impairment due to his prior accident, Dr. McNulty opined this should be
subtracted from his lumbar impairment rating for apportionment purposes.
124.

Regarding the right shoulder, Dr. McNulty found evidence of muscle atrophy,

weakness and limited movement on exam. He also noted that Claimant had an injection in
January 2008 that did not relieve his symptoms. Given Claimant's report that he fell on his
shoulder in the accident (which is notably inconsistent with earlier notes stating Claimant did not
injure his shoulder in the 2006 accident), Dr. McNulty recommended a right shoulder MRI to
evaluate Claimant's rotator cuff.
125.

Dr. McNulty agreed with Mr. Bengston's FCE findings, opining that Claimant

should not engage in heavy physical activities such as logging due to his thoracic and lumbar
fusions. "He should not engage in heavy physical activities such as logging. He is more suited
to work in a light job duty category as outlined in the FCE." JE-332.
126.

Although Dr. McNulty summarized medical records in which other physicians

doubted his credibility, including the panel IME report, he did not comment on them or,
apparently, administer any validity testing on exam.
127.

On September 10, 2009, Dr. Dirks opined that Claimant could not return to his

time-of-injury job, as defined in the ICRD JSE previously approved by the IME panel
physicians.

He also disapproved, without comment, JSEs provided by Mr. Brownell for
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128.

On November 18, 2009, Claimant underwent an MRI of his right shoulder. The

radiologist opined there was no evidence of discrete rotator cuff tear; however, the imaging did
reveal tendinopathy of the supraspinatus and infraspinatus tendons, as well as mild
acromioclavicular mihropathy. On January 14, 2010, Dr. McNulty opined that Claimant had
chronic tendinitis in his right shoulder and offered an injection, which Claimant declined. "It
appears he did not have a significant injury to the shoulder as a result of the 7/3/2006 injury. He
does not require any further treatment related to that accident." JE-515.
129.

On January 28, 2010, Dr. Williams diagnosed Claimant with depression,

prescribed Effexor and discussed coping strategies. Claimant had lost his ambition, was stressed
about finances and the prospect of losing his house to foreclosure, and felt like a burden to his
family. He had initiated bankruptcy paperwork. After a couple of months, Claimant no longer
took Effexor because he did not believe it helped.
130.

Psychological evaluation {April 13, 2010). On April 13, 2010, Claimant was

evaluated by Tim Rehnberg, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, at Claimant's SSDI attorney's
request. Dr. Rehnberg administered psychometric testing and interviewed Claimant. Test results
revealed no clinically significant match with malingering criteria.

However, Claimant did

produce scores clinically significant for identifying somatization, depression, acute stress,
affective and psychological symptoms of depression, somatoform disorder, Cluster 8 (often seen
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131.

Although Dr. Rehnberg was informed that a prior IME had resulted in an opinion

that Claimant was exaggerating his symptoms and that he had previously been accused of
manipulating his prescriptions, the actual IME report was not provided for review. Likewise,
neither Dr. Lea's records, nor the panel IME report were provided. These omissions undercut his
ultimate opinion that "[t]here was nothing in the clinical interview, medical record or current
testing that would indicate that he is malingering or exaggerating his current physical and
psychological symptoms." JE-376.
132.

Dr. Rehnberg diagnosed Claimant \\,ith a pam disorder associated with both

psychological factors and a general medical condition (chronic), adjustment disorder with
depressed mood (chronic, in response to his chronic physical health issues), sleep disorder due to
chronic pain (insomnia sub-type), and nicotine dependence. In addition, he opined that Claimant
has psychosocial stressors from occupational, financial and health care access problems, as well
as Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) scores of 50 (current) and 50 (highest).
Dr. Rehnberg did not explain his diagnoses. Specifically, he did not discuss how Claimant's
pain disorder affects his perception or reporting of pain to his physicians, if at all.
133.

On April 23, 2010, Dr. Williams completed a fill-in-the-blank worksheet provided

by Claimant's Social Security benefits attorney. Among other things, Dr. Williams opined that
Claimant could only do seated work for four hours out of every eight-hour day.
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Cervical and lumbar spine MRis taken that day raised the

question of a C-4 fracture versus an imaging artifact. They also identified mild grade 1 cervical
anterolisthesis, and no evidence of lumbar fracture or static evidence of lumbar instability. A CT
of Claimant's cervical spine the next day revealed no evidence of cervical fracture, C3-4 facet
arthrosis, mild dextroscoliosis, or cervical spondylosis, and he had "adequately patent neural
foramina at all levels." JE-393.
135.

Thereafter, Dr. Williams prescribed either Lortab or Norco in addition to MS

Cantin for Claimant's pain. In March 2011, he referred Claimant to Dr. Dirks for a surgical
consultation and increased Claimant's restrictions to no lifting over ten pounds, with bending,
lifting, and twisting only seldom.
136.

EMG nerve conduction study (May 9, 2011).

On May 9, 2011, Claimant

underwent an EMG nerve conduction study by Ken Young, D.O., to help sort out the etiology of
his new complaints of left lower extremity symptoms.

Dr. Young opined the results

demonstrated "left sided lumbar radiculopathy mainly involving the lower lumbar and sacral
region on that side. Right lower extremity reveals residual chronic neuropathy without any
active lumbar involvement currently." JE-396.
137.

Spinal fusion surgery at L3-S1 by Dr. Dirks (April 2012). Claimant underwent

another fusion surgery with Dr. Dirks in April 2012. The procedure required removal of his
prior lumbar fusion hardware at L3-L5 to integrate L5-S 1.
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is a low-risk for opioid abuse or addiction.
139.

On August 13, 2011, Dr. Williams wrote an open "Justification Letter" stating

that Claimant is "unable to participate in any form of gainful employment for the next two years"
due to his post-surgical status. JE-273. The corresponding chart note indicates the purpose of
this letter was "to support getting government aid for housing." JE-274.
140.

Dr. Williams' chart notes following Claimant's 2012 lumbar spine surgery

indicate he continued to have left foot numbness and lower extremity weakness, along with
cervical, thoracic and lumbar pain. Around the end of 2012, Claimant's left foot and lower
extremity symptoms apparently resolved.
POST-INDUSTRIAL INJURY VOCATIONAL AND INCOME HISTORY
141.

Claimant was approved for SSDI benefits in 2012.

142.

Claimant remained in business until October 2008. He explained that he ceased

operations because Jerry Pokriots, his most trusted employee, was off work with an injury, his
Cat was broken down, he had been operating at a loss for several months, and he could not afford
to pay a $12,000 workers' compensation bill coming due. So, he saw no other viable options.
Claimant could not explain why his tax forms demonstrated he had substantial earnings during
the two years following his industrial accident, even though Claimant was not doing any heavy
logging work.
143.

To support himself after he closed his business, Claimant sold his equipment and

whatever belongings he could. In October or November 2008, Claimant mortgaged his house
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were initiated. He later filed for bankruptcy.
144.

Claimant did not look for work until the first part of 2009 because he did not

believe there were any jobs he could do in the St. Maries area. His daughter brought him an
application from a casino and he filled it out, but did not keep it current. He initially thought he
could do security work there, or flagging work elsewhere, but changed his mind when he learned
these jobs required constant standing. Claimant thought he could do millwork, but upon inquiry
at a mill, he was told his condition presented too big of a liability. He applied for a job as a lead
forester with the Coeur d'Alene Tribe in Plummer. "This one I went over there as soon as I seen
it."

TR2, p. 179.

The application process included a two-hour exam testing Claimant's

knowledge of topics like tree species and fire procedures. Claimant believed he aced the exam,
but then he was required to demonstrate that he could walk a mile carrying a 45-pound fire
fighting pack. This, Claimant could not do. He was disappointed:
... another requirement was to know their land, where it is and whatnot, and from
all the time I worked for Potlatch, man, designing the logging operations, it was
right up my alley. It was perfect. And I was very disappointed about that.
TR2, p. 181.
145.

Claimant was also listed with Job Service for a period, and he regularly perused

the Nickel's Worth and the St. Maries Gazette for job listings. Claimant never found any listed
openings for which he felt qualified, and no employer he approached ever offered him an
interview or a job.
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did not have an active file with Idaho

Division of Vocational Rehabilitation (IDVR), apparently because he was unaware of how to go
about initiating this. After the first part of 2009, he worked with Dan Brownell, vocational
consultant, to find work. With Mr. Brownell, Claimant has approached a number of employers
about jobs. Those efforts were unsuccessful.
147.

In July 2012, Claimant lost his house.

He was living in a camp trailer on

mortgaged land at the time of the hearing, receiving $1,700 per month in Social Security
Disability benefits along with assistance from his children. Claimant's three children help him
financially. Two of them, Shelby and Wesley, sincerely testified that Claimant can no longer do
the things he did before his 2006 industrial accident, that he was devastated that he could no
longer work and support his family, and that he was ashamed of having to accept assistance from
his children.

Wesley explained the hardships occasioned by Claimant's inability to work,

including the loss of their house to bankruptcy and Claimant's resulting depression. He believes
that Claimant stopped socializing because his source of pride

his work - was gone.

TESTIMONY FROM POTENTIAL EMPLOYERS

148.

Mike Roland, owner of a logging salvage operation and Claimant's former boss,

confirmed that Claimant is an excellent worker and has a reputation as such in the St. Maries
community. He heard through the grapevine about Claimant's 2006 back injury. Mr. Roland
would not hire anybody with a back condition, including Claimant. "It's just business, you
know, work. You gotta be able to, you know, work, pull winch line, run chainsaws. And you
can't do that with a bad back. You can't do it." TR2, p. 22.
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149.

Robby Macklin, owner of St. Maries Saw & Cycle, a Yamaha dealership and

repair shop catering to all brands, confirmed that Claimant had approached him about a job
several times over the four years preceding the hearing. Mr. Macklin has known Claimant all his
life and knows his mechanical experience and abilities. Although he would like to help Claimant
out with a job, he never had a position that fits Claimants functional capabilities (specifically, his
lifting limitations that he presumed from observing Claimant). Also, Mr. Macklin gets many
inquiries from presumably able-bodied job-seekers. Mr. Macklin said he thought he could hire
Claimant to be a "broom pusher" four years ago, but he never had an opening when Claimant
inquired. TRI, p. 133.
150.

Randy Reynolds, owner of a marine and automotive repair shop/U-Haul rental

store in St. Maries, confirmed that he has declined to offer work to Claimant, who he knows
incurred a spine injury in a logging accident. "He's asked me for work, and I just - - to be
honest, I gotta have somebody that has a strong back and is not going to be a liability to our
business." TRl, p. 143. Also, Mr. Reynolds must hire mechanics who, unlike Claimant, are
certified to do warranty work. He sometimes hires high school kids to clean out the U-Hauls, but
he has not done so since 2010. Mr. Reynolds owns the shop along with his brother. They have
only employed one other mechanic since they went into business in 1983, and that individual
only worked two days per week.
151.

Dewey "Duke" Shawver, a long-time salvage logger in the St. Maries area who

has worked with Claimant and respects his work ethic and logging abilities, testified that
Claimant was not employable as a logger following his 2003 surgery.
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152.
reporting at Stimson Lumber, where she had worked for nearly 16 years at the time of the
hearing. She testified that she is familiar with the job of a forklift driver at the mill. Usually,
this job is filled from the pool of available general laborers already working for Stimpson. Also,
an individual with limitations on bending and twisting one-third of the time, limited grasping and
handling with his right hand, sitting limited to one-third of the time, lifting limited to ten pounds
on a frequent basis, and moving his head from side to side would likely not be able to drive a
forklift on a full-time basis. She estimated that forklift drivers must sit 85% to 90% of the day,
which is sometimes ten hours long.

She also explained that sometimes boards fall off the

forklift, and the driver needs to pick them up, requiring an ability to bend and lift more than ten
pounds. In addition, Ms. Nordin estimated that a forklift driver spends 75% of his day driving
backwards, requiring him to twist and move his head from side to side. Further, forklift-driving
entails a great deal of bouncing.

VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION OPINIONS
153.

Dan Brownell. Mr. Brownell, a vocational rehabilitation consultant, was retained

by Claimant in early 2009 both to assist him in job placement in the St Maries local labor
market, and to provide an expert forensic opinion as to Claimant's employability. He continued
to work with Claimant and/or look into job possibilities for the next three years. He "was kind of
excited" to work with Claimant "because he was famous down here. Logger of the year for
Potlatch for two years, that's a big deal. So I thought it was going to be a piece of cake in job
placement." TR2, p. 41. However, Mr. Brownell ultimately opined that Claimant is totally and
permanently disabled.
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1
one dated August

2012. He noted

2009,

2012 that Claimant appeared to have regressed since

2009. He reviewed Claimant's medical and vocational records and spent a great deal of time
assisting Claimant with his job search.
In determining what jobs Claimant could physically do, Mr. Brownell adopted

155.

Mr. Bengston's 2009 FCE limitation recommendations for limitations on:
•

Any activities requiring him to lose his neutral spine position (bending, twisting)

•

Repetitive right (dominant) hand grasping and handling

•

Sitting: occasional

•

Sit/stand/walk: up to 8 hours per day

•

Lifting/carrying: 10 pounds frequently/occasionally, 30 pounds rarely

•

Bending/stooping: occasionally

156.

Mr. Brownell defined Claimant's local labor market to include all of Benewah

County (St. Maries, Plummer, Worley, the Coeur d'Alene Casino, Fernwood, Santa, Harrison
and Princeton).
157.

It 1s undisputed that Claimant is a bright fellow.

In 2012, a TABE test

administered by Mr. Brownell revealed that Claimant has college-level applied math skills.
158.

Although Mr. Brownell did not detail Claimant's transferrable skills specifically,

he identified Claimant's main occupations with transferrable skills as logger, owner/operator,
lumber mill laborer, mechanic and operator of logging truck and skidder.
159.

Mr. Brownell opined that Claimant's physical limitations following his 2006

industrial accident place him in the light/sedentary work category, taking him out of any of his
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as a result

2003

spme

surgery, he opined Claimant was able to do medium/heavy work, but he was unemployable in
the logging industry because employers were aware of his limitations and prior accidents.
However, Mr. Brownell opined that Claimant remained employable as a mechanic at that time.
160.

In Claimant's job search, Mr. Brownell started with potential employers in

Claimant's "sphere of influence." TR2, pp. 49-50. " .. .I really talked to Roy about who his
sphere of influence was, and his sphere of influence is massive. I mean, he knows - - it's a rarity
for some of the old timers or most of the people in town to not know Roy or Roy to not know
them. He has relatives that own businesses here in town .... So I utilized a lot of that, and he and I
came up with a list of a lot of people to contact that way." Id He also picked Claimant up at his
house and, on some occasions, helped him get ready to go meet employers.
161.

Mr. Brownell opined that Claimant's popularity in his community was detrimental

to his job search in that "most, if not all, possible employers know of the injuries that Mr. Green
suffered in the 7/3/06 accident and ... as a result he was unable to keep his salvage logging
business operating." JE-699.
162.

Together, Mr. Brownell and Claimant approached Claimant's relatives, who own

a local sporting goods store. They declined to offer employment because they could not afford
to hire anyone outside the immediate family. Also, Claimant was unable to do any stocking.
163.

Either together with Claimant or on his own, Mr. Brownell approached other

employers, too. A local hardware store had no positions and was laying people off. The sawmill
and other employers were afraid of the liability risk Claimant posed. Pete Manufacturing, a
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women
up to 20 pounds.
164.

line and some of the

Brownell did not elaborate on how often such lifting would

lifting
required.)

Mr. Brownell also apparently ruled out some positions without contacting the

employers due to Claimant's appearance, personality, physical abilities, and other factors. For
example, he believed Claimant could work in retail clothing sales, but for the "yuck factor" essentially Claimant's poor appearance

which he opined would preclude Claimant from being

hired. He similarly ruled out convenience store and smoke shop work. Mr. Brownell opined
Claimant had a speech impediment on the telephone that precluded him from call center work.
He ruled out the Subway sandwich maker position because the employer has a lot of turnover
and a lot of biases, and he did not see Claimant fitting in there. He thought Claimant's hobbling
around, his personality, and his overall appearance would be off-putting. He also thought there
would be too much computer work and tallying, and he vaguely opined that there would be too
much physical work. "They expect them to work in other areas." TR2, p. 56. Mr. Brownell
ruled out any security guard position at a casino because there is a hiring preference for tribe
members and, too, Claimant would be physically unable to apprehend uncooperative rowdies.
He ruled out Potlatch and, apparently Jack Buell Trucking, because he did not believe Claimant,
physically, could do any job at either place.
165.

In his 2012 report, Mr. Brownell asserted that he had contacted over 50 employers

in Claimant's local labor market. Although it is unclear exactly which employers Mr. Brownell
actually approached, or when, Mr. Brownell testified that he exhausted all possible options in
Claimant's job search.

"I can honestly say that I sincerely saturated the market on

possibilities ... .I can sincerely say that I think he is a total perm. He's not employable in the labor
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I challenge anybody else

thinks that they could place him." TR2, pp. 59-60.

Mr. Brownell did not reveal his private database of employer information because it is
proprietary.
166.

In developing his opinions and trying to place Claimant in a job, Mr. Brownell

also consulted Carol Jenks, ICRD consultant; Tony Frazier, IDVR consultant; Alivia Metts,
Idaho Department of Labor (IDOL) labor analyst; Annie Frederick and Sue Shoemaker, IDOL
workforce consultants; a testing counselor at ABE in St. Maries; and Jeff Truthrnan,
president/owner of SkillTRAN.
167.

As for his statistical analysis of the job market, Mr. Brownell included a list of

resource materials and some raw job market data.

However, he did not describe his

methodology in either of his reports or at the hearing.
168.

Mr. Brownell is not a certified rehabilitation consultant, and he does not agree

that his involvement in a case should be limited to either forensic analysis or job placement
assistance. He believes he can be a strong hands-on advocate in assisting an individual in job
placement, and at the same time provide an objective opinion based upon statistical analysis of
the relevant job market and an individual's established education, skills, and abilities.
Mr. Brownell has extensive knowledge of the St. Maries labor market through his many years
working as an ICRD consultant before he began his own vocational consulting business.
169.

Nancy Collins, Ph.D., CRC.

Dr. Collins was retained by ISIF to assess

Claimant's employability. Surety also relies upon her opinions.
170.

Dr. Collins authored a letter summarizing her preliminary opinions (based upon

records provided by ISIF and Claimant's 2007 deposition transcript) on July 27, 2009. She
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limitations were

opined that Claimant's most
limitations on lifting over 20 to

his 1988 FCE,

pounds, stooping, overhead work, and right-handed strength

limitations, as well as physician recommendations that he leave logging. Also noting Claimant's
2003 condition prompting new recommendations that Claimant leave logging, Dr. Collins was
unable to find any permanent restrictions related to either the 2002 or the 2006 injury. She did
note Dr. Williams' 2008 temporary restrictions, as well as the 2008 panel IME opinion that
Claimant could return to work as owner/operator of St. Joe Salvage. Dr. Collins concluded:
Mr. Green's deposition testimony is certainly different from the medical records
the [sic J discuss past pain complaints and physical restriction. My preliminary
opinion, based on the records reviewed, is that he has some pre-existing
restriction (that was ignored), but there is no support for a total disability opinion
as a result of a combination of industrial injury and pre-existing condition.
JE-741.
171.

On August 20, 2009, Dr. Collins prepared a full written analysis and report in

which she listed all of the records she reviewed, including medical records, Claimant's 2007
deposition and interrogatory responses, ICRD records, and Dan Brownell's report.

She also

3
identified vocational information databases and software she relied upon. She requested an

interview with Claimant, but he refused.
172.

Dr. Collins defined functional limitation as "the hindrance or negative effect on

the performance of tasks or activities, and other adverse and overt manifestations of a mental,
emotional, or physical disability."

She cited authority (Wright, 1980) in identifying the

following 14 functional limitation areas that result from disability: mobility, communication,
sensory, invisible, mental, substance abuse, pain, consciousness limitation, debilitation, and

3

Dr. Collins utilized SkillTRAN, Idaho Occupational Wage and Employment Survey, Occupational Outlook
Handbook, Department of Labor job listings, and O*NET.
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behavior, and atypical

restricted

appearance. She identified Claimant's limitations based upon his 1988 FCE (noted, above) and
his 2009 FCE, which she interpreted to include: no lifting more than 20 pounds, 15 pounds
occasionally and 10 pounds frequently4; significant limitation with elevated work, kneeling and
forward bending while standing; some limitation with standing work and static standing and
sitting; some limitation for crouching and kneeling, stairs, and ladder climbing; no limitation on
walking; and no limitation for right or left hand grip. In summary, "His most recent FCE allows
light work with additional restriction for elevated work, position changes, occasional bending,
climbing and kneeling." JE-748.
173.

Dr. Collins identified job categories for work Claimant has performed in the past

in the logging and mechanic fields.

She erroneously assumed Claimant had truck driving

experience based upon ICRD records indicating Claimant wished to retrain as a truck driver.
174.

Using the Skil!TRAN program, Dr. Collins compared Claimant's pre-injury

employability with his post-injury employability in order to estimate his loss of access to the
local labor market.

As to Claimant's pre-injury status, Dr. Collins opined that without any

restrictions, Claimant had directly transferable skills for 71 job titles; with medium restrictions
he had directly transferrable skills for 60 job titles and, assuming the restrictions from his 1988
FCE, he had directly transferable skills for 10 job titles, representing an 86% loss of access to the
labor market as a result of his 1987 neck injury. Considering unskilled work, he had access to
58.8% of jobs in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. Post-injury, Claimant had restrictions
greater than imposed in 1988 due to additional restrictions on static sitting and standing.

4

These are not consistent with Mr. Bengston's recommendations of IO pounds occasionally and frequently, and 30
pounds rarely.
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Assuming Claimant was
afterward,

~~nuw

to medium

prior to his 2006

opined Claimant's loss of access would

and light duty

83%. Considering unskilled

work, his loss would be 53%. Dr. Collins posited that Claimant could, for example, still do some
sawyer work. Also, he could inspect exhaust emissions, do some sorter operating and machine
operating, hand soldering and knife setting, and some retail and driving jobs.
By considering the most restrictive limitations, he can do some light work that
does not require constant sitting or standing. Light work makes up 60% of the
jobs in the labor market. If he improves like he did after his 1988 FCE, his access
will be greater.
JE-750.
175.

Dr. Collins also opined Claimant lost significant earning capacity as a result of his

2006 industrial injury. She understood, incorrectly, that Claimant's net earnings for 2008 were
$70,000, and, based upon an ad for a logger in St. Maries, that his pre-injury hourly wage was
approximately $18. Post-injury, Dr. Collins opined that Claimant should be able to earn $8 to
$10 an hour in light-duty jobs, such as driver, some production work, inspection, and retail jobs
that are regularly available within 30 miles of his home.
Labor market research using the Department of Labor job listings for one day
found retail jobs, customer service work, front desk work, driving jobs, lot
attendant/driver, solderer, and a runner position. The Department of Labor posts
less than 25% of jobs that are available in a community, so this is just a small
percentage of jobs he might consider. The economy is poor right now, but should
improve in the next two years and provide additional opportunities.
JE-750.
176.

Dr. Collins understood that Claimant had not attempted any job search since

closing his business, and that he did not know how to look for work. Too, he did not believe he
could do any work because he could not bend or do heavy lifting. She recommended that he
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with a vocational rehabilitation

and take a

training course to

his employment opportunities.
177.

On September 11, 2009, after interviewing Claimant in the presence of

Mr. Brownell, Dr. Collins updated her opinions. She observed that Claimant appeared somewhat
disabled because he did not move his head much, and that he answered her questions in a
straight-forward manner.

Claimant reported that his neck and shoulder conditions were his

primary problems, with constant aching and sharp pains in his neck and shoulder, and limited
function in his right shoulder. He was concerned that he had a rotator cuff tear or some other
unaddressed, repairable, condition. He said he did not have permanent problems with his arms
or hands prior to his 2006 injury. Also, when he looks down he gets a shooting pain in his right
hand and his hand is very weak. He cannot read for long (he testified 20 minutes every three to
four hours), cannot shave well because he has to hold his arms and chin up, and has a hard time
doing anything that requires repetitive use of his hands if he also has to move his head. He also
described low back pain with limited motion including bending, twisting, stooping, and
squatting. He reported being able to stand only 15 minutes at a time. He could walk fairly well,
but slowly because he cannot look at the ground and fears falling. He could sit for an hour
before changing positions, or drive for an hour before getting out and walking around. He spent
most of the day on the sofa watching television and did not climb the stairs in his house very
often.
178.

Claimant reported that, prior to the 2006 accident, he could perform all aspects of

his job as a logger, including operating a bull dozer, loader and processor; operate a chain saw all
morning; walk on uneven ground, over logs and up hills, and other activities.
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1

to no avail.

Claimant and Mr.

also advised

had tried to find

Claimant,

Collins still believed Claimant could do some retail work that would allow him

to walk primarily during the day without much lifting.

"There have been two retail clerk

positions listed in the past week for cashier/clerk in St. Maries." JE-753.

She also noted

Claimant's ideas for self-employment, including producing videos on safety for the logging
industry, and on saw sharpening.

He also had ideas about inventing underwater logging

equipment and marketing some recipes.
180.

If Claimant's testimony as to his pre- and post-injury capabilities is found as fact,

Dr. Collins opined that all of his post-injury disability is due to the 2006 injury.

She also

acknowledged that Claimant's difficulty looking down and his right hand pain are significant.
"This is not addressed by the physicians, but there is mention of right hand problems in the
functional capacities evaluations. This will be problematic in most light and sedentary work."
JE-754. In addition, Dr. Collins acknowledged the job search difficulties accompanying the
lackluster economy, but opined that it would improve in the next two years.
181.

Dr. Collins again updated her opinions in a written report dated October 23, 2010

after reviewing Dr. McNulty' s IME report and the Safety and Surveillance videos, and
periodically considering the labor market within 30 to 40 miles of Claimant's home in St. Maries.
She noted generally that Dr. McNulty, unlike most of Claimant's medical providers, felt Mr.
Green's impairment was due to the 2006 injury and that he was asymptomatic previously. Also,
Dr. McNulty agreed with Mr. Bengston's FCE recommendations and agreed that Claimant could
do light duty work.
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182.

As

difficulties in his

the Safety Video, Dr. Collins
or low back.

"He showed no range of motion

Concerning the September 2009 surveillance

video of Claimant at his son's motorcycle competition, she opined, "This video depicted a
gentleman that was very different from the gentleman I interviewed in his home in September of
2009. At the time I met with him, he displayed fairly severe pain behavior, had very limited
range of motion in his neck, and he stayed in a reclined position during most of the interview."

Id.
183.

Dr. Collins did not believe that Claimant had conducted a "realistic" job search.

"Based on my review of his physical capacities as shown on the surveillance video, and a light
work restriction, I do think Mr. Green could have returned to work in some capacity, had he
5
conducted a reasonable job search." JE-756. She listed a number of job openings in the area

listed in June, July, August, September, and October 2010 that she thought Claimant may be able
to do.
184.

Dr. Collins also criticized Mr. Brownell's methods. "It appeared Mr. Brownell

was working in a dual capacity by providing vocational rehabilitation advice, while at the same
time he appeared to be providing expert opinion regarding disability. I am unsure of his role, but
under CRC guidelines, this is an ethics violation."

JE-756.

At the hearing, Dr. Collins

elaborated that, whereas Mr. Brownell accompanied Claimant to talk to prospective employers
with no current job openings, she would have instead provided Claimant with the information

5

Job titles included log truck driver, truck driver (multiple), food service substitute, pit attendant, equipment
operator (multiple), lead cook, delivery driver (multiple), fuel truck driver, truck driver to haul steel to Seattle,
grocery store cashier, retirement home transportation driver, security officer, buffet cashier, transportation/cart
attendant, gas station cashier, apartment manager, museum guide and gift shop sales person, semi-truck driver,
security guard, construction truck driver, CDA resort driver, parkade night attendant, entry level loan processor,
customer service representative (Kelly Services), part-time telephone operator, deli worker, retail sales associate,
cashier (multiple), assembly worker, banquet cook, and buffet attendant.
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and support to approach employers with current openmgs independently.
Mr. Brownell's approach only highlighted Claimant's disability.

Mr. Brownell disagreed,

testifying that he had been able to put together job training packages for others in the past, with
assistance and funding from IDVR.
185.

Dr. Collins opined that Claimant has good communication skills and "if he

presents to an employer as he did on the surveillance video, he does not appear disabled. He is
in his early 50's and appears to be fit." JE-757.
CLAIMANT'S CREDIBILITY

186. This matter was heard by Referee Just, prior to her retirement. Only Referee Just
was in a position to make a judgment concerning Claimant's "observational credibility". Since
the Commission did not have the opportunity to observe Claimant's demeanor at hearing, it is
only empowered to make a judgment concerning Claimant's "substantive credibility". This
determination may be made based on the Commission's review of the record before it. Stevens-

McAtee v. Potlatch Corp., 145 Idaho 325, 179 P.3d 288 (2008). Here, the record is filled with
conflicting facts and internal inconsistencies such that we are unable to conclude that Claimant is
a credible witness.
187. Claimant, two of his children, and Dan Brownell all testified that Claimant is the
hardest-working, strongest, and toughest person they have ever known. However, the record is
replete with evidence that challenges Claimant's credibility.
188.

With respect to the injuries Claimant claims are due to the 2006 industrial

accident, Drs. Ludwig, Stevens, Zoltani, and Barnard all opined that Claimant magnified his
symptoms during examinations, based in part upon Claimant's responses to Waddell's testing. It
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is noted that Claimant disagreed with some of the methods employed by
critical

who were

him, as well as the conclusions they drew. For example, Claimant felt justified in

refusing to bend at the waist in the 2008 panel evaluation because he felt unsafe:
There was a - - not bed - but a whatever there, similar to a table, but it was
padded. And I told them, "I'll bend over towards that in case I keep going,
because I have no balance." And they're like, "No, we want you to do it here,"
right toward the concrete floor. And I'm like, "I'm not doing that." I mean,
seriously. Especially if they wanted me to keep my legs straight.
TRI, p. 123. Similarly, Claimant minced no words in conveying his sentiments about the panel
physicians' opinions that he could still work. "Well, they can go to hell. I worked with a broken
foot before. I never stopped." TRl, p. 152. However sincere Claimant's protestations may be,
they are insufficient to support a finding that the ultimate conclusions of any of his evaluators are
based upon improper methodology or a preponderance of inaccurate medical findings.
Importantly, no medical opinions in the record rebut these physicians' use or interpretation of
Waddell' s tests, their findings on exam, or the manner in which they considered Claimant's
medical history in deriving their opinions.

Key physicians who found Claimant credible,

including Dr. Dirks, Dr. Williams, and Dr. McNulty, apparently administered no credibility
testing at all. They were satisfied to take Claimant at his word, even though his credibility had
been questioned by others, both before and after his 2006 accident and injury.
189.

In addition, Claimant's testimony concerning his medical comse was often

inconsistent with information contemporaneously recorded in his medical records, and he has
reported symptoms in excess of objective findings throughout his worklife, sometimes receiving
monetary settlements as a result of his persistent but uncorroborated complaints. Furthermore,
Claimant's testimony in these proceedings has been undeniably internally inconsistent on the key

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER 66

both
testimony concerning

quality of his

following the 2003

performed

by Dr. Ganz. Both on questioning by his attorney and by the attorney for the ISIF, Claimant
testified that the surgery left him unable to perform many of the physical tasks he had been able
to perform before he injured his thoracic spine. TRl, pp. 95/6-99/23; 159/5-162/4. Therefore,
Claimant testified that following the 2003 thoracic spine surgery, he was never able to return to
sawing all day owing to the problems he had with bending and lifting. He limited his sawing to
two hours per day, and there were some days when he did not saw at all. He spent more of his
time operating the Cat and the log processor. However, Claimant gave an entirely different
description of his recovery from thoracic spine surgery at the time of his 2009 deposition. At
that time, Claimant described his recovery as follows:
Do you think you made a full recovery from the thoracic, the T-12 L-1
surgery?
Q.

A.

Oh, yeah.

Q.

Yes?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you have any difficulty after you returned to work doing your

logging?
A.

No, sir.

Q.

No part of the job?

A.

No. It was fine.

Q.
You could saw a tree, you could skid, you could operate machinery,
everything?

Yes. I could run and jump. Everything. Ride motorcycles. I could do
anything I wanted to.
A.
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11. 3

190.

16.

deposition Claimant qualified this testimony

stating that Dr. Ganz

had told him to avoid extremely hard to heavy lifting, but said that this restriction only impacted
his ability to install a role of winch cable on his Cat, an activity which he was required to do
once every three months or so. However, he was quite explicit that this was the only aspect in
which his ability to perform his logging work or other physical activities was impacted by the
thoracic spine surgery. (See Exhibit 24 at 345-346.) Claimant did not explain the discrepancy
between his hearing testimony and his 2009 deposition testimony.

TRI, pp. 162/17-164/3.

Claimant was unable to reconcile these conflicting versions of how he fared following the 2003
thoracic spine surgery, but his testimony on this issue is important because it might have a
bearing on whether or not the thoracic spine injury is a pre-existing condition which constituted a
subjective hindrance to Claimant prior to the subject accident. It is easy to understand how an
insincere claimant might be incentivized, under circumstances similar to those at bar, to argue
that he is totally and permanently disabled by virtue of the last injury alone; if the Claimant loses
on his total and permanent disability claim, he has not hurt his chances of still obtaining a sizable
disability award related to the last accident. This might explain Claimant's deposition testimony,
which is counter to the great weight of the medical and other evidence; evidence which clearly
denigrates Claimant's assertion that he could do anything he wanted to at the time the 2006
Safety Video was prepared.
191.

It is also possible that Claimant's pre-injury medical and other records should not

be relied upon to accurately characterize how Claimant was actually getting along prior to the
subject accident. Perhaps Claimant overstated his physical problems in order to maximize the
settlements he obtained in past workers' compensation cases. If so, then the 2006 Safety Video,
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might
actually be a more accurate representation of his functional capacity immediately prior to the
subject accident.
192.

Another factor in assessing Claimant's credibility is his psychological condition.

Claimant was diagnosed with a somatoform disorder in the 1980s and, in 2010, psychological
testing led to a diagnosis of pain disorder. As well, the 2010 testing failed to confirm Claimant
was malingering. The full meaning of these conclusions was not fleshed out in the record but, at
a minimum, they tend to establish that at least some of Claimant's complaints in excess of
objective findings are likely not due to an intent on his part to mislead his caregivers or this
tribunal, but are instead the result of a psychological disorder that manifested prior to the
accident precipitating the instant claims.
193.

It is also relevant that Claimant has been invested in obtaining a disability

settlement since (at the latest) July 30, 2006, when he first applied for SSDI. At this time - less
than one month following his 2006 industrial accident - no physician had yet opined Claimant
had incun·ed any permanent impairment, let alone permanent disability, from any condition
related to his subject injuries.
194.

The evidence of record establishes that Claimant is not a reliable historian with

respect to his medical condition at any given time, that he has exaggerated details about his
condition in sworn testimony offered in these proceedings, and that he has given inconsistent
testimony over the years concerning the impact of his various injuries on his ability to work.
There is also sufficient evidence to establish that Claimant's testimony is at least partially
colored by secondary gain factors, as well as his pre-existing psychological pain disorder.
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we are mindful that
complaints

not been consistent over the

self-

does not mean that he is not

significantly disabled at the present time. 6
DISCUSSION AND FURTHER FINDINGS

195.

The provisions of the Workers' Compensation Law are to be liberally construed

in favor of the employee. Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955, 956, 793 P.2d 187,
188 (1990).

The humane purposes which it serves leave no room for narrow, technical

construction. Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 88, 910 P.2d 759, 760 (1996). However, the
Commission is not required to construe facts liberally in favor of the worker when evidence is
conflicting. Aldrich v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 122 Idaho 361, 363, 834 P.2d 878, 880 (1992).
CAUSATION

196.

The Idaho Workers' Compensation Act places an emphasis on the element of

causation in detennining whether a worker is entitled to compensation.

In order to obtain

workers' compensation benefits, a claimant's disability must result from an injury, which was
caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Green v. Columbia
Foods, Inc., 104 Idaho 204, 657 P.2d 1072 (1983); Tipton v. Jannson, 91 Idaho 904, 435 P.2d

244 (1967).
197.

The claimant has the burden of proving the condition for which compensation is

sought is causally related to an industrial accident. Callantine v. Blue Ribbon Supply, 103 Idaho
734, 653 P.2d 455 (1982). Further, there must be medical testimony supporting the claim for

6

One of the Commissioners remembers very well a comment made at a long ago hearing by thenCommissioner Gerry Geddes. In the middle of cross-examination intended to expose that Claimant's past acts of
dissimulation, all to discredit his current claim, Commissioner Geddes interrupted counsel to point out: "Just
because he is a liar doesn't mean he didn't hurt himself at work."
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medical probability.

claimant is

probable, not merely a possible, connection between cause and effect to

to establish a
his or her

contention. Dean v. Dravo Corporation, 95 Idaho 958, 560-61, 511 P.2d 1334, 1336-37 (1973).
See also Callantine, Id.
198.

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that no special formula is necessary when

medical opinion evidence plainly and unequivocally conveys a doctor's conviction that the
events of an industrial accident and injury are causally related.

Paulson v. Idaho Forest

Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 591 P.2d 143 (1979); Roberts v. Kit Manufacturing Company,
Inc., 124 Idaho 946, 866 P.2d 969 (1993).
199.

Claimant asserts that he suffered injuries to his cervical, thoracic, and lumbar

spine areas, and his right shoulder as a result of his July 3, 2006 industrial accident. He also
argues that he has chronic pain syndrome caused by the accident and subsequent surgeries.
Defendants and ISIF both argue that the conditions requiring Claimant's surgeries were preexisting and not due, either in whole or in part, to an industrial accident.
200.

Accident.

The evidence is sufficient to establish that Claimant suffered an

industrial accident on July 3, 2006. Claimant's description of being struck on his head/hardhat
by a falling tree is consistent over time and it is unrebutted. Also, medical records indicate
Claimant reported the accident immediately, and that he suffered injuries consistent with such an
event.
201.

Lumbar spine herniation (L4-5).

Dr. Dirks and Dr. Ludwig opined that

Claimant's lumbar spine herniation is consistent with being hit on the head by a falling tree.
Further, no physician opined otherwise. Also, MRI imaging soon after the industrial accident
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lumbar
taken in 2004.

at

bulge had grovvn into a

1magmg
that new 1magmg

demonstrated was now compressing the left L4 nerve root. Also, some of Claimant's left-sided
lower extremity symptoms were generally consistent with L4-5 neurological pathology. On the
other hand, some of the symptoms Claimant reported were inconsistent; an epidural steroid
injection failed to alleviate Claimant's symptoms (and, thus, failed to confirm that they arose
from a neurological source) and an EMG study failed to confirm any left-sided acute
neurological trauma.

Also, some physicians were certain Claimant was not honest in his

symptom presentation on their respective exams. Given this array of evidence regarding the new
MRJ finding, several physicians offered causation opinions.
202.

Dr. Ludwig (in August 2006) initially ruled out an acute/industrial cause, even

though Claimant's left-sided lower extremity symptoms were generally consistent with an L4-5
injury, based upon Claimant's normal EMG results and his Waddell's test failures, among other
things. Also, Dr. Ludwig noted that Claimant did not have a clinically significant response to the
epidural steroid injection he received shortly following his industrial accident. At his deposition
in January 2007, Dr. Ludwig repeatedly testified that he could not opine either that the industrial
accident was or was not related to his need for lumbar surgery.

However, by the end of

questioning, Dr. Ludwig opined that the lumbar herniation was likely related to the industrial
accident, and that Dr. Dirks' proposed fusion surgery would be reasonable to treat Claimant's
L4-5 condition. (He deferred to Dr. Dirks as to the relatedness of including L3-4 in the fusion
surgery.) The reasons for Dr. Ludwig's change of heaii are founded upon new information not
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available to
extremity radiculopathy,
203.

Dr. Dirks'
the Safety Video.

Dr. Stevens (in September 2006), and Drs. Barnard and Zoltani (in February

2008) all opined that the enlargement at L4-5 was more likely due to natural degeneration than to
a new trauma. They found Claimant's presentation was not credible, in part, due to multiple
failed Waddell's tests. Drs. Barnard and Zoltani, after viewing the September 2007 surveillance
videos, were certain that Claimant was faking his symptoms on exam.
204.

Dr. Dirks (in September 2006) opined that Claimant required surgery to

decompress L3 through L5 due to his industrial injury.

In 2012, he explained that the

mechanism of injury was consistent with Claimant's complaints and his condition had worsened
since 2004, so it is more likely than not that the industrial accident was a causal factor. He did
not differentiate L3-4 from L4-5 when rendering an opinion, nor did he ever explain why a bilevel fusion was necessary.
205.

Dr. McNulty (in September 2009) shared Dr. Dirks' ultimate opinion, employing

a similar reliance upon the pre-existing imaging, the mechanism of injury, and the post-injury
1magmg.
206.

It is somewhat troubling that neither Dr. Dirks nor Dr. McNulty explained how or

whether the 2006 EMG testing figured into their respective opinions, given that it was pivotal to
Dr. Ludwig's initial causation opinion. Dr. Ludwig did not fully explain why he changed his
opinion, notwithstanding these results, but apparently Claimant's history of left-sided lower
extremity neuropathy led him to place less reliance upon the EMG results.
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McNulty, and
medical history at the time

their initial opinions than was

Dr. Dirks. By the time of the hearing, it is not apparent from the record that Dr. Dirks ever knew
that other physicians had opined Claimant was not credible in terms of accurately reporting his
symptoms, or that he had a significant history of spine injuries and treatment prior to 2003. He
took Claimant at his word regarding the symptoms he was experiencing. As Claimant's treating
surgeon, however, Dr. Dirks was significantly more knowledgeable of Claimant's then-current
conditions than any other physician.
208.

Dr. Ludwig was aware of Claimant's credibility issue, having determined through

his own examination that Claimant failed Waddell's tests, and also having looked into
Claimant's prior medical records. Nevertheless, he appropriately altered his ultimate opinion
regarding Claimant's lumbar spine condition after receiving new relevant information,
establishing himself as an informed and objective witness more concerned with determining the
"truth" than with advocacy.

Also, as a former treating physician, Dr. Ludwig had more

opportunities to evaluate Claimant than did any other opining physician except Dr. Dirks (and
Dr. Williams, addressed below). On the other hand, Dr. Ludwig's reliance upon the Safety
Video in changing his opinion is problematic. He took those images to mean that Claimant
performed at that level all the time.

However, Claimant's testimony concerning his actual

condition when he made the Safety Video was internally conflicting. At one point, Claimant
testified that the Safety Video only caught him on a good day, and that his condition was much
worse than depicted. As a result, the Safety Video as interpreted by Dr. Ludwig is insufficient to
support a change in his original assumptions regarding Claimant's pre-existing condition. Also,
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knowledge

relevant pre-existing medical conditions and symptom reporting

behavior. Dr. Ludwig's change of heart rests on shaky ground. It is not surprising that it came
upon the heels of a confrontational cross-examination at his deposition.
209.

At the end of the day, it is persuasive that all of Claimant's opining treating

physicians agreed that there is a causal link between his worsened L4-5 condition and his
industrial accident. Dr. Ludwig's struggles with this question brought the case complexities into
better focus, inviting heightened scrutiny of the relatively cursory treatment the IME physicians
provided. Although their opinions were well-grounded in Claimant's pre-existing history and
findings from their respective one-time examinations, they lacked the depth and breadth of
experience with Claimant's case possessed by Drs. Ludwig and Dirks, especially. Along these
lines, none of the IME physicians testified under oath or defended their opinions under crossexamination in these proceedings; whereas, both Dr. Ludwig and Dr. Dirks did. Further, there is
objective imaging evidence to corroborate Claimant's complaints, and Claimant's symptoms are
consistent with the mechanism of injury.
210.

Claimant has proven that his L4-5 disc herniation is the result of a permanent

worsening of his pre-existing asymptomatic disc bulge at that level.
211.

Thoracic spine herniation (Tl0-11).

At his deposition m September 2012,

Dr. Williams opined that Claimant has a symptomatic herniation at Tl 0-11 due to the industrial
accident. He relied upon a CT myelogram, presumably from April 2008, to support his opinion.
That study revealed a protrusion at Tl 0-11 that, in combination with degenerative spurring,
mildly contoured the ventral cord. The results were of questionable clinical significance, so
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and thoracic MRls, also

April 2008, which he opined demonstrated

multilevel minimal disc degeneration but, apparently, no neurologic pathology.

There is

apparently no imaging demonstrating a symptomatic herniation at Tl 0-11.
212.

Dr. Dirks also addressed a Tl0-11 herniation in his September 2012 deposition.

He did not know whether Claimant, at the time, had a herniation at this level, but he opined that
Claimant did not have a symptomatic herniation because Claimant had not reported any
symptoms Dr. Dirks associated with that condition. Dr. Dirks had just taken Claimant to lumbar
surgery in April 2012. Claimant's assertion in his briefing that Dr. Dirks "explained that the
mechanism of the accident, getting struck on the head, was responsible for Green's current
thoracic problems" is misleading. Dr. Dirks opined that being struck on the head could create or
accelerate problems throughout the spine; however, he does not specifically address any thoracic
problems, and he definitely does not opine that Claimant incurred a thoracic spine injury as a
result of the July 2006 industrial accident.
213.

Drs. Barnard and Zoltani acknowledged a 2008 thoracic MRl demonstrating a

"small disc protrusion" at Tl 0-11. JE-170.
214.

No other physician has opined that Claimant suffered any thoracic spine injury in

215.

Dr. Williams' opinion is unsupported by the weight of medical evidence in the

2006.

record. Claimant has failed to prove that he sustained an industrial Tl 0-11 herniation.
216.

Cervical spine strain and bulge (C5-6). Radiologic imaging confirmed an acute

cervical sprain in the ligaments and musculature at C5-6 shortly following Claimant's industrial
accident.

No physician disputes that this injury was likely caused by Claimant's industrial
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All opined

it would heal with conservative treatment. None have opined that

Claimant's strain did not, eventually, heal. Claimant has failed to establish that

incurred any

permanent damage to the ligaments or musculature at C5-6 due to his industrial accident.
217.

Claimant's disc bulge at C5-6 was evident on post-accident imaging taken

July 11, 2006. According to the reading radiologist, at C5-6 Claimant had a broad-based right
paracentral disc bulge causing mild contouring of the cervical cord and minimal spinal stenosis.
According to Dr. Dirks, "there was a diffuse disk bulge at C5, 6 but no frank impingement of the
neural elements." 2012 Dirks Dep., p. 21. No physician opined, based upon the 2006 MRI, that
the C5-6 bulge was either acute or caused by the industrial accident, or that it was causing any of
Claimant's symptoms.
218.

Following Claimant's L3-5 fusion in February 2007, Claimant began complaining

of right-sided neck pain and numbness into his right arm. A cervical spine MRI conducted that
month revealed, among other things, "moderate narrowing of the C5-6 right neural foramen"
accompanied by bony changes. Dr. Dirks opined, without elaboration, that the MRI evidenced a
C5-6 disc bulge correlating with Claimant's right radicular symptoms. In June 2007, Dr. Dirks
performed C5-6 fusion surgery that he opined (in 2012) was related to the 2006 industrial
accident. Dr. McNulty (in September 2009) also opined that Claimant's cervical surgery was
necessitated by his industrial accident. On the other hand, Drs. Barnard and Zoltani (in February
2008) opined that Claimant's cervical spine disc pathology was entirely related to pre-existing
degenerative processes, and that the industrial accident had no permanent effect.
219.

According to the reporting radiologist, Claimant's November 24, 2004 cervical

spine MRI showed pre-existing C5-6 pathology consisting of a mild to moderate broad posterior
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right

protrusion and end plate spurring causing a low-normal central canal

volume, without deformity of the cord, and mild bilateral neural foraminal narrowing at C5-6,
somewhat greater on the right.

No physician provided any testimony establishing how, or

whether, these findings were considered in developing their respective opinions regarding the
nexus of Claimant's symptoms leading to his June 2007 C4-5 cervical fusion surgery.
Dr. McNulty did not list this study among the records he reviewed prior to rendering his IME
opinions. Dr. Dirks has never mentioned it. Drs. Barnard and Zoltani indicated in their IME
report that they reviewed cervical imaging, but they did not identify any specific cervical studies.
220.

Claimant reported neck pain on the day of his industrial accident and consistently

thereafter, to Drs. Ludwig, Stevens, and Dirks. Also, it requires no stretch of the imagination to
understand how Claimant's industrial accident could have an effect on his pre-existing cervical
spine bulge, and all parties agree that Claimant suffered injuries to the ligaments and
musculature at the C5-6 level as a result of his industrial accident. In addition, it is conceivable
that Claimant's symptoms and medications related to his contemporaneous low back condition
and related surgery masked the more significant neck pain Claimant may have othenv:ise
experienced.
221.

Amid conflicting expert testimony and in the absence of any testimony regarding

the impact of Claimant's 2004 MRI results, the evidence establishes by a preponderance that
Claimant incurred trauma to his C5-6 disc as a result of his industrial accident that necessitated
his cervical spine fusion surgery.
222.

Right shoulder iniurv. Shortly prior to his cervical fusion surgery in July 2007,

Claimant reported right-sided neck and arm pain, and Dr. Dirks noted weakness in his right
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deltoid, triceps, and
began complaining

on exam. Just one

his cervical fusion surgery, Claimant

mostly posterior bilateral shoulder pain along with right arm pain and he

sought additional pain medication to deal with it.

In August 2007, Claimant still claimed

bilateral shoulder pain, even though he was now taking MS Contin. Follow-up imaging led
Dr. Dirks to opine there was no neurological basis for Claimant's pain.
223.

In September 2007, Claimant was filmed with no apparent shoulder difficulties in

the surveillance video. In October 2007, Dr. Magnuson diagnosed chronic bilateral shoulder and
thoracic spine area myofascial pain.

Like others before him, Dr. Magnuson recommended

physical therapy which, as before, Claimant did not follow up with due to his pain. On exam
around this time, Dr. Dirks noted severe atrophy of the right arm in the deltoid and biceps areas,
with loss of strength in the right deltoid muscle.

Dr. Williams in early 2008 undertook

management of Claimant's pain care and opined that his cervical and shoulder pain were his
worst problems. Dr. McNulty reported in his September 2009 evaluation report that Claimant
had reported right shoulder symptoms immediately following his industrial accident; however,
Claimant's medical records through 2006 and early 2007 do not reference right shoulder pain or
mJury.
224.

Claimant underwent a right shoulder MRI in November 2009.

It failed to

demonstrate any significant shoulder pathology, leading Dr. McNulty to opine that Claimant did
not incur any permanent right shoulder injury as a result of his industrial accident. Dr. Williams,
employing hopeful reasoning, opined that the clear MRI established not that Claimant had no
injury, but that Dr. Williams' treatment must have healed the right rotator cuff tear he diagnosed
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based upon Claimant's complaints

examinations.

No other physician

opined

Claimant's right shoulder symptoms are related to his industrial accident.
225.

Claimant's right shoulder and arm atrophy evidence a lack of use that could be

related to pain. However, the record lacks sufficient evidence to connect the source of such pain
to the industrial accident or either of his subsequent accident-related surgeries. Also, Claimant's
medical records evidence a history of chronic right shoulder and arm symptoms unexplainable
by objective evidence. In July 1987, following his skidder accident, Claimant had severe right
shoulder pain with right arm and hand tingling without evidence of any neurological defect or
acute injury. By May 1988, he was diagnosed with chronic pain in his neck, shoulders, right
arm, and elsewhere. These pain reports continued through the end of 1988, when Claimant
received a settlement related to the industrial injury he claimed caused it. Claimant did not
return for treatment following receipt of his settlement payment and he soon returned to logging.
226.

Claimant has failed to prove that he incurred a right shoulder injury as a result of

the 2006 industrial accident.
227.

Chronic pain syndrome. Claimant was diagnosed with somatoform disorder in

1988. In 2010, psychological testing confirmed he had a psychological pain disorder. Claimant
has not established that he has a physical chronic pain syndrome, nor that he incuned any new
psychological condition as a result of his industrial accident as set forth in Idaho Code § 72-451.
228.

Claimant has failed to prove that he incuned chronic pain syndrome as a result of

the 2006 industrial accident.
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IMPROVEMENT
229.

As a prerequisite to determining Claimant's PPI or PPD, the evidence must

demonstrate that he is medically stable. To wit, "permanent impairment" is any anatomic or
functional abnormality or loss after maximal medical rehabilitation has been achieved and which
abnormality or loss, medically, is considered stable or non-progressive at the time of evaluation.
Idaho Code § 72-422. The statute does not contemplate that a claimant must be returned to his
original condition to be considered medically stable, but only that the condition is not likely to
progress significantly within the foreseeable future.

Another important consideration is that

workers' compensation benefits are allocated based upon injuries stemming from specific
workplace accidents and occupational diseases. In this case, that means that only the conditions
related to Claimant's July 2006 industrial injuries are compensable. Therefore, the Commission
should focus upon Claimant's current diagnoses related to his subject industrial injuries to
determine whether he is medically stable.
230.

Here, Claimant's permanent conditions resulting from his July 3, 2006 industrial

accident include his L4-5 disc herniation requiring spinal fusion surgery in February 2007 and
his cervical disc bulge at C5-6 requiring fusion surgery in July 2007.
231.

Drs. Bernard and Zoltani opined that these conditions were medically stable as of

the date of their panel evaluation on February 13, 2008, even though Claimant continued to
report pain, crunching and snapping in his neck (worsening after surgery), as well as pain in his
mid and low back.

They found Claimant's complaints were unsupported by objectively

verifiable causes and, further, they both opined that Claimant was faldng his symptoms.
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At

deposition, Dr. Dirks opined that Claimant reached MMI by February 21,

2008 (one year follm::ving his February 2007 lumbar spine surgery). He continued to recommend
testing for Claimant's ongoing pain complaints after that time to confirm his industrial injuries
were stable, including a cervical/thoracic spine CT myelogram on April 10, 2008, and MRis on
April 25, 2008, neither of which revealed pathology that would explain Claimant's continuing
symptoms. Thereafter, Dr. Dirks agreed that conservative care to control Claimant's pain was
warranted, but he did not believe Claimant had any condition as a result of his industrial injuries
that could be improved with surgery.
233.

Dr. Williams, on the other hand, opined on April 9, 2008, that Claimant would not

reach MMI for at least a year and that he required additional pain medications and manipulative
treatment for chronic pain in his neck and shoulders. The record establishes that the treatment
Dr. Williams endorsed (and that Claimant received) was palliative in nature. As of September
2012, Dr. Williams still recommended ongoing treatment.

He acknowledged that, as an

osteopath, his concept of medical stability is different from a medical physician's. Dr. Williams'
opinions regarding Claimant's medical stability status are less persuasive than the medical
physicians' generally, and Dr. Dirks' in particular.
234.

On October 1, 2008, Dr. Ganz evaluated Claimant's neck pain and opined that it

was due to muscle spasm, with no radicular component. He recommended that Claimant return
to physical therapy, noting that Claimant only went twice following his cervical fusion surgery,
then quit because it hurt. Claimant had declined physical therapy before, due to pain, and there
is no evidence in the record to establish that Claimant followed Dr. Ganz' recommendation.
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On September 8, 2009,

McNulty opined Claimant had reached MMI and

assessed PPI to both his cervical and lumbar spine conditions.
236.

Only Dr. Williams opined that Claimant was not medically stable in or around

February 2008. Dr. Williams' opinion is based, in part, on Claimant's shoulder and right arm
symptoms that were not proven to be related to his industrial injuries. Further, Dr. Williams
apparently based his opinion (that Claimant had not reached MMI) on his concurrent opinion that
Claimant needed treatment for pain relief, with which Dr. Dirks concurred. Claimant's need for
pain relief as a result of his industrial injuries cannot be quantified, due to his credibility issues
and his psychological pain disorder.

Moreover, even if Claimant's residual pain could be

attributed to his industrial injuries, the evidence in the record establishes that this condition was
stable.
237.

As Claimant's treating surgeon, Dr. Dirks had more opportunities to observe all of

Claimant's relevant conditions than did the other opining physicians.

He followed up with

appropriate testing on all of Claimant's residual complaints, finding no physiological basis.
238.

Claimant's residual pain complaints are likely due to a combination of his pre-

existing somatoform disorder and incentives related to the pendency of the instant litigation.
239.

Claimant reached MMI as of April 25, 2008, the date on which the last test

ordered by Dr. Dirks to confirm the status of Claimant's industrial conditions returned benign
results.
MEDICAL CARE

240.

Idaho Code § 72-432(1) mandates that an employer shall provide for an injured

employee such reasonable medical, surgical or other attendance or treatment, nurse and hospital
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medicines,

required by the employee's physician or

needed immediately after an injury or disability from an occupational disease, and for a
reasonable time thereafter. Claimant is also entitled to reasonable palliative care. Hamilton v.

Boise Cascade Corp., 84 Idaho 209,370 P.2d 191 (1962).
241.

If the employer fails to provide the same, the injured employee may do so at the

expense of the employer. Idaho Code § 72-432(1). Of course an employer is only obligated to
provide medical treatment necessitated by the industrial accident. The employer is not
responsible for medical treatment not related to the industrial accident. Williamson v. Whitman

Corp./Pet; Inc., 130 Idaho 602, 944 P.2d 1365 (1997).
In Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, 116 Idaho 720, 722-723, 779 P.2d 395,

242.

397-398 (1989), the Court held that medical treatment already received is reasonable when: 1)
the claimant made gradual improvement from the treatment; 2) the treatment was required by the
claimant's physician; and 3) the treatment was within the physician's standard of practice, the
charges for which were fair, reasonable, and similar to charges in the same profession. The
Court has announced no similar standard for prospective medical treatment; thus, Sprague
provides some guidance but the instant case must be judged on the totality of the circumstances
with respect to his request for additional medical care. Ferguson v. CDA Computune, 2011 UC
0015 (February 25, 2011); Richan v. Arla G. Lott Trucking, Inc., 2001 UC 0008 (February 7,
2011).
243.

Claimant seeks benefits for ongoing treatment by Dr. Williams of, primarily, his

neck, thoracic spine, and shoulder conditions. He asserts that the manipulations and narcotic
pain medications Dr. Williams administers are helping his body heal itself. Dr. Williams, at the
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the hearing, was prescribing

more pain medications than

January 2008, when he

began treating Claimant. Claimant was only treating with Dr. Williams once

month at

the time of the hearing, as opposed to once per week at the beginning of his treatment.
Dr. Williams has been a strong advocate of Claimant, writing open-ended letters

244.

opining as to his long-term disability and testifying under oath in these proceedings. He came to
Claimant's case nearly a year following his lumbar spine surgery and approximately six months
following his cervical spine surgery. His opinions are sometimes inconsistent with Dr. Dirks',
and he believes Claimant will require manipulations and medications indefinitely. He diagnosed
a right shoulder rotator cuff tear without the aid of radiologic imaging then, after Dr. McNulty
ordered an MRJ that demonstrated no tear, he took credit for helping the "tear" to heal without
entertaining the possibility that there never was a tear in the first place. Dr. Williams' opinions
are generally not very persuasive because they appear more strongly grounded in advocacy than
in reasonable interpretations of objective and clinical evidence.
245.

As discussed elsewhere herein, Claimant's pain complaints are unreliable in terms

of identifying the etiology of the pain. Dr. Dirks ruled out a treatable cervical spine pain source
in April 2008. He agreed that Claimant was in pain, due to his ongoing complaints and his right
shoulder atrophy, but he did not causally connect Claimant's industrial injuries to this pain. He
did not opine that Claimant should receive treatments from Dr. Williams indefinitely, but he did
acknowledge that they helped because they kept Claimant's head aligned.
246.

Claimant's thoracic and shoulder injuries were determined, above, not related to

his industrial accident.

FINDINGS OF

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER - 85

247.
his October
248.

Claimant incurred a new whiplash-type injury to his cervical spine as a result of
2010 chair fall which reignited his cervical spine symptoms.
Claimant has proven that Dr. Williams' treatment of his lumbar spine through

April 25, 2008, and his cervical spine through October 22, 2010 (including palliative care
following April 25, 2008) was reasonable and related to his 2006 industrial injuries. He is
entitled to reimbursement for qualifying treatment through those dates.
INDUSTRIAL INJURY PP/ AND MEDICAL RESTRICTIONS

249.

Following his 2006 lumbar spine fusion surgery, Claimant was limited as set forth

in Mr. Bengston's 2009 FCE. Although this FCE was conducted more than a year following the
date on which Claimant reached MMI, no party disputes that these results accurately reflected
Claimant's post-industrial accident functional abilities.

The Claimant's lumbar and cervical

spine injuries, with their attendant PPI and medical restrictions, are determined to be causally
linked to Claimant's 2006 industrial accident.

Unfortunately, no physician specifically

diagnosed the source of each of Claimant's functional deficits. Drs. Dirks and McNulty did,
however, rule out an industrial source for Claimant's right shoulder and hand deficits indicated
in the FCE.
250.

Lumbar spine. In September 2009, Dr. McNulty assessed 20% whole person PPI

to Claimant's lumbar spine condition. No other physician assessed lumbar PPL Therefore,
Claimant has 20% whole person PPI, with no apportionment to pre-existing conditions.
251.

Cervical spine. In September 2009, Dr. McNulty assessed 25% whole person PPI

to Claimant's cervical spine, without apportionment.
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Claimant could
sit occasionally, walk frequently, and sit/stand/walk for eight hours per day, five days per week,
so long as he could change positions frequently and at his own pace. Claimant could carry 30
pounds rarely and ten pounds occasionally or frequently and could bend or stoop occasionally.
Claimant was significantly limited in any activity requiring him to shift from a neutral spine
condition, like bending or twisting.
253.

Dr. McNulty restricted Claimant from heavy (and very heavy) work due to the

weakness in his spine created between his thoracic (non-industrial) and lumbar (partially
industrial) fusions. He agreed with Mr. Bengston' s light-duty FCE recommendations.
254.

Mr. Brownell and Dr. Collins agree that Claimant was limited to sedentary and

some light-duty work following his 2006 industrial injury.
PERMANENT DISABILITY

255.

"Permanent disability" or "under a permanent disability" results when the actual

or presumed ability to engage in gainful activity is reduced or absent because of pe1manent
impairment and no fundamental or marked change in the future can be reasonably expected.
Idaho Code§ 72-423. "Evaluation (rating) of permanent disability" is an appraisal of the injured
employee's present and probable future ability to engage in gainful activity as it is affected by
the medical factor of permanent impairment and by pertinent nonmedical factors provided in
Idaho Code § 72-430. Idaho Code § 72-425.
256.

The test for determining whether a claimant has suffered a permanent disability

greater than permanent impairment is "whether the physical impairment, taken in conjunction
with nonmedical factors, has reduced the claimant's capacity for gainful employment." Graybill
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v. Swift & Company, 11

Idaho 293, 294, 766 P.2d 763, 764 (1988).

sum, the focus of a

determination of permanent disability is on the claimant's ability to engage

gainful activity.

Sund v. Gambrel, 127 Idaho 3, 7, 896 P.2d 329, 333 (1995).
257.

Time of disability determination. The Idaho Supreme Court in Brown v. The

Home Depot, WL 718795 (March 7, 2012) reiterated that, as a general rule, Claimant's disability

assessment should be performed as of the date of hearing. Under Idaho Code § 72-425, a
pe1manent disability rating is a measure of the injured worker's "present and probable future
ability to engage in gainful activity." Therefore, the Court reasoned, in order to assess the
iajured worker's "present" ability to engage in gainful activity, it necessarily follows that the
labor market, as it exists at the time of hearing, is the labor market which must be considered.
However, the Commission is afforded latitude in making alternate determinations based upon the
particular facts of a given case.
258.

ISIF argues that the time-of-hearing labor market statistics should be applied, as

per Brown, but it would work an injustice to ISIF and Employer/Surety to assess Claimant's
disability (particularly whether he is totally and permanently disabled) as of the time of the
hearing because these defendants are not liable for any worsening in Claimant's condition
attributable to non-industrial causes following the last accident. Consequently, ISIF argues that
Claimant's disability should be determined as of the date of medical stability.
259.

The Commission agrees that Claimant's disability should be assessed as of the

date on which he became medically stable from his last industrial accident for the following
reasons. Importantly, there is sufficient evidence in the record to establish that Claimant reached
medical stability following his subject industrial accident, but before his subsequent injury.
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Also, Claimant's condition attributable to the industrial accident and his pre-existing conditions
can more precisely

assessed as of the date of MMI. This is because Claimant's subsequent

injury required surgical intervention at a site he contends was permanently impaired by his
subject industrial accident. The worsening in his functional abilities (if any) attributable to the
subsequent condition cannot be separated from his industrial and prior conditions by objective
testing. Yet, testing and opinions in the record confirm Claimant's functional capabilities prior to
the non-industrial subsequent injury. Under these circumstances, it would be nothing more than
an academic exercise to consider Claimant's time-of-hearing condition, then attempt to
"subtract" his subsequent conditions to determine Defendants' liability.

The addition, then

subtraction of irrelevant information would unnecessarily complicate the determination of
Claimant's disability, leading to a less accurate assessment of Claimant's loss of functional
abilities attributable to his industrial accident and more effort and expense required of all parties.
Therefore, Claimant's local labor market will be determined as of the hearing date; however, his
functional capabilities will be determined as of April 25, 2008, the date on which he reached
MMI.
260.

Nonmedical factors. Claimant has a GED and scored at the college level in math

skills on the TABE test administered by Mr. Brownell. He has some on-the-job training in
mechanics, as well as extensive experience in all aspects of logging, including operating and
maintaining machinery, hands-on management of logging salvage jobs, budgeting and recordkeeping, paying bills, complying with laws related to employment and maintaining a business,
and related activities. Claimant does not have experience hiring employees from outside his St.
Maries "grapevine" area contacts. He does not possess office-ready computer skills, and he has
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not worked in a job

requires him to accommodate walk-in customers since

was a service

station attendant in high school.
261.

Claimant is not disfigured, though he did walk with a limp, at times, on and

around April 25, 2008. Claimant was, at that time, a fit man in his late 40s. Claimant is wellknown in his local labor market as a logger who has suffered a significant back injury.
262.

Permanent disability - two methods. As a threshold matter, Claimant must

establish he was totally and permanently disabled as of April 25, 2008 to prove ISIF is liable for
his benefits. There are two methods by which a claimant can demonstrate that he or she is totally
and permanently disabled.
263.

100% method. A claimant may prove total and permanent disability if his or her

medical impairment together with the nonmedical factors total one hundred percent Idaho Code
§ 72-430(1) provides that in determining percentages of permanent disabilities, account should

be taken of the nature of the physical disablement, the disfigurement if of a kind likely to
handicap the employee in procuring or holding employment, the cumulative effect of multiple
injuries, the occupation of the employee, and his or her age at the time of accident causing the
injury, or manifestation of the occupational disease, consideration being given to the diminished
ability of the affected employee to compete in an open labor market within a reasonable
geographical area considering all the personal and economic circumstances of the employee, and
other factors as the Commission may deem relevant, provided that permanent partial or total loss
or loss of use of a member or organ of the body no additional benefits shall be payable for
disfigurement.
established.

If the claimant has met this burden, total and permanent disability has been

If, however, the claimant has proved something less than one hundred percent
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he or she can still demonstrate total disability
odd-lot worker. Boley v. State Industrial Special Indemnity

fitting within

definition of an

130 Idaho 278, 281, 939 P.2d

854, 857 (1997).
264.

Claimant does not argue that he is totally and permanently disabled by the 100%

method. Moreover, the record establishes that Claimant is not so disabled that he can do no
work at all. Therefore, Claimant is not totally and permanently disabled by the 100% method.
265.

Odd-lot doctrine. Claimant argues that he is totally and permanently disabled as

an odd-lot worker. An odd-lot worker is one "so injured that he can perform no services other
than those which are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable
market for them does not exist." Bybee v. State, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho
76, 81, 921 P.2d 1200, 1205 (1996). Such workers are not regularly employable "in any wellknown branch of the labor market - absent a business boom, the sympathy of a particular
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or a superhuman effort on their part. " Carey v.
Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 112, 686 P.2d 54, 57 (1984). Claimant

carries the burden of proof to establish total permanent disability under the odd-lot doctrine,
which may be established in any one of three ways:
a. By showing that the claimant has attempted other types of employment without
success;
b. By showing that the claimant or vocational counselors or employment agencies
on his behalf have searched for other work and other work is not available; or
c. By showing that any efforts to find suitable work would be futile.
Lethrud v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995).
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266.

The

establishes that Claimant has attempted other

types of employment since the subject accident. Following the date of injury, he continued as
the sole proprietor of St. Joe Salvage, although all logging work was performed by his
employees. Claimant was forced to close his business in October of 2008. The question is
whether the facts demonstrate that it was because of his injuries that Claimant was ultimately
unsuccessful in his efforts to continue as the sole proprietor of St. Joe Salvage.
267.

In 2007 and 2008, Claimant's participation in the sole proprietorship consisted of

running safety meetings, finding out where Potlatch wanted Claimant to log, doing payroll, and
paying the bills.

TRI, p. 169/20-23. He did no to minimal work in the woods. Even so,

Claimant's business had gross receipts of $244,396.00 in 2007, and Claimant had an adjusted
gross income of $70,295.00 in that year. Claimant only ran his business through October of
2008.

Even so, for 2008, Claimant's tax returns show gross receipts of $187,673.00 with

adjusted gross income of $50,016.00. Claimant testified that he closed his business in October of
2008 because he had been operating at a financial deficit. He testified that he lost a top worker
due to an injury, had to deal with the breakdown of his Cat, and faced a $12,000.00 workers
compensation insurance premium payment that he could not meet.

It is difficult to square

Claimant's testimony that he had been losing money in the business prior to its closure with his
tax returns, which show an AGI in excess of $50,000.00 for 2008. However, it is easier to
understand how events such as the loss of key personnel or equipment can suddenly turn a
business from profitable to unprofitable. The closure of Claimant's business led, in short order,
to the loss of his home and property, effectively putting him on the street, or close enough
thereto to make no difference. If Claimant's business was still profitable, we doubt very much
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that he

close

order to
Although Claimant's return to logging following the subject

accident ultimately proved unsuccessful, we are not persuaded that it proved unsuccessful
because of Claimant's work injury. Ultimately, the evidence persuades us that Claimant was
forced to close his business because of business-related misfortunes, not because he was
physically incapable of continuing to run his business in a profitable fashion.

Therefore,

Claimant has not shown total and permanent disability by evidence that he attempted other types
of employment without success.
268.

Second Lethrud Method. Next, Claimant can satisfy his burden of showing that

he is an odd-lot worker by demonstrating that he, or vocational rehabilitation experts on his
behalf, have searched for other work to no avail. Claimant has engaged in some independent job
search activities since the subject accident. He has filed one application for employment with the
Tribe, and though he alluded to other applications for employment, he did not identify any other
employers with whom he filed a formal application. Aside from Claimant's application with the
Tribe, Dan Brownell could not remember any other employers with whom Claimant filed an
application, but testified that he thought the filing of formal applications for employment a waste
of time in Claimant's case. (Transcript 93/15-23.) Mr. Brownell assisted Claimant in searching
for employment by contacting area employers both with, and without, Claimant. Mr. Brownell
did not prepare a resume for Claimant outlining Claimant's background, skills, and other
attributes, explaining that such a resume would not actually advance any of Claimant's goals
towards finding a job. However, he acknowledged that Claimant actually does have a lot of
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things to

proud

which could be beneficially exploited on a resume, such as his good

reputation with Potlatch and his multi-year awards as logger of the year.
269.

Although Mr. Brownell testified that he saturated Claimant's labor market with

job contacts and inquiries on Claimant's behalf, Dr. Collins was critical of this approach,
testifying that by accompanying Claimant on job contacts, or making the contacts without
Claimant, Mr. Brownell may have unintentionally sabotaged Claimant's prospects for making a
good impression on a potential employer; Mr. Brownell's presence robs Claimant of the
opportunity to make his own impression on a potential employer and signals to that employer
that Claimant may be damaged goods.

Dr. Collins was also critical of Mr. Brownell's

lackadaisical attitude towards the preparation of formal job applications and a suitable resume to
accompany such applications. Dr. Collins was also critical of Mr. Brownell for not seeking
employment where the job openings were.

Per Dr. Collins, many of the job contacts and

inquiries made by Mr. Brmvnell were made at places where no current job openings existed.
270.

Further, Mr. Brownell acknowledged that he did not focus his efforts on placing

Claimant in cashiering, retail, or other service industry jobs because of his perception that
Claimant suffered from what he colloquially described as a "yuck factor", even though Claimant
admittedly had math and other skills that could be exploited in such employment. According to
Mr. Brownell, Claimant's physical presentation, bad dentition, and rustic demeanor made him a
poor candidate for any job which required interaction with the public. However, Mr. Brmvnell
was also the first to state that Claimant was well-known and well-liked in his small community, a
legend in fact. Even if we give credence to Mr. Brownell's observations concerning Claimant's
appearance and mannerisms, we believe that he inappropriately excluded from his job search
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which openings frequently appear, and which claimant was
physically capable

performing. On balance, we cannot say that Mr. Brownell's failure to

identify suitable employment for Claimant is sufficient to demonstrate that Claimant is an oddlot worker.
271.

Third Lethrud method. Mr. Brownell opined that it would be futile for Claimant

to attempt to find work in the St. Maries area. In addition to Claimant's medical and nonmedical factors, Mr. Brownell cited the peculiarity of Claimant's local labor market in which
employers are familiar with the logging industry and the potential liability associated with
employing an ex-logger with a spine injury. Specifically, everyone knows Claimant. They also
know that he is no longer logging due to a spinal injury, and are unwilling to risk financial
liability, should he again injure himself.

Testimony in the record from potential employers

supports Mr. Brownell's opinion in this regard, as does his 30 plus years of experience placing
individuals in jobs in the St. Maries area.
272.

Dr. Collins opined that, at least until his 2010 chair injury, Claimant was

employable in regularly occurring jobs like retail sales, cashier, security guard, and driver.
Mr. Brownell testified that security guard and driver likely required physical abilities in excess
of Claimant's limitations. He did not believe Claimant would be employable in other jobs for a
variety of reasons, many of which are peculiar to the St. Maries area.

Contrary to

Mr. Brownell's testimony regarding a deli job, the evidence does not establish Claimant would
have trouble tallying. However, even though Claimant is apparently well-liked in his hometown,
such that his rustic presentation might not be an obstacle to employment, Claimant would be
competing with able-bodied individuals, many with customer service or other directly-related
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someone else for more than 20 years, and had not worked

outside the logging industry for more than 30 years, except for one short stint as a mechanic. In
addition, Claimant's lack of computer skills and his sitting restriction would have precluded him
from being competitive for back office and telephone work for which he may otherwise qualify
based upon his established computational skills.
273.

Based on the foregoing, we find that Claimant has proven his odd-lot status by

demonstrating that efforts to find suitable work would be futile. In making this determination,
we recognize that there is some potential conflict between this conclusion, and our determination
that Claimant did, in fact, successfully continue to work as the sole proprietor of St. Joe Salvage
through October of 2008, and that the business' failure has more to do with a number of
coincidental business misfortunes than it does Claimant's physical injuries.

However, that

Claimant was able to find ways to operate his business in 2007 and 2008 as a nonworking sole
proprietor is not necessarily fatal to a determination that Claimant is totally and permanently
disabled. Claimant need not demonstrate that there is no work that he can do. He is merely
required to demonstrate that he can perform no services other than those which are so limited in
quality dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable labor market for them does not exist.

See Bybee v. State Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, supra. Claimant's self-employment was
just such a limited employment opportunity, one that is unlikely to arise again for Claimant.
274.

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Claimant has met his prima facie case

of demonstrating that he is an odd-lot worker because it would be futile for him to look for work.

FINDINGS OF

CONCLUSIONS OF

AND ORDER - 96

now
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available to

some kind of suitable
claimant."

V.

IS

County Road

Department, 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 1067 (1995). Defendants must prove there is:

An actual job within a reasonable distance from [claimant's] home which
[claimant] is able to perform or for which [claimant] can be trained. In addition,
the [employer] must show that [claimant] has a reasonable opportunity to be
employed at that job. It is of no significance that there is a job [claimant] is
capable of performing if he would in fact not be considered for the job due to his
injuries, lack of education, lack of training, or other reasons.
Lyons v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 98 Idaho 403, 565 p.2d 1360 (1977).

276.

Dr. Collins listed a number of advertised positions that she opined may be within

Claimant's restrictions within 30 to 40 miles of his home. Although she did not check on every
opening, the evidence of record, including Mr. Brownell's opinions, indicates that it is likely that
Claimant could have done, at a minimum, some retail sales/cashiering work.

There is no

evidence, however, rebutting the testimony herein of the potential employers regarding the
stigma associated with Claimant's spine condition, or affirming that Claimant would be a serious
contender for any specific job. As such, the evidence fails to establish that Claimant had a
reasonable opportunity to achieve employment in any proposed position. Claimant's lack of
experience and appearance would preclude him from some of the jobs within his functional
abilities. The fact of his back injury would likely preclude him from the rest. Requiring few
skills, these jobs would place Claimant in competition with a broad hiring pool of many ablebodied individuals, who would likely be selected over Claimant due to the stigma of his
significant spinal pathology and related liability fears.
277.

Defendants have failed to prove that there is work in Claimant's local labor

market that he has a reasonable opportunity to obtain. Claimant has established that he was

FINDINGS OF

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER - 97

totally and permanently disabled pursuant to the odd-lot doctrine as of April

2008, the date

on which he reached MMI following his July 2006 industrial injuries.

ISIF LIABILITY
278.

Idaho Code § 72-332(2) provides that ISIF is liable for the remainder of an

employee's income benefits, over and above the benefits to which an employee is entitled solely
attributable to an industrial injury, when the industrial injury combines with a pre-existing
permanent physical impairment to result in total and permanent disablement of the employee.
279.

In Dumaw v. J L. Norton Logging, 118 Idaho 150, 795 P.2d 312 (1990), the

Idaho Supreme Court listed four requirements a claimant must meet to establish ISIF liability
underldaho Code§ 72-332:
(1) Whether there was indeed a pre-existing impairment;
(2) Whether that impairment was manifest;
(3) Whether the alleged impairment was a subjective hindrance to employment; and
(4) Whether the alleged impairment in any way combines with the subsequent injury to
cause total disability.
Dumaw, 118 Idaho at 155, 795 P.2d at 317.
280.

In evaluating the claim of Employer/Surety that responsibility for Claimant's total

and permanent disability should be shared between Employer/Surety and the ISIF, it is first
necessary to address Defendants' argument that notwithstanding his current proclamations,
Claimant is bound by the provisions of the prior lump sum settlements which identify preexisting impairments totalling ten percent of the whole person.

The argument is that since

Claimant acceded to these PPI ratings when settling the prior claims, he cannot now be heard to
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assert that all

disability is referable to

Defendants

subject accident.

that Claimant should be judicially estopped from arguing that

responsibility for his total and permanent disability should not be shared between
Employer/Surety and the ISIF. Notwithstanding any other objections which might be raised to
the application of the doctrine of judicial estoppel, we find it inapplicable for the simple reason
that in this proceeding Claimant takes no position that could be deemed inconsistent with the
averments allegedly made in the earlier lump sum settlements. It is Defendants who have made
claim against the ISIF, and it is Defendants who have assumed the burden of proving all the
elements of ISIF liability. Claimant has asserted that he is totally and permanently disabled, but
has taken no position on whether responsibility for his disability should be borne by Employer
alone or by Employer and ISIF jointly. (See Claimant's Opening Brief at 28.) What Defendants
are really attempting to do is bind the ISIF to the averments of the prior lump smn settlement.
However, the ISIF did not make the averments in question and was not even a party to the prior
settlements. The Commission concludes that the doctrine of judicial estoppel has no application
to the facts of this case. Having determined that the doctrine of judicial estoppel does not apply,
we must now determine whether or not the elements of ISIF liability are met by the evidence
before us.
PRE-EXISTING PERMANENT PHYSICAL IMPAIRMENT

281.

Claimant has a number of pre-existing conditions which may qualify as pre-

existing permanent physical impairments. Some of these can be disposed of fairly quickly. In
1993 Claimant underwent bilateral carpal tunnel surgery. In 1995 he suffered a right shoulder
separation for which he underwent surgery. In 2000 Claimant was diagnosed with a hernia for
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which he

two

which he underwent

2001 Claimant suffered a left shoulder separation for
2002. For the conditions referenced above, the record fails to

disclose that Claimant suffered any permanent physical impairment. Nor does it appear that any
of the other elements ofISIF liability are satisfied for any of these conditions.
Lumbosacral Spine
282.

Claimant suffered an unspecified injury to his lumbar spine in 1984. The 2005

lump sum settlement agreement reflects that Claimant was given a five percent PPI rating for the
effects of the 1984 injury. However, there are no medical records in evidence which support the
assertion that Claimant was given a five percent PPI rating for a 1984 lumbar spine injury, much
less the nature and extent of his lumbar spine injury. In 1987 Claimant suffered a work related
accident while operating a skidder. Although his injuries were primarily to the neck, jaw, right
shoulder and upper extremities, there are some references to lower back symptoms among the
constellation of Claimant's other symptoms. The 1987 accident was eventually resolved via a
lump sum settlement, which referenced Claimant's entitlement to a five percent PPI rating on
account of the 1987 injury. However, the lump sum settlement does not reflect to what body part
or parts the five percent PPI rating attached. Nor are there any contemporaneous medical records
which support the award of a five percent PPI rating arising from the 1987 work accident.
283.

The record does reflect that Claimant began repo1iing neuropathies m

approximately 1988.

In December of 2004, Dr. Dirks confirmed that an EMG evidenced

residual radiculopathy in Claimant's Sl nerve distribution.

In August of 2006, Dr. Ludwig

assessed permanent restrictions of "no significant repetitive bending or heavy lifting due to his
ongoing condition of chronic S 1 radiculopathy on the right as well as his history of lumbar
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but not due to

mJury

"

JE-30.

In September

2006,

SI radiculopathy.
284.

On September 8, 2009, Dr. McNulty assessed Claimant's permanent impairment

related to the 2006 accident, assigning a 20% PPI rating to Claimant's lumbar spine injury. He
declined to apportion any part of this impairment to a pre-existing condition, reasoning as
follows:
Though Mr. Green did have pre-existing degenerative changes, they were
asymptomatic and he was functioning at a high level prior to his injury. For this
reason, I did not feel that apportionment is indicated in this case. However, if he
did have a prior lumbar spine workmen's compensation settlement, that would be
subtracted from the 20% whole-person impairment that is attributable to his
lumbar spine condition.

I have reviewed the FCE and agree with the findings. Mr. Green has a fusion at
T12-Ll and at L3-L5. Because of those fusions, he has increased stress between
LI and L3. He should not engage in heavy physical activities such as logging.
He is more suited to work in a light job duty category as outlined in the FCE.
JE-23, p. 332.
At first blush, Dr. McNulty's treatment of the issue of apportionment of PPI appears somewhat
inconsistent with the records he reviewed in connection with his evaluation. Both D:rs. Ludwig
and Stevens noted Claimant's pre-existing chronic S-1 radiculopathy, yet Dr. McNulty failed to
consider these findings when addressing the issue of apportionment, concluding that Claimant's
lumbar spine was asymptomatic prior to the subject accident. Dr. McNulty's treatment of the
apportionment issue can be reconciled with the records of Drs. Ludwig and Stevens by
recognizing that Claimant's radiculopathy was at S-1, while Dr. McNulty' s rating addressed only
L3-L5.
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285.

The

Claimant may

impairment due to his well-documented

a

1 radiculopathy. However, although we conclude that

this pre-existing condition may have been of sufficient severity to warrant an impairment rating,
the record does not disclose that Claimant was ever rated for this condition.
Thoracic Spine

286.

In 2002, Claimant suffered an injury to his thoracic spme at T12-Ll.

He

underwent a fusion surgery at this level in January of 2003, performed by Dr. Ganz. Dr. Ganz
released Claimant without restrictions referable to the Tl2-Ll fusion in 2004. However, both
Dr. Dirks and Dr. Ludwig testified that permanent medical restrictions against bending and
lifting would be appropriate following Claimant's fusion, such that he should avoid heavy and
very heavy work, like logging, following the surgery. In September of 2006, Dr. Stevens opined
that Claimant's pre-existing conditions precluded him from heavy and very heavy work.
287.

The Commission concludes that Claimant is likely entitled to an impairment

rating referable to the TI2-Ll fusion and residuals. However, the record altogether fails to
establish what that impairment rating might be.
Cervical Spine

288.

Among Claimant's complaints following the 1987 skidder accident were

complaints of neck, jaw, and bilateral upper extremity symptoms. Some of Claimant's medical
providers felt he was chronically disabled due to pain following the 1987 accident, even though
there was little to no objective evidence of injury. Although it was recommended that Claimant
not return to logging, he did anyway, even though he was afforded the opportunity through the
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as a truck

lump sum

until 2004, evidently
289.

any ongoing

. Claimant continued to

as a

spine complaints.

In 2004, Claimant sought treatment after he hit his head getting into his Cat MRI

imaging did not identify evidence of neurological injury, but did reveal some degeneration in
Claimant's cervical spine. No physician ever assessed any PPI related to this injury, and he
settled his workers compensation claim for the 2004 accident via a 2005 lump sum settlement,
which failed to reference any PPI referable to the cervical spine.
290.

The evidence fails to establish that Claimant had any pre-existing permanent

physical impairment referable to his cervical spine.
291.

Manifest: "Manifest" means that either the employer or employee was aware of

the condition so that the condition can be established as existing prior to the injury. See Royce v.

Southwest Pipe of Idaho, 103 Idaho 290, 294, 647 P.2d 746, 750 (1982). Here, Claimant was
diagnosed with a thoracic spine injury in 2002 for which he underwent fusion surgery in 2003,
and his residual SI radiculopathy was diagnosed following an EMG nerve conduction study in
November 2004.

Claimant, who is also the Employer, knew of his pre-existing sacral and

thoracic spine conditions prior to July 2006.
292.

Subjective hindrance:

ISIF disputes that Claimant had any pre-existing

condition that constituted a subjective hindrance prior to his final industrial mJunes.
"subjective hindrance" prong of the test for ISIF liability is defined by statute:
"Permanent physical impairment" is defined in section 72-422, Idaho Code,
provided, however, as used in this section such impairment must be a permanent
condition, whether congenital or due to injury or disease, of such seriousness as to
constitute a hindrance or obstacle to obtaining employment or to obtaining reemployment if the claimant should become employed. This shall be interpreted
subjectively as to the particular employee involved, however, the mere fact
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Idaho Code§ 72-332(2) (emphasis added).
293.

The Idaho Supreme Court set out the definitive explanation of the "subjective

hindrance" language in Archer v. Bonners Ferry Datsun, 117 Idaho 166, 172, 686 P.2d 557, 563
(1990):

Under this test, evidence of the claimant's attitude toward the pre-ex1stmg
condition, the claimant's medical condition before and after the injury or disease
for which compensation is sought, nonmedical factors concerning the claimant, as
well as expert opinions and other evidence concerning the effect of the preexisting
condition on the claimant's employability will all be admissible. No longer will
the result tum merely on the claimant's attitude toward the condition and expert
opinion concerning whether a reasonable employer would consider the claimant's
condition to make it more likely that any subsequent injury would make the
claimant totally and permanently disabled. The result now will be determined by
the Commission's weighing of the evidence presented on the question of whether
or not the preexisting condition constituted a hindrance or obstacle to employment
for the particular claimant.
Id.

294.

Archer makes it clear that an injured worker's attitude towards a pre-existing

condition is but one factor to be considered by the Commission in detern1ining whether or not the
pre-existing physical impairment constituted a subjective hindrance to Claimant. After Archer,
the Commission is required to weigh a wide variety of medical and nonmedical factors, as well
as expert and lay testimony, in making the determination as to whether or not a pre-existing
condition constituted a hindrance or obstacle to employment for the particular claimant.
295.

With respect to his thoracic spine injury, Claimant has offered conflicting

testimony from which one could conclude either that this condition was or was not a hindrance to
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he
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medical testimony, paiiicularly that of

surgery. We are more
Dirks

Ludwig, which establishes that

Claimant reasonably did have permanent medical restrictions on bending and lifting such that
Claimant should avoid heavy and very heavy work following his thoracic fusion surgery.
296.

Regarding Claimant's pre-existing S-1 radiculopathy, we note that the

limitations/restrictions attached to this condition do not appear to be any different than those
given to Claimant for his prior thoracic spine injury. As such, it is difficult to understand how
the S-1 radiculopathy could be deemed to constitute a subjective hindrance to Claimant prior to
the 2006 accident. If the condition did not materially decrease Claimant's :functional ability,
would Claimant or anyone else consider the condition to constitute a hindrance to his
employability? Probably not, but as developed below, we need not come to a resolution of this
question, because we find that Claimant's S-1 radiculopathy does not satisfy the "combining
with" element of the prima facie case against the ISIF.
Combining With:

297.

As part of its prima facie case, Employer/Surety bears the burden of establishing

that both Claimant's pre-existing S-1 radiculopathy and his pre-existing thoracic spine condition
combined with his accident produced impairments to cause total impairment and disability.
Employer/Surety bears the burden of demonstrating that but for the pre-existing conditions,
Claimant would not be totally and permanently disabled following the work accident.

See

Garcia v. JR. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966, 772 P.2d 1973 (1989); Bybee v. State Industrial
Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 76, 921 P.2d 1200 (1996).

FINDINGS OF

CONCLUSIONS OF

AND ORDER - 105

298.

ISIF

that Claimant's 2006 industrial accident, standing alone, rendered him

totally and permanently disabled.

Therefore, the claim against the ISIF must be dismissed

because the requisite "combining with" elements of the prima facie case is not met In making
this argument, the ISIF relies heavily on the 2006 Safety Video, and certain portions of
Claimant's testimony, which tend to establish that Claimant was unhampered by any of his preexisting conditions prior to the 2006 accident. Therefore, the 2006 accident, standing alone, left
him totally and permanently disabled. As noted above, we assign little weight to Claimant's
conflicting testimony concerning his pre-injury and post-injury abilities. More persuasive to us
is the testimony of Mr. Brownell and Dr. Collins, both of whom opined that Claimant's preexisting conditions, in particular, the thoracic spine injury, limited his ability to engage in gainful
activity in his labor market.
299.

We have also concluded that as of his date of medical stability following the 2006

industrial accident, Claimant is an odd-lot worker via the path of futility.

The remaining

question is whether this result obtains solely from the combined effects of the work accident and
Claimant's pre-existing physical impairments. We find the records of Drs. Ganz and McNulty
particularly instructive on this question. In his report of October I, 2008, Dr. Ganz offered the
following comments on the impact of the thoracic spine fusion on the injuries attributable to
Claimant's work accident:
The patient specifically asked me whether I would recommend that he return to
logging again, and my recommendation is that he should not return to logging or
heavy labor again because of his prior lumbar fusion and then the fusion that I
performed for the central disc herniation of Tl2-Ll. The only motion segment
that remains in his back is at Ll-2 and L2-3, and with heavy work, those will
certainly begin to fail and most likely will require surgery in the future.
JE-21, p. 309.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 106

8, 2009,

offered similar observations:

I have reviewed the FCE and agree with the findings. Mr. Green has a fusion at
at
Because those fusions, he has increased stress
LI and L3. He should not engage in heavy physical activities such as logging.
He is more suited to work in a light job duty category as outlined in the FCE.
JE-23, p. 332.
300.

Therefore, per Drs. Ganz and McNulty, the fact that Claimant has a pre-existing

Tl2-Ll fusion increases the risk that he will have further problems from the L3-5 fusion unless
he observes certain prophylactic limitations/restrictions.

We believe this demonstrates that

Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine condition does combine with the effects of the work
accident to contribute to Claimant's total and permanent disability.
301.

With respect to Claimant's pre-existing S-1 radiculopathy, we are unable to

identify any persuasive evidence of record which would lead us to conclude that this condition is
implicated in contributing to Claimant's total and permanent disability. As noted above, the
limitations/restrictions referable to the S-1 radiculopathy do not appear to be any different than
the limitations/restrictions relating to Claimant's earlier thoracic spine condition. Nor does there
appear to be any evidence suggesting that Claimant suffered a worse outcome from the effects of
the work accident as a consequence of the S-1 radiculopathy.

In short, the evidence is

insufficient to demonstrate that the S-1 radiculopathy combined with Claimant's thoracic spine
condition and his accident produced conditions to cause total and permanent disability. Rather,
the evidence establishes that Claimant's total and permanent disability is a result of the combined
effects of Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine condition and the injuries associated with the
2006 accident.
CAREY FORMULA
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302.

Determination of the amount ofISIF liability is a matter of calculation set forth by

the Idaho Supreme Court. Carey v. Clearwater County Road Dept., 107 Idaho 109, 686 P .2d 54
(1984). To establish the amount of ISIF liability, the extent - in percentage of the whole person
- of qualifying permanent physical impairments is required.
303.

The most persuasive evidence on the question of the extent and degree of

Claimant's accident-caused impairment comes from Dr. McNulty. Dr. McNulty proposed that
Claimant has a twenty percent PPI rating referable to his lumbar spine condition and a twentyfive percent PPI rating referable to his cervical spine condition, with no impairment to preexisting conditions.
304.

We have found that while Claimant has a long and complicated pre-injury and

medical history, only one of these pre-existing conditions combined with the subject accident to
cause total and permanent disability. Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine condition combined
with the accident-produced cervical and lumbar spine injuries to cause total and permanent
disability. We have also found that the pre-existing thoracic spine condition satisfies all other
elements of the primafacie case against the ISIF. The problem, of course, is that although we
have found that the pre-existing thoracic spine condition was of such a severity to constitute a
pre-existing permanent physical impairment, the extent and degree of Claimant's permanent
physical impairment for that pre-existing condition has not been quantified by Employer/Surety,
who bears the burden of proof in this regard. The Commission recognizes its authority, as
discussed in Hartman v. Double L Manufacturing, 141 Idaho 456, 111 P.3d 141 (2005), to
request evidence on the issue of Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine impairment, yet we are
reluctant to do so when the parties, represented by experienced counsel, had ample opportunity
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to marshal such evidence prior to hearing. The issue was clearly noticed and the parties are well
aware of the elements required to prove and calculate ISIF liability. However, we believe the
facts of this case mandate an assessment of the extent and degree of Claimant's pre-existing
thoracic impainnent considering the overwhelming proof that Claimant suffered from a preexisting impairment which would impact Employer/Surety and ISIF's liability. Justice demands
that we request that the parties present additional evidence of Claimant's pre-existing thoracic
spine condition. As in Hartman we deem it necessary to retain jurisdiction of this matter in order
to allow the parties to adduce additional evidence on the following question:
(1) What is the appropriate impairment rating for Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine
condition?
305.

The parties are directed to conduct such additional discovery and/or investigations

that may be needed to provide the Commission with the evidence necessary to address this issue.
If necessary, an additional hearing will be scheduled to allow the parties to present evidence and

arguments on the issue as they deem fit. The Commission will necessarily defer any assessment
of how responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability should be apportioned
between Employer/Surety and the ISIF under Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department,
107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54 (1984) pending additional evidence necessary to apply the Carey
formula.
TEMPORARY AND TOTAL DISABILITY

306.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-408 and § 72-409, during his period of recovery, an

injured worker is entitled to temporary total or temporary partial disability benefits calculated,
for the first 52 weeks following the subject accident, at sixty-seven percent of his average weekly

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER- 109

wage, and thereafter, at sixty-seven percent of the currently applicable average weekly state
wage.
307.

Idaho Code § 72-419 identifies the various ways to calculate the average weekly

wage of injured workers, the method of calculation depending on whether the worker in question
is paid by the hour, week, month or year or by his output. Claimant does not fall into any of the
categories specified by the statute. As the sole proprietor of St. Joe Salvage, Claimant has never
been paid a "wage", whether it be hourly, weekly, monthly or yearly. The sections which come
closest to describing Claimant's situation are Idaho Code § 72-419(5) and Idaho Code § 72419(10) which specify:
Idaho Code § 419(5). If at such time the hourly wage has not been fixed or
cannot be ascertained, the wage for the purpose of calculating compensation shall
be taken to be the usual wage for similar services where such services are
rendered by paid employees.
Idaho Code§ 419(10). When circumstances are such that the actual rate of pay
cannot be readily ascertained, the wage shall be deemed to be the contractual,
customary or usual wage in the particular employment, industry or community for
the same or similar service.
However, even these methods of calculating an injured worker's average weekly wage provide
little guidance under the facts of this case; Claimant is not an employee. Rather, he is a sole
proprietor who has elected coverage under the workers' compensation laws of this State.
308.

However, that he is entitled to TTD benefits during a period of recovery following

a compensable work accident should be beyond cavil. When he elected coverage for himself,
Claimant was certainly entitled to expect that he would receive the same classes of benefits as
any other injured worker. Certainly, the Surety did not tell Claimant that because he was a sole
proprietor, he was not entitled to time loss benefits since he was not a "wage earner".
Anecdotally, the average weekly wage of sole proprietors such as Claimant has been calculated
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the past by refe1Ting to tax returns and associated schedules. However, we need not decide
Claimant's average weekly wage should be calculated for purposes of this case, since
Claimant is entitled, at most, to the payment of temporary partial disability benefits. Under
Idaho Code § 72-408, where Claimant has found employment at a lower paying job during his
period of recovery, he is entitled to benefits for partial disability, calculated per Idaho Code § 72408(2) as follows:
Partial disability. For partial disability during the period of recovery an amount
equal to sixty-seven percent (67%) of his decrease in wage-earning capacity, but
in no event to exceed the income benefits payable for total disability.
309.

Here, during the entirety of his period of recovery from July 4, 2006 through

April 25, 2008, Claimant continued to operate St. Joe Salvage.

He reported no earnings to

Employer/Surety, yet his tax returns reveal that he had adjusted gross income from business
profits of $42,321.00 for 2006, $70,295.00 for 2007, and $50,016.00 for 2008. For the period
July 4, 2006 through March 13, 2008, Surety paid TTD benefits to Claimant of $28,703.90,
representing what Surety thought it was required to pay for Claimant's period of temporary total
disability. However, since Claimant continued to operate St. Joe Salvage during the period in
question, he was entitled, at most, to temporary partial disability benefits.

A review of

Claimant's tax returns reveals that in the years following the subject accident, Claimant earned
more than he had in the years leading up to his industrial accident. In short, the evidence does
not reflect that Claimant suffered a "decrease in his wage earning capacity" following the subject
accident, and during the time that he continued to operate St. Joe Salvage. Quite apart from the
question of how to calculate Claimant's average weekly wage, Claimant has simply failed to
demonstrate that he earned less in his business after the subject accident than before. Claimant
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has demonstrated no entitlement to temporary partial disability benefits under Idaho Code § 72408(2). Employer/Surety has overpaid benefits in the amount of $28,703.90, and is entitled to a
credit of $28,703.90 against its obligation to share in responsibility for Claimant's total and
permanent disability.
ATTORNEY FEES

310.

The final issue is Claimant's entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §

72-804. Attorney fees are not granted as a matter of right under the Idaho Workers'
Compensation Law, but may be recovered only under the circumstances set forth in Idaho Code

§ 72-804 which provides:
If the commission or any court before whom any proceedings are brought under
this law determines that the employer or his surety contested a claim for
compensation made by an injured employee or dependent of a deceased employee
without reasonable ground, or that an employer or his surety neglected or refused
within a reasonable time after receipt of a written claim for compensation to pay
to the injured employee or his dependents the compensation provided by law, or
without reasonable grounds discontinued payment of compensation as provided
by law justly due and owing to the employee or his dependents, the employer
shall pay reasonable attorney fees in addition to the compensation provided by
this law. In all such cases the fees of attorneys employed by injured employees or
their dependents shall be fixed by the commission.

311.

The decision that grounds exist for awarding attorney fees is a factual

determination which rests with the Commission. Troutner v. Traffic Control Company, 97 Idaho
525, 528, 547 P.2d 1130, 1133 (1976).
312.

Claimant asserts that Surety unreasonably delayed payment of his temporary

disability benefits. As addressed above, Claimant failed to establish entitlement to TTD benefits
because he failed to prove he had any lost wages. Therefore, Claimant is not entitled to an award
of attorney fees related to the manner in which Surety paid him TTD benefits. Claimant also sets
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forth a laundry list of complaints about Surety's behaviors in adjusting the claim and
communicating with the panel experts that he asse1is constitute unreasonable practices. Too,
Claimant asserts that Surety did not pay bills associated with claims it accepted, and did not pay
mileage due. The record and briefing are insufficient to establish Claimant's claims with the
specificity necessary to form the basis for an order for attorney fees.
313.

Claimant has failed to establish he is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant

to Idaho Code § 72-804.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
1.

Claimant has proven that he suffered injuries to his cervical and lumbar spine

areas as a result of his industrial accident on July 3, 2006.
2.

Claimant has proven entitlement to medical care for his cervical and lumbar spine

injuries through April 25, 2008.
3.

Claimant has failed to establish entitlement to temporary disability benefits.

Surety is entitled to a credit of $28,703.90 for its overpayment, such credit to be applied as
anticipated by Idaho Code § 72-316.
4.

Claimant has proven PPI related to his July 2006 industrial accident of 20% of the

whole person related to his lumbar spine condition and 25% of the whole person related to his
cervical spine condition.
5.

Claimant has proven that he is totally and permanently disabled as of April 25,

2008.
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6.

Employer/Surety has proven that Claimant's thoracic spine injury warrants the

assignment of a PPI rating, was manifest, constituted a subjective hindrance, and combined with
the effects of the subject accident to cause permanent and total disability.
7.

Employer is liable for its portion of disability as may be established by

application of the Carey formula and it shall begin paying total and permanent disability benefits
immediately, based upon the date of medical stability (April 25, 2008), with opportunity for
adjustment with ISIF after relevant pre-existing PPI and Carey formula applications have. been
ascertained.
8.

ISIF is liable for its portion of disability as may be established by application of

the Carey formula.
9.

Jurisdiction over this matter is retained for the purpose of reqmrmg

Employer/Surety to put on additional proof concerning the extent and degree of permanent
physical impairment referable to Claimant's thoracic spine condition.
10.

If necessary, the Commission will schedule another hearing for the purpose of

taking evidence and argument on the extent of the thoracic spine impairment.
11.

Claimant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-

12.

Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all

804.

matters adjudicated.

INDU~MM~~~-

Thomas P. Baskin, Chairman
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J.C. No.: 06~007698
DEFENDANT EMPLOYER/SURETY'S
MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION ON ORDER
AND MOTION FOR DEADLINE
ON FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

COME NOW Defendants, St. ,Jocs S.ilvage and Travelers Indemnity Company, by and through their

attorneys ofrecord, Bowen & Bailey, LLP, and hereby requests that the Commission address 2 issues in

this matter. At this point in time these Defendants are not making a Motion for Reconsideration.
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DEFENDANT EMPLOYER/SURETY'S
MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION ON ORDER
AND MOTION FOR DEADLINE
ON FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

COME NOW Defendants, St. Joes Salvage and Travelers fudemnity Company, by and through their
attorneys of record, Bowen & Bailey, LLP, and hereby requests that the Commission address 2 issues in
this matter. At this point in time these Defendants are not making a Motion for Reconsideration.
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Instead, Defendants are making two separate motions for post-order activities from the Findings of
Conclusions of
1.

and Order as filed January

2014.

The Industrial Commission has ordered ISIF and the Employer/Surety to engage in

some additional activity to establish impairment ratings for purposes of addressing the "CAREY"
Formula for determining ISIF proportionate responsibility in this matter. Jurisdiction has been
retained. Insomuch as it appears that the paiiies may need to go as far as having a second hearing,
these Defendants would like to establish a timeframe for additional activity.
It is proposed that the Industrial Commission issue an Addendum, or subsequent Order

indicating that the parties are to have any activity needed to be undertaken completed within 120
days from the date of any such order. It is believed that this would allow both of the parties ample
time within which to formulate additional evidence and documentation that may be needed. Withing
this period of time, parties can deal with the question of whether another hearing will be required in
this matter. Defendants simply do not want this to be an open ended situation where this case now
languishes for many more months. It has been going on long enough. As such, Defendants would
respectfully request that the Industrial Commission issue an order establishing a 120 daytimeline on
the parties' ability to generate additional evidence to be submitted to the Industrial Commission.
2.
m this matter.

The Industrial Commission has indicated that ISIF is liable for a portion of disability
(Order, Section 8).

The Industrial Commission has ordered the Defendant

Employer/Surety to pay total and permanent disability benefits. Defendants believe that this is an
onerous burden upon the Employer and is inconsistent with how the payment of total permanent
benefits is undertaken in a case. In fact, in situations ofISIF liability, Defendants are unaware of any
case law or statute suggesting such a process.
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Obviously, the Industrial Commission has already decided ISIP is liable. What has not been
decided is an analysis under the CAREY Formula as to when the Employer's responsibility would
end for making any payments, and when ISIP' s responsibility for taking over all total perm benefits,
(i.e. TTD payments) would start.
In a normal situation where the CAREY Formula analysis has occurred, both the Employer
and ISIP are contemporaneously exposed to payment of certain benefits. During the timeframe that
the Surety is required to pay out their exposure under that analysis, payments are made essentially at
the PPI/PPD rate. Then, during that same period of time that the Surety is making the monthly
payments for its portion of the total perm benefits ISIF makes up the differential between what the
payment is at the PPD rate, and what the appropriate TTD rate payment would be.
Once the Employer's proportionate responsibility has run and all of the Employer's payments
have been made (pursuant to the CAREY Formula), ISIP then takes over full payment ofbenefits for
the remainder of the disabled Employee's life. This is well established, and there is no question as to
how that process normally proceeds.
In the current matter, the Commission has issued its Findings of Pact and Order that ISIF is
liable to some degree. The exact "degree" is that dispute. Nonetheless, ISIF should be making
payments on Claimant's benefits for the differential between the PPD rate and the TTD rate from
April 25, 2008 to some indeterminate time in the future. That is absolutely undisputed. That is how
the payment system works.
What is up in the air is when the Surety's timeframe ends and ISIF is relegated to taking over
the entirety of payments.

That is what the issue is about in this case.

Since the Industrial

Commission has found Claimant to be totally and pem1anently disabled and ISIF to be liable to some
DEFENDANT EMPLOYER/SURETY'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION ON ORDER AND MOTION FOR
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degree, then ISIF owes those "differential" payments. The Defendants agree that at this point in time
there is insufficient evidence to identify when these Defendants' obligation ends.

All

Defendants are stating is that no matter how one looks at this case, if Claimant is totally and
permanently disabled and ISIF has liability (as per the Industrial Commission's Order) then ISIF
should be making the differential payments until such time as the Industrial Commission determines
the full extent of the Employer's liability.
If the Employer's liability does not end until many, many months down the line into the
future, then there is no harm to ISIF because ISIF would still only be making the differential
payments as is required by statute and case low and would not have to pay out money for the full
total perm payment erroneously and prematurely.

Once again, ISIF should be making that

differential payment to the Claimant.

WHEREFORE, these Defendants respectfully request that the Industrial Commission
modify the prior Order indicating that ISIF should make immediate payment to the Claimant of the
differential amounts not owed by these Defendants for total perm benefits to the Claimant until such
time as Defendant Employer/Surety's ultimate liability is ascertained from this next round of
litigation.
These Defendants also request an Order from the Industrial Commission establishing a
deadline of 120 days to generate additional evidence as previously ordered.
DATED this 18th day ofFebrmny, 2014.

ERIC S. BAILEY
\
Attorneys for Defendant Emplo er/Surety

1

J

DEFENDANT EMPLOYER/SURETY'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION ON ORDER AND MOTION FOR
DEADLtNE ON FURTHER PROCEEDtNGS - 4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY
that on the 1s1h day of February, 2014, I caused a true and correct
copy of the within and foregoing instrument to be served:
STARR KELSO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 1312
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1312
FAX: (208) 664-6261
(counsel for Claimant)

D

THOMAS W CALLERY
JONES BROWER & CALLERY
PO BOX 854
LEWISTON ID 83501
FAX: (208) 746-9553
tcallery@lewiston.com
(counsel for ISIF)

U.S. MAIL
HAND DELIVERY
FACSIMILE

U.S. :tv1AIL
HAND DELIVERY
FACSIMILE

Eric S. Bailey

DEFENDANT EMPLOYER/SURETY'S MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION ON ORDER AND MOTION FOR
DEADLINE ON FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 5

1

14 13:50 FROM-JB

2087469553

T-921

P0002/0005

Thomas W. Callery, ISBN 2292
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY,
1304 Idaho Street
P.
Box 854
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 743-3591
Facsimile: (208) 746-9553
tcallery@lewiston.com

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
vs.
)
ROY GREEN, d/b/a ST. JOES SALVAGE )
LOGGING,
)
ROY GREEN,

)
)
)
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY, )
Employer,

Surety, and
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)

LC. No. 06-07698

DEFENDANT ISIPS RESPONSE TO .
EMPLOYER/SURETY·s MOTIONS
FOR CLARIFICATION ON ORDER
AND MOTION FOR DEADLINE ON

FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

)
)

-----~--------)
Comes now the Defendant State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, by and

through its attorney of record, Thomas W. Callery of Jones, Brower and Callery, PLLC, and
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1. The Employer/Surety has requested a motion establishing a 120 day timeline in which

the parties are to generate additional evidence to be submitted to the Industrial Commission on
the issue of impairment and a proposed Carey apportionment. The ISIF believes that the parties
can move expeditiously on this issue without the establishment of a deadline;

Frankly, the

Employer/Surety has had a period in excess of 6 years to obtain an impairment rating for the
Further, the Order of the Industrial

Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine condition.

Commission indicates that the burden of establishing an impairment rating is upon the
Employer/Surety to put on additional proof concerning the extent and degree of impairment for
the Claimant's thoracic spine.
Unlike the Employer/Surety, the Fund has not obtained any Independent Medical
Evaluations during the pendency of the case.

It is the intention of the Fund to review the

additional evidence that the Employer/Surety obtains, but would reserve the right to obtain its
own Independent Medical Evaluation pending review of the Employer/Surety's additional
evidence. The burden of proof in this case remains on the Employer/Surety and the Fund should
be allowed sufficient time to rebut that evidence if it so desires.
Further, a hearing, as proposed by the Commission in its Order, can be established on an
expedited basis if necessary due to the limited nature of the issue.
2.

The second motion of the Employer/Surety appears to be requesting that the

Commission enter an order for the immediate payment of the so called differential amount by the
ISlF from the date of stability (April 25, 2008) forward. Although the Employer/Surety tries to
couch its pleading as not a motion for reconsiderationi in essence, the motion is exactly such a
motion. It seeks affirmative relief from the original Order of the Commjssion and is hardly
seeking clarification. The Order is not ambiguons.
DEFENDANT ISIF'S RESPONSE TO
EMPLOYER/SURETY'S MOTIONS

2

0

/2

4 TU

00 [

X NO

2

02-25- 14 13:51 FROM-JB

2087469553

1

The Industrial Commission's Order clearly sets
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forth

its

intention that the

Employer/Surety begin "paying total and permanent disabilify benefits immediately.

The

appropriate Carey apportionment is specifically reserved for a later determination. Should it be
necessary for an adjustment following a final order on the Carey apportionment, then such action
can be taken at that time. It is the Employer/Surety who failed to establish as part of its prima
facie case, a pre-existing impairment. The only reason a Carey apportionment is not available
immediately is because the Employer/Surety failed to put on proof of a permanent physical
impairment with regard to the pre-existing thoracic spine condition.
Before the Industrial Special Indemnity FlUld should be ordered to begin making
payments, a prima facie case must be established. It is not prejudicial to the Employer/Surety to
make it pay the full total and permanent disability payment at the TTD rate in a situation such as
the present case where the Commission is retaining jurisdiction to allow the Employer/Surety an
opportunity to present a pre-existing impairment rating. It was the Employer/Surety's obligation
to provide that evidence to the Commission and it had ample time in the many years that this
litigation has been pending. It is not now an emergency, and payment by the Industrial Special
Indemnity FlUld can await a proper and fully adjudicated and final Carey apportionment
detennination.
/

DATED this 2.. '> day of February, 2014.
JONES, BROWER & CALLERY, P.L.L.C.

THOMAS W. CALLERY
\
Attomey for State of Idaho Industrial
Special Indemnity Fund
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
GREEN,
Claimant,
V.

IC 2006-007698
ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOE SALVAGE,
Employer,

ORDER REGARDING
CLARIFICATION

and
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

On February 18, 2014, Defendants Employer and Surety ("Defendants") filed two
motions in response to the Commission's decision in the above-captioned case. The first motion
seeks to limit the time during which the parties may collect additional evidence. The second
motion purports to seek "clarification" of the decision, specifically ~7 of the order, which states:
Employer is liable for its portion of disability as may be established
by application of the Carey formula and it shall begin paying total and
permanent disability benefits immediately, based upon the date of
medical stability (April 25, 2008), with opportunity for adjustment
with ISIF after relevant pre-existing PPI and Carey formula
applications have been ascertained.
Green v. St. Joe Salvage, IC 2006-007698, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 114

(January 29, 2014).

ORDER REGARDING CLARIFICATION -1

Defendant State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") objects to the motions,
arguing, first, that a deadline for evidence compilation is not necessary, and second, that the order
requires no clarification, because it is not ambiguous. ISIF asserts that Defendants are essentially
making a motion for reconsideration.
Regarding the first motion, we agree with ISIF that no deadline is necessary. Defendants bear
the burden of proof on the issue of Claimant's permanent impairment referable to his thoracic spine
condition. Therefore, the time it takes to compile the necessary evidence will largely be determined
by Defendants. ISIF is correct that it should be afforded sufficient time to collect rebuttal evidence, if
necessary. The Commission will not at this time presume to estimate how long the compilation of
evidence will, or should, take. If, in the future, any of the parties believes that another party is
unfairly delaying proceedings in this matter, the Commission will entertain a relevant motion. At this
time, however, setting a deadline would be premature.
Regarding the second motion, we likewise agree with ISIF that what Defendants are seeking
1s not clarification, but reconsideration. The order is unambiguous, and it is clear from their
arguments that Defendants understand its requirements. Defendants simply object to the
requirements, stating that the order places an "onerous burden" on them. Defendants argue that in a
"nonnal situation ... both the Employer and ISIF are contemporaneously exposed to payment of
certain benefits." Defendants' Motion, p. 3. This is not, however, a normal situation. The degree of
ISIF's liability has not been determined. Defendants have been granted an extraordinary opportunity
to put on more evidence relating to Carey apportionment, and it is not unreasonable, in the meantime,
to require Defendants to pay total and permanent disability benefits to Claimant. The order allows for
adjustment, if necessary, after the extent ofISIF's liability has been determined.
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendants' motions for deadline and clarification are
DENIED.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this~_ day of March, 2014.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION

ATTEST:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

/qr{'1

day of March, 2014, a true and correct copy of the
""""a,1,:t~,t?f~by certify that on the
foregoing'ORDER REGARDING CLARIFICATION was served by regular United States
Mail upon each of the following:
STARR KELSO
POBOX1312
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83816
ERIC S BAILEY
PO BOX 1007
BOISE ID 83701
THOMAS W CALLERY
PO BOX 854
LEWISTON ID 83501
eb
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ERIC S. BAILEY, ISB NO: 4408
BOWEN & BAILEY, LLP
1311 W. Jefferson Street
Post Office Box 1007
Boise, Idaho 83701-1007
Telephone: (208) 344-7200
Facsimile: (208) 344-9670
Attorneys for Defendant Employer/Surety

BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)
Claimant,
)
vs.
)
)
ST. JOE SALVAGE,
)
)
Employer,
)
and
)
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMP ANY, )
)
Surety,
)
and
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL
)
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND,
)
)
)
Defendants.
ROY GREEN,

J.C. No.: 06-007698

NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH
WITH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
DIRECTIVE

Comes now Defendant Employer/Surety by and through their undersigned counsel of record,
and hereby submits the following evidence in compliance with the Industrial Commission's Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order as filed on January 29, 2014.

NOTICE OF COMPLIANCE WITH INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DIRECTIVE -

Industrial Commission, in its Order indicated the following:
Jurisdiction over this matter is retained for the purpose of requmng
Employer/Surety to put on additional proof concerning the extent and degree of
permanent physical impairment referable to Claimant's thoracic spine condition.
The Industrial Commission furthermore indicated that if necessary, the Industrial
Commission would schedule another hearing for the purpose of taking evidence and argument as to
the extent of the thoracic spine impairment. Insomuch as the Industrial Commission indicated that
there may be necessity for scheduling a hearing, that also presumes that there was no specific
requirement that there be a hearing in this matter.
As such, Defendants have submitted as Exhibit A to this document its additional proof as
defined by the Industrial Commission concerning the need for evidence as to extent and degree of
permanent physical impairment referable to Mr. Green's thoracic spine condition. By way of this
submission, these Defendants believe that they are in compliance with the request of the Industrial
Commission to provide it with this additional information.
On the chance that another hearing may be "necessary'', Defendants would certainly reserve
the right to present additional testimonial evidence from any physician who has either treated
Claimant or has rendered opinions as to issues concerning Claimant's thoracic spine.
DATED this

2

day of May, 2014.

ERIC S. BAILEY
Attorneys for Defendants E ployer/Surety

l
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on th;-2_, day of May, 2014, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document was delivered to the following party(ies) in the method indicated:
STARR KELSO
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 1312
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83816-1312
FAX: (208) 664-6261
THOMAS W CALLERY
JONES BROWER & CALLERY
PO BOX 854
LEWISTON ID 83501
FAX: (208) 746-9553
(counsel for ISIF)

"N

U.S.MAIL
HAND DELNERY
[ ] FACSIMILE

~
U.S.MAIL
[ ]

HAND DELNERY
[ ] FACSIMILE
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Benewah Community Hospital
St Maries Family Medicine
229 S. 7th Street
St Maries, ID 83861
(208) 245-5551
www.bchmect:org

IMPAIRMENT RATING
DATE:

03/19/2014

PATIENT NAME:

GREEN, ROY

DATE OF INJURY: April of 2002
Mr. Green is a 54-year-o ld male who is known to me through an IME performed
on 9/8/2009. Please refer to that report for additiona l informatio n
concerning Mr. Green's medical treatment.
Mr. Green sustained .an injury in April of 2002. He had progressiv e symptoms
of lower extremity paresthes ias and eventually bladder dysfunctio n. He was
evaluated by Dr. Ganz in January of 2003. Dr. Ganz obtained a myelogram and
enhanced CT scan on 1/15/2003 . which demonstra ted a significa nt herniated
disc at the T12-Ll level. At the time of that appointme nt, Mr. Green was
having lower extremity weakness as well as urinary incontinen ce. On
1/29/2003, Dr. Ganz performed an anterolat eral thoracotom y for approach to
the Tl2-Ll disc space. He performed a microdisce ctomy at Tl2-Ll and an
anterior lumbar interbody fusion with allograft bone and hardware. Mr. Green
notes a prolonged period of convalesce nce from that surgery; however, he did
eventually return to work.
Subsequen t to that injury, he has had cervical and lumbar spine surgery.
Mr. Green was examined on 3/19/2014 . He has a well-heal ed thoracotom y
incision on the right side. The incision is well healed and 18 cm in length.
He does have decreased peri-incis ional sensation on the right side, but not
on the left. No pain with thoracic rotation of his spine. No evidence of
infection and minimal tendernes s over the operative site.
Mr. Green has reached maximal medical improveme nt concernin g his injury and
subsequen t surgery at T12-Ll level. His surgery was performed in 2004 and the
5th edition of the AMA. Guides will be used to calculate an impairmen t

HJBIT A

GREEN, ROY
3/19/2014
Page 2

His symptom complex best falls into DRE thoracic category 4 with a 20% whole
person impairment. That impairment is attributable to the fusion at the T12
disc space, incorporating T12 and Ll.
Medical records from 2003 through 2004 were reviewed concerning Mr. Green's
treatment with Dr. Ganz, Dr. Dirks, and Dr. Luther.
Thank you for allowing me to evaluate Mr. Green.
Sincerely,

MD*

JMM:ml

BEFORE

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ROY GREEN,
Claimant,

IC 2006-007698

V.

ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOES SALVAGE
LOGGING,

ORDER ON ISIF LIABILITY

Employer,
and
IRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendants.

This matter went to hearing before the Industrial Commission on August 2 land August
22, 2012. On or about January 29, 2014, the Industrial Commission entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Order finding, inter alia, that Claimant is totally and permanently
disabled, and that ISIF shares in responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability by
virtue of a pre-existing thoracic spine injury. However, because Employer put on no proof that
would allow the Commission to quantify apportionment of total and permanent disability
between the Employer and the ISIF, the Commission retained jurisdiction over the case for the
purpose of adducing additional proof on the extent and degree of Claimant's permanent physical
impairment for his pre-existing thoracic spine injury. The Commission's decision specifies that
the decision is final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated pursuant to Idaho Code
ORDER ON ISIF LIABILITY - 1

§

8. No party

a motion for reconsideration within 20 days of

decision as allowed by Idaho Code§ 72-718. By order dated April

Commission's

2014, the Commission set

the following issue for hearing:
The extent of ISIF liability for total permanent benefits as previously addressed
by the Industrial Commission.
As noted, having found that responsibility for Claimant's total and permanent disability should
be shared between Employer and the ISIF, the only element remaining to quantify ISIF liability
is the identification of the impairment rating related to Claimant's pre-existing thoracic spine
mJury.
The parties referred this question to physicians of their choosing. Dr. McNulty evaluated
Claimant on behalf of Employer while Dr. Sears evaluated Claimant on behalf of ISIF. In
rendering their opinions on the extent and degree of Claimant's thoracic spine impairment, both
physicians relied on the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 5th Edition

(Guides). Dr. Sears testified that he thought it more appropriate to rely on the 5th Edition to the
Guides because the

5th

Edition affords an opportunity to rate Claimant's impairment based on a

diagnosis-related estimates method, which, according to Dr. Sears, offers a more accurate way to
assess Claimant's impairment for his thoracic spine injury under the peculiar facts of this case.
(Sears deposition 15/10-17/19).
Following his examination of Claimant, Dr. McNulty proposed that Claimant qualifies
for rating under DRE thoracic category IV, which suggests a rating ranging between 20% to 23%
of the whole person for individuals with alteration of motion segment integrity or bilateral or
multilevel radiculopathy. Dr. McNulty rated Claimant at the lower range of category IV, giving
him a 20% whole person rating.
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bilateral or multilevel

Sears testified that on exam Claimant had no
radiculopathy, so

only way that category IV status could be entertained for Claimant is if he

can be said to have "alteration of motion segment integrity". Dr. Sears testified that Claimant
cannot qualify for this diagnosis since alteration of motion segment integrity is identified from
flexion and extension radiographs demonstrating translation of one vertebra on another of more
than 2.5 mm. Since Claimant is fused at Tl2-Ll, and since the fusion is solid, it follows that he
does not have any motion at T12-Ll, and cannot, therefore have any translation of one vertebral
body on another with flexion and extension.
The complete qualifying criteria for DRE thoracic category IV reads as follows:
Alteration of motion segment integrity or bilateral or multilevel radiculopathy;
alteration of motion segment integrity is defined from flexion and extension
radiographs as translation of one vertebra on another of more than 2.5 mm;
radiculopathy as defined in thoracic category III need not be present if there is
alteration of motion segment integrity; if an individual is to be placed in DRE
thoracic category IV due to radiculopathy; the latter must be bilateral or involve
more than one level.
AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment,

5th

Edition.

Using the definition of alteration of motion segment integrity quoted above, it would not seem
that Claimant can qualify for a category IV diagnosis since he has neither radiculopathy, nor
alteration of motion segment integrity.
However, as pointed out during the deposition of Dr. Sears, the Guides contain expanded
definitions of "alteration of motion segment integrity" at several places. At page 378 of the

5th

Edition to the Guides, the following definition of alteration of motion segment integrity is found:
Alteration of motion segment integrity can be either loss of motion segment
integrity (increased translational or angular motion) or decreased motion resulting
mainly from developmental changes, fusion, fracture healing, healed infection, or
surgical arthrodesis.
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page 383 of the 5th Edition to the Guides, a similar definition of

motion segment

is found:
Motion segment alteration can be either loss of motion segment integrity
(increased translational or angular motion) or decreased motion secondary to
developmental fusion, fracture healing, healed infection, or surgical arthrodeses.
From these sections, it appears that alteration of motion segment integrity is intended to refer to
both alteration and loss of motion segment integrity. Loss of motion due to fusion is specifically
included in these definitions of alteration of motion segment integrity.

It is clear that a finding of alteration of motion segment integrity is one of the paths
towards obtaining a DRE thoracic category IV diagnosis. What is puzzling is that in defining
that term for the purposes of DRE thoracic category IV, the editors of the Guides chose to give a
narrower definition than that used by the editors to more generally describe what is meant by
altered motion segment integrity. From this, it could be argued that the more specific definition
described in the qualifying criteria for DRE thoracic category IV should govern. However, as
Employer has pointed out, one of the illustrative examples provided by the editors to the Guides
augers against this conclusion. In example 15-11, at page 391 to the 5th Edition, an individual
with a thoracic spine fusion was found qualified for DRE thoracic category V, in part, because he
demonstrated "alteration of motion segment integrity given the fusion" under category IV.
Therefore, it seems clear that the editors of the Guides anticipated that a loss of motion segment
integrity can be demonstrated by a successful fusion surgery which produces a decrease in
motion.
Dr. Sears testified that he found that Claimant was not qualified for inclusion in category
IV because he had no abnormal translation of one vertebral body over another. However, on
cross examination, Dr. Sears conceded that the definition of alteration of motion segment
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integrity appears to include decreased motion by way of successful fusion.

on this

definition, he acknowledged that an individual with a thoracic spine fusion would qualify for
inclusion in category IV.
Even so, Dr. Sears declined to amend his opinion on the appropriate impairment rating
for Claimant, who assuredly had a Tl2-Ll fusion as part of the treatment for his pre-existing
thoracic spine injury. Dr. Sears explained that loss of motion segment integrity at this level is
not significant, and that an individual with a successful fusion following surgery should be able
to return to good function. Accordingly, he testified that he continued to abide by the 16% rating
he awarded to Claimant, even though he had previously acknowledged the propriety of applying
the 5th Edition to the Guides to this situation exactly because it offered a diagnosis-based method
of evaluation that would not confuse the contributions of Claimant's various injuries to his
complaints.
Having considered the evidence, we conclude that the evaluation performed by
Dr. McNulty is more persuasive, and that Employer has met its burden of showing that Claimant
suffers from a 20% PPI rating for the effects of his pre-existing thoracic spine injury.
With this conclusion in place, it is now possible to perform the calculations necessary to
apportion Claimant's total and permanent disability between the ISIP and Employer.
Claimant's impairments total 65% (20% lumbar spine, 25% cervical spine, 20%
pre-existing thoracic spine). This leaves 35% residual disability to apportion between Employer
and the ISIF under Carey v. Clearwater County Road Department, 107 Idaho 109, 686 P.2d 54
(1984). Using the formula adopted in that case, Employer's liability for the payment of PPI and
PPD is calculated as follows: 45/65 x 35 = 24.23 + 45 or 69.23 of the whole person. This
represents Employer's liability for disability, inclusive of the 45% impairment found owing.
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Claimant is entitled to
commencing on the date

payment of 346.15

of PPI/PPD benefits, at the appropriate rate,

medical stability. Thereafter, Claimant is entitled to the payment of

total and permanent disability benefits at the statutory rate by the ISIF.
In its brief: the ISIF has raised a number of challenges to the Commission's January 29,
2014 decision.

As noted by Employer, that decision is final and conclusive as to matters

adjudicated pursuant to the provisions of Idaho Code § 72-718. Neither party filed a timely
motion for reconsideration following the January 29, 2014 decision. As such, the Commission is
not authorized to entertain a motion to revisit the matters decided in the original decision.
Idaho Code § 72-718 adopts a version of the doctrine of res judicata peculiar to the Idaho
workers' compensation system. A decision of the Commission is res judicata as to matters
actually adjudicated in the absence of a timely motion to reconsider. The decision became final
and conclusive as to matters adjudicated therein by the Commission 20 days after the date of the
decision. Neither the parties, nor the Commission may disturb such a decision lest the plain
meaning of "final and conclusive" be ignored.
As we noted in the recent case of Powell v. Northwest Cascade, Inc., Order Denying
Reconsideration, 2007-001470, 2014 IIC 0050 (2014), we are mindful of the fact that in the
recent case of Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 155 Idaho 903, 318 P.3d 893 (2014), the
Supreme Court observed that an order of the Commission making an award to Claimant of
medical benefits in an amount certain was not a "final order", but was, instead, an "interlocutory
order", which could have been revisited by the Commission at any time until a final appealable
order was issued. In Powell, the order at issue was final and conclusive per Idaho Code § 72718, and no timely motion for reconsideration had been filed. We noted that while Vawter might
suggest a contrary result, we were unwilling to read that case as broadly as might be suggested,
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where the

§ 72-718.

not treat the

It is difficult to square Vawter with the unambiguous provisions of Idaho Code §

18.

present, we will be guided by what we perceive to be the applicable provision of the statutory
scheme. We decline to entertain the ISIF's several arguments against the Commission's January
29, 2014 decision.
__::.--=-~=-----'

2014.

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
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I hereby ce1iify that on the
day of
201 a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER ON ISIF LIABILITY was served by regular United States Mail
upon each of the following:
STARR KELSO
PO BOX 1312
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83816
ERIC BAILEY
PO BOX 1007
BOISE ID 83701-1007
KENNETH L MALLEA
PO BOX 857
MERIDIAN ID 83680
THOMAS W CALLERY
PO BOX 854
LEWISTON ID 83501

ka
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Thomas W. Callery
JONES BROWER & CALLERY
P.O. Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Telephone: (208)743-359]
Fax: (208) 746-9553
Email: tcallery@lewiston.com
Idaho State Bar No. 2292
Kenneth L. Mallea
MALLEA LAW OFFICES
78 SW 5th Avenue, Suite 1
P.O. Box 857
Meridian, ID 83680
Telephone: (208) 888-2790
Fax: (208) 888-2789
Email: klm@mallealaw.com
Idaho State Bar No. 2397
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant State of Idaho
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
STATE OF IDAHO

********
ROY GREEN,
Claimant/Respondent,
vs.
ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOES SALVAGE
LOGGING,
LC. No. 2006-007698
Employer/Respondent,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
and
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Surety/Respondent,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED CLAIMANT, ROY GREEN, AND HIS
ATTORNEY, STARR KELSO, P.O. Box 131
DEFENDANTS ROY

dba

Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1312 AND

JOES SALVAGE LOGGING AND

TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY AND THEIR ATTORNEY, ERIC S.
BAILEY, P.O. Box 1007, Boise, ID 83701 AND THE CLERK OF THE INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named Defendant, STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL

INDEMNITY FUND, appeals against the above-named Claimant, ROY GREEN, and
above-named Defendants, ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOES SALVAGE LOGGING AND
TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Idaho
Industrial Commission Order and Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law entered
January 29, 2014, and the Order on ISIF Liability entered November 26, 2014.
Commissioner Baskin, Chairman.
2.

The issues presented on appeal include:

Whether the Commission erred in sua sponte retaining jurisdiction in this case.

Whether the Commission abused its discretion in sua sponte retaining jurisdiction in this
case.

Whether the Commission erred in relieving Employer/Surety from its failure to prove the
elements ofISIF liability, which such issues were clearly noticed for hearing.

Whether the Commission's finding that Claimant's thoracic spine condition "combined
with" the industrial injuries to render Claimant totally and permanently disabled is
supported by substantial and competent evidence.

Whether the Commission erred in concluding as a matter of law that Claimant suffered
from a permanent pre-existing physical impairment within the meaning of

section

72-332(2) when no physician had assigned an impairment rating for Claimant's thoracic
spine condition.

Whether the Commission erred in applying the Carey Formula when at hearing there was
no evidence of any impairment rating for Claimant's thoracic spine condition.

3.

Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

Judgment or Orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and
pursuant to I.AR., Rule 1 l(d).
4.

A reporter's transcript of the Hearing held on August 21 and 22, 2012, was

prepared and used by the parties in post hearing briefing and is requested for inclusion in
the record on appeal.
5.

The Appellant requests the following documents to be included in the

agency's record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.AR.:
a.

All Exhibits admitted at the hearing held on August 21 and 22,

b.

All Post-Hearing Depositions.

c.

All Post-Hearing Briefs of the parties.

d.

ISIF Brief on Retained Jurisdiction filed November 10, 2014.

2012.

6.

I certify:

a.

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each

reporter of whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out
below:
Julie Mccaughan
M & M Reporting Services
816 Sherman Avenue, #7
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
(208) 765-1700
b.

That the Appellant is exempt from paying any clerk's fee or filing

fee because Appellant is an agency of the State ofldaho.
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: December 2). , 2014
Thomas W. Callery
Attorney for Appellant

Dated: Decembe 0-7, 2014
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-~~~
Kenneth L. Mallea
Attorney for Appellant

/

December, 2014, a true and
day
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on
correct copy of the within and foregoing document was served upon:
Starr Kelso
P.O. Box 1312
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1312
Attorney for Claimant
Eric S. Bailey
Bowen & Bailey, LLP
P.O. Box 1007
Boise, ID 83701
Attorney for Employer/Surety
Court Reporter
U.S. mail
_ _ by facsimile

OF

r

ROY GREEN,
Claimant /Respond ent,

SUPREME COURT NO.

v.
ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOES SALVAG E
LOGGING, Employer, and TRAVEL ERS

CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL

INDEMNITY COMPANY, Surety,
Defendan ts/Respon dents,
and

STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTR IAL SPECIAL

INDEMNITY FUND,

Appeal From:

Industrial Commiss ion,
Thomas P. Baskin, Chairman presiding

Case Number:

IC 2006-007698

Order Appealed from:

Findings of Fact, Conclusio ns of Law, and Order,
filed January 29, 2014, and Order on ISIF Liability,
filed Novembe r 25, 2014.

Attorneys for Appellan t (ISIF):

Thomas W. Callery
PO Box 854
Lewiston, ID 83501
Kenneth L. Mallea
PO Box 857
Meridian, ID 83680

CERTIFICATE OF

GREEN -I

Attorney for Respondents
(Employer & Surety):

Erle Bailey
PO Box 1007
Boise,
83701-1007

Appealed By:

Defendant/Appellant (ISIF)

Appealed Against:

Claimant/Respondent (Roy Green)
Defendants/Respondents (Roy Green, dba St. Joes
Salvage Logging, Employer, and Travelers
Indemnity Company, Surety)

Notice of Appeal Filed:

December 23, 2014

Appellate Fee Paid:

No fees paid. Appellant is ISIP, a state agency.

Name of Reporter:

Julie Mccaughan, M&M Reporting Services

Transcript Requested:

Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript
has been prepared and filed with the Commission.

Dated:

December 29, 2014

CERTIFICATE

' I

.

l

1'.

~

• , ~

(_tJ

·1~i:)1E GOUR F

M'PEALS

I t.M B:
I, Kenna Andrus,

"''!".'""" Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial

Commission of the State ofldaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal, Findings of

Conclusions of Law, and Order, and

Order on ISIF Liability, and the whole thereof, in IC case number 2006-007698 for Roy

Green.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of
said Commission this 29th day of December, 2014.

1

CERTIFICATION OF RECORD

I, Kenna Andrus, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the Industrial
Commission, do hereby certify that the foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all
pleadings, documents, and papers designated to be included in the Agency's Record Supreme Court
No. 42782 on appeal by Rule 28(b)(3) of the Idaho Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal,
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b ).
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are correctly
listed in the List of Exhibits. Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme Court upon settlement
of the Reporter's Transcript and Agency's Record herein.
DATED this
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BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
ROY GREEN,
Claimant/Respondent,

SUPREME COURT NO. 42782

V.

NOTICE OF COMPLETION
ROY GREEN, dba ST. JOES SALVAGE
LOGGING, Employer, and TRAVELERS
INDEMNITY COMPANY, Surety,
Defendants/Respondents,
and
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL
INDEMNITY FUND,
Defendant/Appellant.

TO:

STEPHEN W. KENYON, Clerk of the Courts; and
Thomas W. Callery for Defendant/Appellant;
Kenneth L. Mall ea for Defendant/Appellant;
Starr Kelso for Claimant/Respondent; and
Eric Bailey for Employer & Surety Respondents.
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Clerk's Record was completed on this date and,

pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following:
Attorney for Appellant:
THOMAS W CALLERY
PO BOX 854
LEWISTON ID 83501

KENNETH L MALLEA
PO BOX 857
MERIDIAN ID 83680

Attorney for Claimant/Respondent:
STARR KELSO
PO BOX 1312
COEURD'ALENEID 83816
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Attorney for Employer & Surety/Respondents:
ERIC BAILEY
PO BOX 1007
BOISE ID 83701-1007

YOU ARE FURTHER NOTIFIED that pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all
parties have twenty-eight days from the date of this Notice in which to file objections to the
Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions.
In the event no objections to the Clerk's Record or Reporter's Transcript are filed within the
twenty-eight day period, the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript shall be deemed settled.

Assistant Commission Secretary
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